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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Matthew Adam Jones for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Public Administration and Policy presented January 7,2008.

Tide: Police organizations: An empirical examination of American sheriffs offices
and municipal police agencies.

The landscape of American policing is comprised of a myriad of police
organizations, each serving a distinct function and populace. Yet, police reformers
rarely recognize this and continue to disseminate 'umbrella' policy prescriptions to
all policing organizations. This body of research argues that public and police
administrators must take into account the nature of the organization and its
constraining forces before prescribing change or initiating policy. I argue that to
intelligently construct police agencies, prescribe policy, and accurately diagnose
police organization behavior we must first have a strong idea, if not solid
understanding, of the factors that shape and constrain them. The way an organization
is structured speaks to the manner in which it carries out its day-to-day work.
Therefore, the investigation of structural antecedents provides insight into why some
police organizations operate in the manner they do, which subsequently allows for a
more informative administrative and policy making environment.
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This research addresses the question of whether there is a difference in
formal structure between police organization types and identifies what sets of
conditions and theories contribute to the explanation of these differences. This is
accomplished by employing a quantitative analytical approach utilizing secondary
data sources that provide information about American police agencies as well as the
communities in which they are located. Results of the multiple analysis of variance
(MANOVA) suggest that there are differences in the formal structure between police
organization types. Hierarchical multiple regression (HMR) was used to
incrementally and sequentially examine the effects of organizational, environmental,
and institutional contingencies on the organizational structure of police organization
types. The results indicate that organizational contingencies predominantly explain
the structures for all police organizations. The external environment had a
discernable strong impact on smaller municipal police agencies but Sheriffs Offices
are largely insulated. The institutional environment assists in explaining the
formation of formal structures in all police organization types. The theoretical,
methodological, and policy implications of the research are also discussed.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE CURRENT PROBLEM WITH POLICE ORGANIZATION STUDY

Rigorous academic research exploring facets of policing continues to grow
and diffuse across both the academic and practitioner realm at exponential rates (e.g.
COMPSTAT, community policing, diversity, etc.). Yet, focusing on the manner in
which police formally organize remains under-studied. The organizational structure
of a police agency is the manner in which the organization allocates its resources and
ultimately carries out its work. Many normative theories of organization behavior
and policing philosophies (e.g. democratic and community policing) tie the structure
of the organization to a set of desired outcomes or goals. Although these normative
theories carve out a large role for an organization's structure, they fail to investigate
if there are any factors that may shape or constrain the structure beyond simple
administrative direction. If one argues that in order to reach a desired policing
strategy, a specified organizational design is needed, then it is important to know
what organizational, institutional, and environmental factors contribute to shaping
the design.
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The few dedicated police organization theorists that have focused on
questions of formal structure have often cited Duffee's (1980) comments, which
seem just as germane today as when originally written. Duffee argued that the
research community focuses far too much on the hypothetical issues of what criminal
justice organizations should be doing -such as achieving maximum efficiency or
effectiveness- rather than seeking to understand what it is they actually do. Further,
he continued, we should seek to identify and understand the variables that shape and
constrain the variation in any criminal justice organization (p. 101).
Moreover, there is an ever-increasing interest and accumulation of
knowledge about how the structures of police organizations affect officer behavior.
Klinger (2004) recently reiterated Duffee's statement by noting that although a
sizeable and extensive body of research exists on the relationship between
organization structure and police behavior, we know far less about the controlling
and contributing factors that influence the manner in which the police formally
organize. The notion that the study of the police organization is equal to that of
police behavior is far from novel. Early police administrative theorists such as O.W.
Wilson (1941), V.A. Leonard (1951), Bruce Smith (1950), and Donal MacNamara
(1950) focused upon the importance of a police organization's structure.
Inevitably when undertaking a discussion about police organizations, one
must ask whether there is anything different about police organizations as compared
to other public organizations. Police organizations are indeed fundamentally
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different from other organizational types. No other human service organization has
the ability to take awayfromthe citizens it serves the most sacred tenets of a liberal
democracy: life, liberty, and property. Although many other public organizations
serve a policing function1 (e.g. EPA, corrections organizations, planning
departments, etc.), their line workers do not operate under the combined conditions
of having continuous conflicting and ambiguous operational goals (Lipsky, 1980), as
well as the consistent ability to take life, liberty, or property without prior
adjudication or hearing. As a consequence of this great power and trust afforded to
the police, they are by their very nature controversial and in constant pursuit of
organizational legitimacy.
Unlike many other organizations, the police are often heavily scrutinized by
the public, who frequently call for improvements in their efficiency and
effectiveness. Yet, at the same time it is difficult to measure what success is in the
field of policing. Moreover, the police are a unique social organization in that they
are an institution and a symbol in and of themselves embedded into Western society.
Manning (1997) states that the police are unique in that they convey a sense of
sacredness and power that is at the root of the state's political order and authority.
Manning (1997) further mentions that the police also have the capability to deter

In this sense the term 'police' is referred to in its original context of government agencies having
the legal ability to regulate, monitor, coerce, and sanction (Smith, 1776). Recent scholarship has
reminded us of the profound meaning of this term and its usage in a public administration and
governance context (e.g. Dubber 2005; 2006; Dupont & Wood, 2006; Wood & Shearing, 2006).
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citizensfromcommitting that which threatens the very order of which they
symbolize.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS, 2000) states the United States has some
17,784 state and local law enforcement organizations that employ 708,022 full-time
sworn law enforcement officers. Given the prevalence of police organizations, the
amount of people employed by them, the important role they play in society, the
public scrutiny they face, and the significant amount of public funding they receive,
it seems miraculous that organizational researchers have somehow largely neglected
the study of their formal structures in favor of other organizational types. Moreover,
the recognition of this lack of knowledge is not lost on the practitioner. Recent
articles appearing in Police Chief (the official publication of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police) that are authored by chief executive officers of law
enforcement agencies, actively seek to gain an understanding of how their formal
police organizational structures work (see Lane, 2006; Wuestewald, 2006).
Furthermore, the public safety consulting professional is now seeing a proliferation
of Requests for Proposals that constitute some great aspect of the request for service
to focus upon analysis of the organization structure. Finally, the Police Futurists
Group, which is comprised of academics and practitioners, has recently noted at their
last annual meeting that problems still exist with formal police structures.
For police administrators to understand the problems with formal structure
and consequently respond to internal and external pressures, they need to understand
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the sources that may shape and constrain the formal structure. Police managers have
recognized the importance of understanding their structures and have subsequently
shifted to their trade publications and consultants in an attempt to seek answers.
For some time, the only research that applied organization theory to the
police organization was James Wilson's (1968) Varieties ofPol ice Behavior and
Peter Manning's (1976) Police Work These studies were largely normative and did
not focus, nor did they empirically address, structural issues of the police agency. It
would be another 10 years until a researcher (Langworthy, 1986) attempted to
explain the nature of the structure of the modern police organization. Outside of this
pioneering study, only two other significant and comprehensive studies exist, which
seek to provide coherence on the determinants of police organization structure
(Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 2006). These latter studies rely primarily on the use of
structural contingency theory to explain the formation of police organizational
structures. Within the previously accomplished research, some inconsistencies exist
amongst the findings. Most notably, the studies disagree on the effects of
organizational context upon the formal structure (e.g. organization size).
As a result of the inconsistencies, there is not a common understanding on the
impact, if any, on the factors that contribute to the structures of police organizations.
A contributor to the inconsistency in research is the afore-mentioned heavy reliance

upon contingency theory. As police organizations are a symbolic institution rooted in
a society that constantly questions their legitimacy, it would be a misspecification of
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research to ignore the powerful institutional variables that contribute to forming
them. In Scott's (1987) words, it is a mistake " to ignore significant causal factors
shaping organizational structures and practices" (p. 508). There is a minor body of
literature dedicated to the institutional theory of policing that seeks to explore the
relationships of police to their institutional environments (Crank and Langworthy,
1993; Crank, 2003; Renauer, 2007). Yet, there is very little research dedicated to the
integration of the two theories in policing, or exploration of the utility of one theory
over the other (Willis, Mastrofski, and Wesiburd, 2007).
To compound the issue of inconsistent results, most research into police
organization structures has solely focused on the structural determinants of large
municipal police agencies (Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 2006), which
only comprise approximately 2.4% of police agencies in the United States. Prior
research has defined a large agency as having 100 or more sworn officers and the
majority of police organizations in the United States (97.6%) do not meet this
definition and are therefore, not included in the research. Moreover, not only has
previous research predominantly ignored smaller and medium sized departments, but
also has largely ignored non-municipal agencies such as Sheriffs Offices, which in
many jurisdictions are the primary organization providing police services.2
As such,froma research standpoint, can one really state they have an
understanding of the factors that influence the division of labor and coordination and
2

Paoline and Sloan (2003) have been the only researchers to examine structural determinants of nonmunicipal agencies in their study of campus law enforcement agencies.

.

•
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control of American police agencies? Furthermore, can the research community,
with confidence, answer the police practitioner's questions about what factors and
forces shape and constrain the manner in which varying police organizations arrange
their resources? Given that the majority of the United States' law enforcement chief
executives manage and lead organization types that were not included in previous
research, it seems doubtful that at this point we can provide a coherent answer.

STUDY PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to explore the factors that shape and constrain the
formal organization of American police agencies. Research within the field of police
organizational theory is desperately in need of renewed study. To this point, there
has been a tremendous amount of research performed by a dedicated cadre of
academics, who should all receive respect for their pioneering efforts within this
field. It is not an overstatement to say that this proposed research rests upon the
shoulders of giants. Yet, the field has failed to come to any consensus on the
determinants of the structure of police organizations and the focus on the large
municipal agency is simply to narrow. The increase in conflicting evidence arising
from the research has left the academic community, and more importantly the
practitioner, without any substantial theory on why the police formally organize in
any particular manner.
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This research will significantly add to the literature in a number of ways,
most notably by using a larger heterogeneous sample of American police agencies
that include municipal organizations with less than 100 sworn officers and also by
including Sheriffs Offices. This will allow the research community to gain insight
into the predictors of organization structure of all types of law enforcement
organizations. This is the first study, to this author's knowledge, that uses a national
sample of Sheriff s Offices as well as a representative sample of police organizations
with less than 100 sworn officers.3
Further, the research will add to the organizational literature by building upon
limited previous research that has attempted to integrate contingency theory and
institutional theory as they apply to the police organization (Wilson, 2006). While
institutional theory has received an extensive normative treatment in the police
literature (Crank & Langworthy, 1991; Paoline and Sloan, 2003), and some minor
empirical treatment (Maguire 2003; Wilson, 2006), there is still room for a great deal
of improvement. Scott (1987) has noted that when contingency and institutional
theories are applied separately to organization analysis, they offer only a partial and
incomplete understanding of coordination and control practices in contemporary
organizations. Future research needs to address understanding the interplay between
the technical and the institutional dynamics of the production of police structures
(Crank & Langworthy, 1992).
3

In NIJ document number 210830, Falcone & Wells (2005) provide some brief regression tables with
an aggregate sample of Sheriff Offices and Municipal police agencies, but use only a minimal amount
of environmental predictors and they provide no description of the analysis.
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STUDY IMPORTANCE

There have been innumerable studies treating the police organization's
structure as a predictor or controlling aspect to understand efficiency, employee
performance, service delivery, officer behavior, arrest rates, gender discrimination,
and officer stress, just to mention a few. However, only a couple of studies have
placed the locus of research on the structure itself as a dependent variable. Without a
theoretical understanding of the determinants of structure in law enforcement
organizations, managers and administrators are at a loss to properly interpret the
results of the impact that organizational structure has on other aspects of policing.
Further, in policy terms, if changes are called for in relation to the organization, a
manager's lack of knowledge about the structure will surely hinder any chances of
successful organizational change.
Certain elements of an organization's context might constraint structure.
Furthermore, the elements of one type of police organization (e.g. municipal versus
Sheriff) may constrain the structure more than other types of law enforcement
agencies. At this point, we cannot make generalizations on the formal organization
of the police based upon research that has only investigated large municipal police
departments. Additionally, with the advent of community policing becoming
prevalent, there has been an increased call for change in organization structure to
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meet the needs of this philosophy.4 However, of the previous studies that have been
conducted on police structure, many researchers have been left wondering whether
managers and administrators are capable of altering the structure of their
organizations as called for by community policing, or whether the determinants of
the structure are completely out of their hands (Maguire, 2003).
Finally, this country is witness to an increasing number of 'start-up' police
departments, many of which comprise less than 100 sworn officers. Designing the
manner in which an organization controls its employees and coordinates resources
cannot be made light heartedly. Therefore, this research will be useful to the
command staff of these organizations in gaining an understanding of internal and
external forces that play a role in the shaping of the formal structure of their
organization.
This study will attempt to resolve the debate on the factors shaping police
organization structures by using current data and new measures of institutional
theoretic variables. The findings of this research will provide the organizational
theory field, as well as the police practitioner and researcher, with a clearer
understanding of the determinants of police organizational structure. The study will
also lay a theoretical foundation for future research by helping to explain police
organizations as social systems affected by both technical and institutional
environments. By studying what influences organizational structure in police

Community policing encourages vertical and spatial decentralization of structures.
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agencies, managers and administrators canfirstly;begin to understand how both
internal and external contextual components contribute to the operations of the
organization, and secondly; understand how this subsequently affects the behavior of
their employees. This research therefore seeks to address the question of whether
there is a difference in formal structure between police organization types and
identify what sets of conditions and theories contribute to the explanation of these
differences.
ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH

Chapter 2 begins by providing the reader with a discussion and subsequent
definition of the elements that comprise the formal structure of an organization. Like
Maguire (2003), I posit that organizational structures consist of two key dimensions:
complexity and control. Structural complexity is the division of labor within an
organization that consists of: vertical, functional, occupational, and spatial
differentiation. Structural control is the manner in which an organization coordinates
its work. Formalization and administrative intensity are the components used in
police organizations as mechanisms of coordination. Following the structural
definitions, a review of the most salient work from the larger field of organizational
theory and behavior pertaining to organization structures is provided.
Chapter 3 provides the reader with a history of the study of police
organization structures and presents an in-depth literature review of past research

12
conducted on the determinants of the structures. Following the review, a discussion
is initiated regarding the absence of Sheriffs Offices and smaller municipal police
agencies within previous research and a detailed description of these two policing
entities is provided. As this research relies upon an open systems theoretic
framework, structural contingency theory and institutional theory are also introduced
and defined. Following this review, I present a series of questions and related
hypotheses that I seek to test within this research. Ifirstquestion whether formal
structure differs across police organization types. I then follow this line of
questioning to ask what theories and factors predict and explain differing structures
across police organization types.
In Chapter 4,1 lay out the analytic strategies used to test the hypotheses. I
first describe the utilized data sources and sample. Next, I describe the variables used
to operationalize constructs of the dimensions of organizational structure and their
varying contingencies and present descriptive statistics of the variables. Finally, I
provide a discussion on multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and
hierarchical multiple regression (HMR), which are the statistical methods used in the
course of this research.
Chapter 5 begins with a conversation regarding the statistical diagnostics
conducted before the quantitative analysis. I discuss the problems encountered in the
data with deviations from the assumptions of normal distribution and methods used
to mitigate this issue. I follow with a presentation of the resultsfromthe MANOVA
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and HMR models used to test the hypotheses presented in chapter 3. Thefindingsfor
each hypothesis are sequentially presented and a cursory discussion regarding their
significance follows.
Chapter 6 presents a detailed discussion of the researchfindingsand provides
the reader with an interpretation of the results as they relate to the different police
organization types and organizational theories. I determine that there is a difference
in structure between police organization types as well as a difference in what
contributes to their structures. I provide some explanation for thesefindingsbased
upon organizational theories and previous police research. The chapter closes with a
discussion of how integrating contingency and institutional theory in police research
helps us understand the dynamics of police organizations.
This research closes with Chapter 7 in which I provide an account of how the
study has built upon existing theory and provided new questions and possible
directions for future analytic endeavors. Several recommendations regarding data
collection and analysis are also made for future research. The chapter reiterates the
importance of the study of police organization structures and relates the significance
of the findings for policy-makers and police administrators of all police organization
types.
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CHAPTER II

WHAT IS AN ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND WHAT DETERMINES IT?

The importance of structure to organizational theorists is far from a novel
idea. Classical theorists such as Taylor (1917) and Fayol (1949) immediately noticed
the importance of organization structures on work performance. However, little
research in the first half of the century was dedicated to analyzing the structure of
organizations. The genesis of the study of formal organization structures began in the
1950s when organization researchers began to view the organization itself as a unit
of analysis. As Scott (1992) notes, organizations come in a variety of sizes and
configurations and understanding the variance in configuration is a worthy endeavor
of organizational researchers. The 1960s and 1970s highlighted intense and fruitful
research encompassing the study of formal structures. However, during the late
1970s, studies on formal structure rapidly declined despite repeated calls citing both
the significance and importance of research on structure (see Ouchi, 1978). During
the 1990s there began somewhat of a resurgence on the study and importance of
structure (Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, & Spaeth, 1994), but these studies largely
focused upon the private organization.
The field of organizational studies took a dramatic turn when researchers
began to recognize mat the structure of the organization was worthy of study in
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itself. Organizations were increasingly viewed as being more than just a mechanism
of providing goods and services, but that of a complex structure that is greater than
the sum of its parts (Maguire, 2003). Organizations not only act, but also are acted
upon by other influences such as social, economic, cultural, and institutional forces
(Scott, 1992).
For the purposes of providing a cogent review regarding past research on the
determinants and causes of organizational structure, one shouldfirstgive attention to
a working definition of organizational structure to use within the confines of this
work. An organizational structure is a formal apparatus that accomplishes two main
activities: the division of labor and the coordination of work (Scott, 1992).
Mintzberg's (1993) definition of organizational structure most eloquently
summarizes these two concepts:
Every organized human activity—from the making of pots to the
placing of a man on the moon-gives rise to two fundamental and
opposing requirements: the division of labor into various tasks to be
performed, and the coordination of these tasks to accomplish the
activity. The structure of an organization can be defined simply as
the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into distinct
tasks and then achieves coordination among them (p. 2).
Organizational theorists have identified several components that comprise these
formal structures. Of these core elements, all seem to encompass the manner in
which an organization formally allocates and controls its use of resources. Table 1,
which is adopted from Maguire (2003, p. 12) presents a sampling of a list of these
components extracted from the literature.
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Table 1. Dimensions of Organization Control and Complexity.
Organization Coordination & Control

Organization Complexity

Administrative Component
Autonomy
Centralization
Concentration
Delegation of Authority
Formalization
Segmentation
Span of Control
Standardization

Complexity
Differentiation
Functional Differentiation
Integration
Occupational Differentiation
Professionalization
Spatial Differentiation
Specialization
Vertical Span

Of the literature related to the study of formal organization the preceding
components draw two common distinctions, those listed in the left column present a
description of some degree of control within an organization (e.g. administrative
intensity, formalization, etc.). The elements in the right columns present an element
of structural complexity (differentiation) within the organization. Hsu, Marsh, and
Mannari (1983) aptly referred to these two predominant, yet multifaceted notions of
an organization's structure quite simply and aptly, as the "complexity and control" of
an organization. Throughout the remainder of this work, the elements of division of
labor and coordination and control of work are used synonymously with
organizational structural complexity and control.
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A WORKING DEFINITION OF ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

As previously mentioned, the complexity of a structure encompasses a variety of
constructs. Yet, among both the general as well as police organization literature, one
can follow Blau (1971) and draw a consensus that varying aspects of differentiation
best encompass this notion.
Organization Complexity
Vertical Differentiation
Vertical differentiation is a linear concept describing the distancefromthe
top to the bottom of an organization. Maguire (2003) described the most obvious
measure of vertical differentiation as being the level of segmentation, or the number
of levels of rank that exist within an organization. For the police organization, this
would be counting the progressive levels of command responsibility from the line
worker to the organization's chief executive. While this intuitively might appear to
be an obvious measure, it is not without flaw.
Due to varying (and sometimes non-existent) civil service classifications
across police organizations, specific ranks arefrequentlytreated in a dissimilar
manner. For example, in a majority of police agencies a detective position is not
considered a promotion, but merely a technical assignment. However, in many police
organizations the detective position is a separate rank structure in which a line-level
officer must seek 'promotion.' The issue is further compounded by 'lead worker'
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positions, such as 'corporals' or 'master police officers.' These are often positions
that provide marginally higher salary over a line officer's, yet it becomes somewhat
convoluted to determine whether they are a separate level within the organizational
command structure or simply serving in a mentoring position. Often the people
occupying these positions have some confusion themselves (largely attributable to
the organization) whether they are serving in a supervisory capacity or simply in an
advisory role.
The height of an organization has also frequently been suggested as an
indicator of vertical differentiation (Langworthy, 2002; Maguire, 2003; Wilson,
2006). Although admittedly a crude measure, salary difference between the highest
ranking and lowest ranking member is an adequate indicator of height because
conceivably, the greater the difference in salary between the highest ranking and
lowest ranking member the greater the possibility for more rank structures. If one
follows the argument, an assumption is made that larger gaps between salary indicate
increasing layers of ranks or pay steps. For instance, in the Portland, Oregon Police
Bureau there is an approximate $100,000 difference between the salary of an entrylevel officer and the Chief, indicating a large range to include numerous ranks
between the two positions. In the Condon, Oregon Police Department there is only a
difference of $6,000 between the Chief and the lowest rank indicating little room for
organization height and segmentation. Incidentally, they are the only two employees
of the department. Other descriptions of vertical differentiation have included
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concentration (Maguire, 2003), or similarly centralization (Hsu et al., 1983). These
concepts speak to the degree to which formal decision-making rests with the higher
levels of the organization.
Functional Differentiation
The degree to which an organization is functionally differentiated, is a
measure of the degree to which the tasks of the organization are broken down into
distinct units. Police organization research has typically focused on defining this
aspect based upon the creation and operation of specialized policing units (e.g. gang
units, drugs & vice units). Police organizations in the last 30 years have increasingly
added functionally specialized units (Reiss, 1992). However, Langworthy (2002)
also suggest that functional differentiation of an organization can be conceived of as
the assignment of personnel to specific functions of the organization (e.g. court
operations, investigation, etc.).
Spatial Differentiation
Spatial differentiation is the degree to which an organization divides the
territory it is responsible for into units encompassing distinct geographic boundaries.
Large private corporations (e.g. Kodak, Hewlett Packard, Intel, UPS) often
coordinate the work of their organization by creating regional offices or 'hubs'.
Other firms might be more spatially centralized with only one or two offices, thus
keeping the coordination of work close to the administrative component of the
organization. Police organizations, like many firms, are responsible for achieving the
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organization mission within a geographic boundary. Therefore, many police
organizations have varying numbers of precincts and sub-stations located within
those precincts.
Occupational Differentiation
Occupational differentiation isfrequentlyconfused with functional
differentiation. While functional differentiation deals with the assignment of
specialized tasks, occupational differentiation deals with the aspect or degree to
which the organization employs specialists or professionals. Hsu et al. (1983)
synonymously described this as "knowledge complexity" (p. 983). In recent years,
police organizations have been diversifying and employing a greater amount of
civilian professionals (e.g. planners, auditors, research specialists, fleet managers,
administrators, crime scene processors, forensic specialists) compared to their
historical counterparts that largely consisted of sworn officers performing the
culmination of this work within their general duties.
Organization Control
Organizations must also control and coordinate the manner in which the work
is accomplished. Organizationsfrequentlyaccomplish this task through
formalization and administrative intensity. This aspect of organization structure has
been of interest to scholars and practitioners for some time in their efforts to find the
one perfect way in which to accomplish the tasks of the organization in the most
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efficient manner (Taylor, 1917; Gulick, 1937). A brief description of both of these
facets follows.
Administrative Intensity
Administrative intensity or overhead describes the proportion of an
organization's resources that are committed to a management, supervisory, or
administrative function. Classical theorists such as F.W Taylor and Weber engrossed
themselves with this aspect. Frequently, administrative intensity becomes
synonymous with the degree to which an organization can be characterized as being
bureaucratic. The argument is that organizations that have a higher administrative
component are typically thought to naturally be more technocratic (Scott, 1992).
That is, a higher degree of resources are allocated to the administrative component of
the organization rather than the line-level. Police organizations (frequently described
as a classic bureaucracy) have also focused a great deal on the administrative
component. This in large part is evidenced through historical analysis of the
professional policing movement that sought to keep a tight reign on the operation
and distribution of line officers to curb corruption.
Formalization
Formalization is a second aspect of coordination and control within an
organization. It is the manner in which, and the degree to which, organizations are
controlled by formal written policies,rales,or standard operating procedures. One
could also easily describe formalization as a degree of bureaucratization as well.
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Organizations drastically vary in the degree of formalization. Some firms have very
little formalization, allowing employees to decide how best to control and coordinate
their work. Police organizations, historically, tend to have larger administrative
components, which are congruent with classical police management literature that
emphasizes mechanistic structures (Smith, 1940; Wilson, 1950; Leonard, 1951).

PRIOR RESEACH OF STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS

The majority of research conducted by structural theorists has focused on
how extra-organizational contingencies, such as size, technology, and other
environmental factors affect structures (Kalleberg, et al. 1996). The following review
provides a synopsis of the major research conducted during the bourgeoning period
of structural research in organizations and follows with a review of the work
performed specifically within thefieldof police organizational research.
Size and Organization Structure
Of the contingencies determining formal organizational structure, one can
easily describe agency size as holding the spotlight and gaining the most interest
from social scientists. A great many of the early studies focused upon the
relationship of an organization's size and the degree to which the organization is
bureaucratized or the size of the organization's administrative component (Scott,
1975). Although some inconsistencies persist, the majority of research indicates a
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significant relationship between an organization's size and its formal structure.
Larger organizations not only require greater degrees of administrative intensity, but
the increasing size creates a greater degree of differentiation, which in turn also
affects the level of administrative intensity. However, although there initially appears
to be a consensus among researchers regarding the effects of size, there is still some
debate regarding the true effect, if any.
Some of the early critics of research regarding organizational size, such as
Parkinson (1957), asserted that large organizations are simply over bureaucratized,
devoting too much of their staff resources to administration. Recent literature written
by those seeking to reform public administration, such as Osborne and Gaebler's
(1993) bestselling book Reinventing Government, have reiterated Parkinson's view.
This critical body of literature has argued that size does not necessarily determine an
overly bureaucratic structure, but that simply, organizations have been created that
often have too many Generals and not enough soldiers. If this true, the more
interesting question is why this happens.
When attempting to understand the effect of organizational size on formal
structure, researchers have traditionally first been struck with how to
methodologically operationalize the concept. Size has been measured in many ways
within the researchfieldto include square footage, sales volume, and net assets
(Kimberly, 1976; Scott, 1992). However, the most widely used measure of
organizational size, is the number of people employed by the organization.
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Many of the earliest studies focused on the relationship between size and the
proportion of administrators as a defining characteristic of structure. Earlier studies
conducted by Melman (1951) and Bendix (1956) found an inverse relationship
between size and proportion of administrators. Terrien and Mills (1955), in their
study of California school districts found a positive relationship between size and
proportion of administrative personnel. In contrast, a study performed by Baker and
Davis (1954) of 211 manufacturing plants in Ohio did notfindany significant
relationship between size and administrative officials. The debate continued until the
focus on the size and structure relationship changed drastically with a study
performed by Anderson and Warkov (1961).
Anderson and Warkov first introduced the notion of complexity when
performing their research on 49 Veterans' Administration hospitals. They introduced
this concept after their study indicated there was not a significant relationship
between organizational size and administrative function, which went against
conventional thinking at the time. However, the introduction of the concept of
complexity allowed them to explain previous studies conducted by Terrien and Mills
(1955) that indicated the larger the organization, the larger the number of
supervisors. Anderson and Warkov's research was groundbreaking in examining
organizational size because of its introduction of the complexity aspect. They found
that hospitals that focused on a specialized function, such as tuberculosis, had higher
proportions of administrators than hospitals of similar size that treated general
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illnesses. Thus, Anderson and Warkov have shown that the complexity of the work is
a key variable when determining structure, hinting that increased specialization and
role differentiation are key factors. As such, Terrien and Mill's study indicating a
positive relationship between size and proportion of administrators may actually be
due to the complexity of the organization's function. Larger school districts may just
be more complex requiring more administrators.
Similarly, Blau (1970) found that large size is positively associated with
structural differentiation, and this differentiation creates the need to increase the
administrative component. In an attempt to further explain the relationship of size to
structure, Blau and Schoenherr (1971) conducted an examination of 53 state
employment security agency offices, 1,201 local branches, and 354 headquarter
divisions in an investigation to ascertain if size had any influence on the amount of
administrative personnel. Blau and Schoenherr's research indicated that increasing
size generates structural differentiation, which in turn requires greater managerial
power. However, two subsequent tests of Blau's theory of formal differentiation
refute his findings (Mileti et al., 1977; Beyer & Trice, 1979). In both of these studies,
the differences in results are attributed to the heterogeneous samples used in the
studies versus Blau's more homogeneous sample. Miller (1987) in a meta-analysis of
27 published empirical studies dealing with the relationship between size and
structure, found that there was a significant positive correlation between organization
size, specialization, and formalization within an organization.
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Scott (1992) points out a different aspect of the structural complexity/size
relationship. Increases in the size of the organization might lead to the increased use
of complex personnel, such as autonomous professionals and crafts people, rather
than structures that are more complex. Therefore, it might be the task that the worker
is performing that is more complex rather than the structure itself. Aldrich (1972)
brings forth another interesting aspect; inversing the relationship by hypothesizing
that size might be dependent upon structure. This indeed is an interesting way of
thinking of the size/complexity issue within organizations. However, one should note
that Aldrich's hypothesis has gained little support due to criticism of his
methodology (Maguire, 2003). Perhaps most interesting is Kasarda's (1974) study of
structural implications of system size. Kasarda analyzed 178 school systems in the
state of Colorado. The findings of the study indicated that within small
organizations, managerial tasks formed the bulk of administrative functions. As
organizational size increased, managerial functions decreased and communicative
and professional staff functions increased. If this is correct, as organizations grow
they will rely less heavily upon centralization and administrative intensity as a form
of control.
Taken together, this small sampling of mixed findings within the literature on
organizational size and structure indicates there is not a clear consensus on the
relationship between the two. Perhaps the greatest contributor to this lack of
consensus is the debate over how size should be measured. Blau (1972, p.3) has
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defined it as "the scope of an organization and its responsibilities," Aldrich (1972, p.
30) has used the definition of "scale of operations," and Pondy (1969) viewed it as a
factor of production. This is certainly not an exhaustive list of definitions and the
reader and researcher can easily apply many other concepts. Further, as Kimberly
(1976) has postulated, what if organization type plays a larger role than researchers
have previously thought? Is size a determinant of structure regardless of the type of
organization? This is an avenue that bears further exploration by future researchers
and will be discussed in the latter half of this review regarding its relationship to
municipal police agencies.
Technology and Organization Structure
Technology can be defined as the "work performed by an organization"
(Scott, 1992, p. 231). Perrow (1967), in his quest to relate technology to formal
structure, stated that technology "or the work done in organizations" is the defining
characteristic of those organizations (p. 194). Thompson and Bates (1957) are
attributed with the first study to focus on the connection of technology to an
organization structure (Maguire, 2003). Thompson and Bates hypothesized that the
type of technology that is available and suitable to particular types of goals sets
limits on types of structures appropriate for that organization. Woodward (1965)
conducted a study offering empirical evidence suggesting work technology
influences organizational structure. Woodward surveyed 100 different organizations
and found that operational technology had a discernable impact on how the
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organizations were structured,findingthat it affected the number of levels of
management. Perrow (1967), following and citing Woodward, attempted to provide
the organizational field with constructs of universal measures of technology
(Maguire, 2003). In addition, Perrow also attempted to examine the impact of
routines of technology on the structure, but failed to arrive at afirmconclusion. He
didfind,however, that organizations that had routine tasks were more likely to have
a bureaucratic structure.
Much of the previous research regarding technology had predominantly
focused on industrial organizations that produced an inanimate object. Hage and
Aiken (1969), inspired by Perrow's work, were innovative in their study of
technology and organizational structure. They deviatedfromthe inanimate object
processing industrial organization by analyzing health and social welfare
organizations, which are people processing organizations. In their study of 16 social
welfare and health organizations, they found the degree to which the work was
routine to be a key variable. The study concluded that organizations with more
routine work will be more centralized, formalized, and to have less professionally
trained staff. Further, organizations with routine work emphasize goals of efficiency
and clients served rather than innovativeness, staff morale, or the quality of client
services. Thus, a routine of technology has a definite and discernable impact on the
structuring of the organization.

29
Hickson, Pugh & Pheysey (1969) conducted a detailed analysis using the
technology aspect and came to the conclusion that operations technology had a
limited effect on the structure of the organization compared to the size. However, the
most interesting aspect that they suggested was that the measure of technology
depended on whether emphasis was placed on the material on which work was
performed, characteristics of the operations used in carrying out the work, or the
knowledge relating to the transformation process of the product (Scott, 1992).
Mintzberg (1993) also hypothesized that the more complex the technology became
the more decentralized the structure would become. As Maguire (2003) notes, the
links between technology and structure are riddled with inconsistencies, causing a
lack of consensus on determining whether organizational technology has any
relationship to structure. Yet, as with size, technology has been measured in a variety
of ways by researchers, and Scott (1992) has suggested narrowing it to three
dimensions: complexity or diversity, uncertainty or unpredictability, and
interdependence.
The Environment of Organizations
With the advent of an open systems approach in the 1960s, organizational
researchers began to lend a greater role to factors existing outside of the internal
context of the organization that could shape the structure of the organization.
Thompson (1967) was perhaps one of the first researchers to recognize this by
showing that organizations needed to seal off their technical cores to protect the
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organization from external uncertainties. Blau and Schoenherr (1971) found that size
of the organization was largely dependent upon the external demand for service.
Since size was found to have a significant effect on structure, one can conclude from
this study that population demand has as well. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that
powerful myths within institutional environments were powerful shapers of
organizational structures. Pfeffer and Salancick (1978), as well as Jacobs (1974),
performed research in the area of resource dependency, recognizing that to a certain
degree, organizations are controlled by circumstances and influences from the
external environment. Mintzberg's (1983) study of power also looked at
environmental factors and identified numerous internal and external influencers that
can affect the organization's structure. The environmental aspects of organizations
are immense and can encompass everything external to the organization as well as
numerous internal factors. As a result, the literature on the subject is quite wide and
varied. However,fromthe broader range of material, environment appears to have a
relationship to organization structure.
Summary
Size, technology, and environment emerge as the common themes in prior
research on organization structures. The discussion of the generalizabihty of the
results of the given studies largely revolves around issues of organizational types.
That is, a difference between organizations producing an object and those that
produce a human good, as well as organizations having a routine work technology
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and those that do not. Mileti et al. (1977) and Beyer and Trice (1979) have buttressed
this statement by illustrating that when samples are comprised of heterogeneous
organizations, prior research is largely disproved. Therefore, the type of organization
is an important factor if one wants to understand its structure. The next chapter
specifically deals with police organizations as a typology. This chapter describes the
influence of size, technology, and environment on police organization structures,
which are largely ignored in the larger organizational theory literature.
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CHAPTER in

POLICE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES, TYPES, AND THEORIES

The Study of Police Organization Structures
Researchers have generally ignored the study of police organizations in favor
of studying police work and behavior (Maguire, 2003). Over the past four decades
there have been over 150 studies of police behavior but only 10 studies of police
organizations, five of which were derived from one doctoral dissertation and two that
used police structure as an intermediate variable in describing police performance
(Maguire, 2003). Langworthy's (1986) work on the structure of police organizations
was the first such empirical work completely dedicated to applying the
organizational literature to police organizational structures. Maguire's (2003)
recently published doctoral dissertation is the second and most recent work dedicated
solely to police organizational structure. Just recently, Wilson's (2006) book on
community policing in America compliments these two previous works by
significantly examining the determinants of police organization structures.
Although Langworthy (1986) is credited with the first major work on the
study of formal police organization, the real genesis can be found in the Ostrom,
Parks, and Whitaker (1978) study relating organization size to the formal
coordination of police agencies. Ostrom et al. used the number of sworn officers as
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their size variable to determine the impacts that an organization's size had upon the
proportion of officers assigned to patrol versus administrative functions. The study
found, quite simply, that smaller municipal agencies have a lower proportion of
officers assigned to administrative functions and a higher number assigned to patrol.
This study, however, has limitations. It does not analyze the tasks of the officers and
it may be possible that officers assigned to patrol still are required to perform a large
amount of administrative duties. Further, Ostrom et al. did not address the issue of
complexity of the agency. Smaller agencies may have less administrative positions
because they are not addressing complex situations on a routine basis.
Langworthy (1986) followed up on the Ostrom research by addressing
concepts of structural complexity. In his review of size and structure for police
agencies, Langworthy relies heavily uponBlau's theory of differentiation (1971).
Langworthy (1986) attempted to replicate Blau's research by substituting precincts
for the number of local offices and number of day and night beats to replicate the
geographic spread. Langworthy (1986) comes to the obvious assumption, based upon
Blau and Schoenherr (1971), finding that larger police organizations will have a
higher patrol officer to supervision rate and higher proportion of staff dedicated to
administrative functions to cope with the complexity of the organization. In simpler
terms, larger organizations provide less direct line supervision and more coordination

and communication because larger organizations tend to be more complex
(Langworthy, 1986).
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Langworthy (1986), like Blau (1971), views spatial, occupational, hierarchal,
and functional differentiation as the core structure for police organization.
Langworthy was able to replicate the results of Blau's theory on the study of police
organizations and arrive at the conclusion that there is a direct relationship between
organizational size and organization structure. While police organization researchers
widely recognize that size has obvious effects on organization structure, there is still
a debate on the magnitude of the effect (Crank & Wells, 1991; Langworthy, 1986;
Maguire & Uchida, 2000). Langworthy (1986) found there is a strong relationship
between size and spatial differentiation but other size-structure associations have a
weaker relationship with a large amount of unexplained variance. Further, the
problem of deciding what measures of size to use in studies still exists. Researchers
are still plagued with deciding if size refers to total number of employees in the
agency, total sworn officers, resources used by the agency, or the costs associated
with running the agency. As Paoline and Sloan (2003) suggest, it is entirely possible
for an agency with a small number of employees to have high operating costs and
therefore be smaller in number of human resources, but larger in terms of operations.
However, most police organization researchers have opted to use the number of fulltime personnel employed by the agency as an adequate measure of size.
Slovak (1986) used police structure as an intermediate variable in an attempt
to examine what characteristics might determine police organization structure and
how that structure affects police style and arrest rates. Although Slovak did not focus
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entirely on organization structure as a dependent variable, his research is still widely
cited within the narrow police organization structure field due to the lack of
academic work. Slovak also used the number of full time police employees as his
measure and found that the organization's size has no discernable effect on the
agency differentiation. Slovak's research has been praised for laying out a
sophisticated multivariate causal pathway of modeling, but since his research aimed
to address structure's effect on behavior, the analysis for determinants of structure is
left incomplete (Maguire, 2003).
Maguire (2003), using the number of employees of the organization as a
measure of size, found a positive relationship between size and vertical, functional,
and spatial differentiation. However, in this study there was no relationship between
size of the organization and the measures of structural control (formalization,
centralization, administrative intensity). Therefore, according to Maguire,
organization size, by itself does not necessarily predict a greater degree of formal
control.
Wilson (2006) has performed the latest study. Wilson has used two sets of
LEMAS data (1997 & 1999) as well as 1990 U.S. Census data. Wilson was also able
to obtain supplementary survey data previously used by Maguire (2003) as well as
King (1998). Additionally, Wilson incorporated some grants data from COPS
(2001). Wilson's approach was somewhat expanded and he attacked it from a
different angle than his predecessors. Wilson wanted to determine what influenced
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the structure of police organizations, but also how that structure affected the
implementation of community policing.
Essentially, Wilson asked the question; given a desired outcome, what
structural arrangements are most conducive, and are we in control of altering this
structure? However, in exploring this question Wilson first explored the determinants
of police organization structures in depth. Wilson found that size had no significant
relationship to any aspect of structural complexity. This is most curious as it counters
all previous research, including that of Blau's (1971) theory of differentiation.
Further, the findings are even more perplexing given that Wilson's study utilized
Maguire's (2003) dataset.
Work Technology and the Police Organization
As previously mentioned, the literature on police organization structures is
scant. Of an even rarer nature is the literature that addresses the relationship of the
organization's technology to the structure of the police organization. Langworthy
(1986) largely applies Perrow's (1967) framework to analyze organizational
technology, or the way an organization does it job, to the relationship of the
organization's structure. Perrow (1967) focused on the interaction of two variables,
characteristics of raw materials to be transformed and characteristics of the tasks
(technologies) involved in the transformation process. Recalling from the general
organizational literature reviewed above, Perrow concluded that when tasks are
generally predictable, a routine and bureaucratic form of structure is the most
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relevant. Conversely, when the tasks are non-routine, or the nature of the work is
poorly understood, a bureaucratic structure will not work properly because it is
difficult to have clear lines of authority, high degree of division of labor, and rules
and procedures to address the complexity of the work (Perrow, 1967).
Perrow's (1967) work was normative in nature and thus hard to apply to the
empirical task that faced Langworthy. Using the data collected from Ostrom et al.,
and utilizing Perrow's theoretical framework, Langworthy hypothesized that as tasks
become increasingly routine, the organization would become more bierarchal, or
vertically differentiated. By using linear regression and correlation coefficients,
Langworthy's confirmed his hypothesis and substantiated Perrow's theory. As the
technology within the organization become more standardized, the hierarchal (or
bureaucratic to use Langworthy's terminology) nature of police organizations
increased. Additionally, the study found that functional differentiation, and to a
lesser degree, occupational differentiation, were significantly associated with the
manner in which the police conduct their tasks.
Maguire (2003) used a considerably more complex dataset than Langworthy
(1986). While Langworthy's data set consisted of the 1978 data from the research of
Ostrom et al., Maguire used a combination of data from LEMAS, his supplemental
survey, 1990 Census data, and data from the Police Foundation. Maguire's study
concluded that there was no relation between organizational technology and the
structure, finding that agencies engaging less in routine patrol still had high levels of
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functional differentiation. This implies that institutional factors might better explain
functional differentiation rather than contextual factors. The research mentioned
above by general organizational theorists, including Perrow, indicates that
organizations with routine established patterns of technology should result in an
increase of hierarchy.
Police organizations are typically characterized as people-processing
organizations; they place people (raw material) into categories and confer upon them
some sort of legal status and a social label. As a result, the produced product of
people processing organizations is people who have been categorized into varying
statuses (traffic offenders, criminals, civil litigants, etc.). Conversely, peoplechanging organizations are hospitals, schools, and to some degree prisons. Rather
than simply processing people, these organizations employ their technology in an
attempt to change the person one way or another. Hospitals treat the sick, schools
provide education, and prisons seek to rehabilitate. These organizations use their
work technology to respond to the needs of each individual. Maguire (2003) has
largely applied Hasenfeld's (1972) theory in an effort to test how the technology of
the police organization (a traditional people-processing organization) influences its
formal structure.
With the advent of community policing, tasks within police organizations
have become increasingly non-routine because the philosophy of community
policing views each circumstance as a unique problem requiring individualized
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solutions. Maguire's study reiterates that the increase of this non-routine technology
has not had a discernable impact upon the structures of police organizations except
for a decrease in centralization. Interestingly enough, since the advent of community
policing, there has been a significant increase in the social distance between the top
and the bottom of police organizations (Maguire, et. al., 2003). Mastrofski and Ritti
(2000) have also argued that the switch to community policing is transforming the
modern police agency from a people-processing organization to a people-changing
organization. In Wilson's (2006) follow up study, he also found that technology had
no relationship to any part of the structure. Therefore, according to Wilson, the
manner and the variety in which the police perform their tasks is largely independent
of formal organizational structures.
Maguire's findings stimulate a return to Kimberley's (1976) question; are the
general findings of organizational structure research applicable to all types of
organizations? Particularly, can the larger body of organizational literature be
applied to the study of police organization structures? Maguire (2003) hypothesizes
that police organizations are different from others in that they may not have the same
incentives to seek a proper fit between technology and organizational structures as
other might. In the private sector, organizations must seek a proper fit to not only
maximize profit, but to ensure organizational viability and survival. Police
organizations will undoubtedly exist despite the nature of fit between their structure
and technology. The remainder of limited literature on police organizational
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structures has remained reticent on the topic of technology's relationship to structure.
Of the three major works in publication, each has arrived at a somewhat different and
varying conclusion. Clearly, this area warrants deeper research in search of a cogent
answer.
Environment and the Police Organization
Blau and Schoenherr (1971) illustrated that size of an employment security
agency was largely a product of external situations, which determined the demand
for services. Langworthy (1986) attempted to once again utilize this research and
apply the framework to police organizations. Langworthy initially attempted to use
city population (or number of people demanding service) as the determinant for the
demand of service. However, as he noted, cities of the same size can have drastically
different sized departments. Langworthy regressed the number of employees and
number of officers on the city population and SMSA data from the standard
metropolitan statistical area (Langworthy, 1986, p. 99). The results confirmed Blau
and Schoenherr's theory, as relevant to police agencies; organization structure has a
direct relationship to size of the population served.
Langworthy further investigated Perrow's (1967) routines of task, in
relationship to environment's effect on structure. If populations in cities were
constantly changing, then police agencies would have less knowledge of the
character of the community and be unable to routinize tasks. In turn, this lack of
routine of work technology should have an effect on structure (Perrow, 1967).
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However, Langworthy's regression analysis did not show any statistically significant
results between population change and structure of the organization. The lack of
significant results seems to contradict what Langworthy found when testing Perrow's
use of technology on the environment. Langworthy had found significant results on
technology's effect on police structure. Yet, in this case, when populations are
consistently changing and there is less chance of routine, there is no effect on the
structure.
Maguire (2003) also attempted to study the impacts of environment on police
organization structure. Maguire found a marginal interaction between population
dispersion and instability on some forms of the structure, but did not find a
relationship between environmental capacity and complexity on the structure. In
Wilson's (2006) study, the only aspects of the environment that appeared to have
some relationship was the environmental uncertainty, as measured by
unemployment, which appeared to produce more mechanistic police structures. As
such, it appears that no generalizations can be made about the effects that
environment has on structure because the research is limited and inconsistent.
According to Maguire (2003), law enforcement managers appear to have minimal
control over changing the degree of complexity of their structures (largely
attributable to size), but for the most part are able to manipulate the aspects of
organization control as they see fit
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Table 2 provides a brief description of police organization research performed up to
this point illustrating the independent predictors of structure used by the researcher
and the dimensions of structure they were seeking to predict.
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Table 2. Summary of Key Findings in Past Police Organization Research
RESEARCHER

ANALYTIC
METHOD UTLIZED

DEPENDENT
STRUCTURAL
DIMENSIONS

INDEPENDEN RESULTS
T PREDICTOR
OF
STRUCTURE
Smaller
Size
agencies have
lower
administrative
ratios.

Ostrom et. al
(1978)

OLS
Regression/Correlation

Langworthy
(1986)

Bivariate Correlation,
simple regression,
scatterplots

Spatialdifferentiation;
Hierarchaldifferentiation;
Occupationaldifferentiation;
Functionaldifferentiation.

(1) Size,
(2)Technology,
(3)
Environment

(l)Size is
related to
spatial
differentiation
and weakly to
other measures.
(2) Technology
is associated
with functional
differentiation.
(3) Population
complexity was
positively
related to
occupational
differentiation.

Slovak (1986)
(Structure only
used as an
intermediary
variable)

Path analysis

Administrative
Intensity;
Division of
Labor.

Size

Size has no
effect on
differentiation.

Crank (1989)

Descriptive

Civilianization

Size

Civilianization
increased in
agencies that
declined in size.

Crank & Wells
(1991)

OLS Regression

Concentration;
Organization
height;
Civilianization;
Supervisor Ratio.

Size
Urbanism
(Illinois
Municipal
Departments)

Urbanism has
no effect on
structure.
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King (1999)

OLS
Regression/correlation

Age
Administration;
Civilianization;
Formalization;
Hierarchal
height;
Functional
differentiation.

Older
organizations
are less
occupationally
differentiated
and more
vertically
differentiated.

Zhao& Maguire OLS Regression
(2003)

Formalization;
Verticaldifferentiation;
Functionaldifferentiation;

Political Culture No influence
organization
structure.

Maguire (2003)

SEM

Vertical,
Spatial, and
Functionaldifferentiation;
Centralization;
Formalization;
Administrative
Intensity.

Size positively
(l)Size,
(2) Technology, predicts
(3)Environment, vertical, spatial,
and
(4) Age
occupational
differentiation.

Paoline &
Sloan (2003)

OLS Regression

Functional,
Vertical, and
Occupationaldifferentiation;
Administrative
density;
Formalization.

(1) Size,
Size is
(2) Technology, positively
(3)Environment, related to
vertical and
occupation
differentiation
as well as
administrative
intensity.
Task scope
positively
predicts
functional
differentiation
and
formalization.
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Vertical, Spatial,
and
Functional
Differentiation;
Centralization;
Formalization;
Administrative
Intensity.

(l)Size,
Size has no
(2)Technology, effect on
(3)Environment, structural
(4)Age
complexity or
control. Task
scope is
positively
associated with
occupation
differentiation.
Unemployment
inversely
effects of
occupational
differentiation.
Region
positively
influences
formalization
and
administrative
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THE MISSING POLICE ORGANIZATION TYPES

The previous research reviewed has predominantly dealt with the formal
structures of large, urban, municipal police departments that employ more than 100
sworn officers. This is of no surprise, as the overwhelming majority of policing
literature is dedicated to the study and operation of these types of departments. Of
the extensive body of literature dedicated to the study of policing, only a minor part
encompasses any analysis of Sheriffs Offices, smaller police departments, and
campus law enforcement agencies. Tribal law enforcement agencies appear to have
been ignored all together.
The office of the Sheriff is a uniquely Anglo-American institution (Falcone &
Wells, 1995), yet is greatly overlooked among the research community. The
historical context under which the office was founded, and the mission that the
Sheriff serves, finds its roots in England before the invention of any form of
municipal policing. In 2000, BJS reported that were 3,070 Sheriffs Offices in the
United States. Since this policing entity is far from rare, the manner in which it is
ignored by the academic community is somewhat perplexing and troubling at the
same time. A comprehensive survey of the literature finds only one article of
significance solely dedicated to description and research on the Sheriffs Office
(Falcone & Wells, 1995). In this study, the authors survey four major policing texts
and find that in the combined 1,500 pages, there is less than three pages total
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dedicated to Sheriffs departments (Falcone & Wells, 1995, p. 146). Only one other
more recent article was found that was solely focused on Sheriffs Offices (Helms,
2007).5
The style of policing performed by Sheriffs offices is distinctive. Most
notably, the chief executive of the organization is an elected official.6 This brings
with it some degree of freedom, as the Sheriff does not serve at the will of the Mayor
or City Manager, therefore releasing the Sheriff from some of the political
constraints common to the municipal police chief (such as immediate dismissal). At
the same time, the fact that the Sheriff holds an elected position brings with it a host
of pressures that are foreign to the police chief. The Sheriff, like any other politician,
must constantly keep in mind that actions taken during the term of office today can
have disastrous effects at the next election. This may make the Sheriff more
responsive to both environmental demands as well as perceptions of legitimacy.
Because the Sheriff is an elected official, Sheriffs organizations are often
referred to as 'offices' rather than 'departments.' Additionally, since this is an
elected office, a new Sheriff is also able to turn over command staff. Unlike a
municipal agency, where an officer might promote through the ranks, a newly
elected Sheriff has the ability to choose a deputy (line staff member) to become the
Chief Deputy (the equivalent of a municipal P.D. Assistant Chief) or even bring in
an acquaintance from the outside to take the position. Therefore, institutional
This article examined the effects of political culture on Deputy employment rates.
Rhode Island and Hawaii do not have an elected Sheriff position (Falcone & Wells, 1995, p. 127).
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knowledge in the command ranks can often be lost and the results of a new election
can bring a complete turnover in not only the executive staff, but within the entire
rank structure. Additionally, this introduces a greater degree of uncertainty into the
internal environment.
The functions that a Sheriffs Office carries out are frequently more varied
than that of a municipal department. In most counties, the Sheriff is responsible for
providing and administering a county jail as well as carrying out a host of civil duties
such as: serving civil papers, performing evictions, collecting taxes, and so forth.
Additionally, the Sheriff is frequently responsible for providing security for the local
courts and prisoner transport as well. Of course, the Sheriff is also responsible for
providing law enforcement services for the county and in many rural jurisdictions is
the primary policing organization. Also very unique to the Sheriff, is that in 35 out of
the 50 states, the Sheriff is a constitutionally created office unlike its municipal
counterparts, which are often administratively created (Falcone & Wells, 1995).
In highly urbanized areas, many Sheriff's Offices have moved away from
more of a law enforcement body to that of a correctional-judicial organization. In
counties with increasing rates of urbanization, the majority of the county is
incorporated by municipalities and therefore policed by those municipalities. The
Sheriffs within these jurisdictions have subsequently fallen back onto focusing their
organizational energy on their corrections and judicial functions (Falcone & Wells,
1995). However, at the same time, many municipal police departments have
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expanded their roles by also engaging in a correctional function with the
establishment of municipal based corrections divisions (e.g. Scottsdale, AZ P.D.; Las
Vegas, NV P.D.).
Sheriff s offices also have a different work technology than their municipal
counterparts. The Sheriff is responsible for policing a geographic area considerably
more dispersed and heterogeneous than a municipal agency.7 While a municipal
police officer might be responsible for policing a six city-block square area, a deputy
might be responsible for policing as much as 250 square miles. The municipal police
officer is engaged in work that often encompasses responding to 911 calls,
community-policing activities, and directed patrol. The deputy might be engaged in a
wider diversity of activities including: highway traffic enforcement, investigating
farm crime, fish and wildlife enforcement, forest patrol, and directed patrol in a
varying urban landscape. Sheriffs offices are unique in this latter point as it is
common (particularly in Western states) for municipalities to contract with the
Sheriff for police services. As such, a deputy at one moment might be working in a
rural setting and shortly thereafter, be working in an urbanized setting.8 Furthermore,
because of the spatial diffusion of the Sheriffs policing responsibility, deputies do
not have the luxury of cover (or backup) from other officers as they do in an urban
municipal department. Therefore, the deputy must be conscious of this fact and
Deputies can be responsible for much larger areas. For example, Wheeler County Oregon usually
only has one Deputy on duty at a time, which makes that Deputy responsible for 1,713 sq. miles
(Oregon Blue Book).
For example, the cities of University Place and Edgewood, Washington contract with the Pierce
County Sheriff for police services. This is just one example among many.
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conduct the duties of the job in such a manner as to not rely as extensively on backup
resources.
The small municipal police organization has received the same lack of
attention as the county Sheriffs Office. This is similarly perplexing as the small
town police department represents the majority of police organizations in the Untied
States (Reaves, 1993). A review of the literature illustrates that very little is
published on smaller police agencies, of which most focuses on the relationship
between crime and the police in these communities (Simes, 1988; Weisheit et al.,
1999; Falcone et al., 2002). Falcon et al. (2002) describe the small town police
department as a police organization that serves a jurisdictional population of 25,000
people or less.
Unfortunately, these police departments receive some level of disdain from
the public, as well as from their larger counterparts. The stereotypical picture of a
smaller police department conjures up images of the Andy Griffith Show and
degrading analogies to the fictional town of Mayberry. Moreover, this typology of
police department is regarded as being comprised of members that frequently suffer
from boredom and therefore subsequently become forced to set up 'speed traps' in an
effort to occupy their time. Needless to say, this view is ignorant and perhaps
codified because there is such a lack of mention of this organization type within the
policing literature.
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In many respects, the small police department is similar to the Sheriffs
Office in that their work technology is more generalized than that of an officer
employed by a larger urban police department. Although smaller municipal agencies
are not as spatially differentiated as larger agencies, individual officers in smaller
agencies frequently patrol larger geographic spaces and may frequently work along
side members from the Sheriffs Office on a frequent basis. Police departments
serving populations under 25,000, like larger agencies, are also functionally,
occupationally, and vertically differentiated. Smaller police departments often have
their own telecommunications branch, where in a larger department this might be a
function of a separate agency. Furthermore, against conventional thought, many of
these smaller agencies are also spatially differentiated because like Sheriffs offices,
they sometimes contract police services to some of their neighboring municipalities.9

OPEN SYSTEM THEORY AND POLICE ORGANIZATION

Structural Contingency Theory
Contingency theory has been the predominant driving force behind much of
the police organization structure literature (Maguire & Uchida, 2000). Contingency
theory is rooted in general systems theory (Zhao et al., 2003), and as explained by
Galbraith (2003), posits two underlying assumptions: 1) there is no one best way to
For example, the Newberg, Oregon police department serves a population under 20,000 but is
spatially differentiated as it has a contract with Dundee, Oregon to provide police services.
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recognize; 2) any way of organizing is not equally effective (in Scott 1992, p.96).
Contingency theory overrides the assumptions by theorists who sought to develop
general principles applicable to all organizations at all times (Scott, 1992). From this,
Scott (1992) adds a third assumption about contingency theory as "The best way to
organize depends on the nature of the environment to which the organization relates"
(p. 96). That is, the emphasis is placed on the task environment, which includes:
organization size, technology, and socioeconomic characteristics of the community
where the organization carries out its missions (Hage & Aiken, 1970). Thus,
contingency, as a branch of systems design, recognizes that organizational decisions
depend upon, and are contingent upon, the complexity of environmental conditions.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who coined the term "contingency theory,"
propose that different environments place different requirements on organizations.
Environments with uncertainty and rapid rates of change host a greater set of
challenges and opportunities than are present in stable environments. Further,
different sub-units within the organization may face uncertainty in a more rapid
changing environment than other units. To accommodate for this, organizations
create specialized sub-units with differing structural features (Scott, 1992). The more
varied the type of environment confronted by an organization the more differentiated
the structure. However, the more differentiated the structure, the more difficult it
becomes to coordinate activities between the various subunits resulting in an increase
in points for conflict to arise among the participants. Put simply, structural features
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of each organization subunit should be suited to the specific environment in which it
functions and the differentiation of the larger organization should be suited to the
overall complexity in which it relates (Scott, 1992).
Although past police organization research has largely focused upon using
contingency theory to aid in explaining formal organization structures, the empirical
evidence fails to provide any consistent proof for the continued use of this theory. If
this is correct, then why do researchers have a continued interest in this research
field? Cunningham, Renauer, and Khalifa (2006) effectively argue that previous
research has misapplied contingency theory's notion of task environment by
focusing on a static view of the environment rather than encompassing a temporal
view of the changes occurring in the environment, which is a more accurate
description of the theory. Cunningham, et al. further argue that if contingency theory
is correct, then organizations should respond to changes in the environment. Dess
and Beard (1984), in their work on the dimensions of task environment, refer to this
as "environmental dynamism" (p. 55). Yet, past research has predominantly focused
upon using a temporal cross section in the environment. Examining the
environment's impact on structure from this static viewpoint is faulty. Researchers
should focus on the dynamic nature of the environment to determine its true effects.
Wilson (2006) also advocates further research into the environmental aspect of
formal structures, as does Klinger (2004).
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Institutional Theory
Police organization theorists have not focused as much attention as they
could on explaining structures using an institutional theoretic viewpoint. As Scott
(1987) has noted, solely relying upon the use of institutional or contingency theory
alone only partly explains structure and further complicates arguments of causality.
Institutional theory posits that organizations are social systems shaped by social,
cultural, and symbolic systems (Scott, 2001). Furthermore, the success and survival
of an organization depends upon the organization having the ability to conform to the
demands of the institutional environment. Selznick (1996) stated,
The formal structure of an organization, it is said, cannot be
understood as a rational system for coordinating activities, nor can it
be accounted for by logic of transaction costs. Rather, the formal
structure is institutionalized from without as well as from within, and it
reflects prevailing concepts of how work should be organized (p.273).
Perhaps the most powerful notion of this theory is that socially constructed belief
and rule systems exercise an inordinate amount of control over the organization in
how it carries out its work and how it is structured (Scott, 2001). Under this theory,
organizations are in a constant pursuit of legitimacy rather than improvement of
technical efficiency (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Renauer, 2007). Therefore,
organizations subsequently respond to pressures and engage in activities that are
congruent with institutional expectations. Police organizations, above all, given their
unique ability to seize from the people the most basic liberal rights of life, liberty,
and property are in constant pursuit and maintenance of legitimacy (Herbert, 2006).
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Crank and Langworthy (1992) state that police organizations and their structures
need to be studied from a viewpoint of how powerful myths shape their institutional
environments (p. 338). Crank (1994) describes the following as elements of these
myths:
1. They are powerful.
2. The affected environment contextualizes them.
3. They have an inherent notion of change and emergence.
4. They are defended by powerful individuals or political interest groups
(in Wilson, 2006 p. 20).
Because organizations (especially police) are in this constant pursuit of legitimacy,
they are often more responsive to the institutional concerns rather than the technical
concerns (Maguire & Uchida, 2000). Contingency theory, in large part, deals with
these technical concerns and rational aspects. For this reason, many organizational
theorists have abandoned contingency theory because it places too much emphasis
on the rational aspects of social organization (Donaldson, 1995).
Institutional theory may be a better theoretical model for the study of police
structure because it aids in explaining how police organizations survive given the
lack of relationship found in past research between elements of technology,
environment, and their structure. Hughes (1939) noted, "more commonly the term
institution is applied to those features of social life which outlast biological
generations or survive drastic social changes that might have been expected to bring
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them to an end" (p. 283). This statement initially sounds at odds with
technical/rational perspective of structural contingency theory. Perhaps this may aid
in explaining why Sheriff's offices still exist given that prominent police
management theorists (Smith, 1940; MacNamara, 1950) predicted their demise
because of duplication of services and the antiquated medieval nature of the office.
Crank and Langworthy (1992) have largely been credited with facilitating the use
of institutional theory in police studies. In their seminal theoretic piece, they describe
several myths relevant to the police organization in how they allocate resources and
pursue, as well as maintain legitimacy. These myths include:
1. Professional credentialing.
2. Organized labor.
3. The institution of innovative police practices, which is often tied to funding.
4. Crime fighting (crime index).
5. The urban location of a department.
Crank and Langworthy (1992) describe myths as legitimating pressures of police
organizations, but Scott (2001) goes further and describes three distinct pillars of
legitimacy within institutional theory that pressure organizations: the regulative,
normative, and cultural-cognitive. Table 3 provides an insightful picture into each of
these pillars.
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Table 3. Three Pillars of Institutions
Pillar
Regulative

Normative

Cultural-Cognitive

Basis of Compliance

Expedience

Social Obligation

Taken for Granted
Shared Understanding

Basis of Order

Regulative Rules

Binding Expectations

Constitutive Schema

Mechanisms

Coercive

Normative

Mimetic

Logic

Instrumentality

Appropriateness

Orthodoxy

Indicators

Rules
Laws
Sanctions

Certification
Accreditation

Common Beliefs
Shared Logics of Action

Basis of Legitimacy

Legally Sanctioned

Morally Governed

Comprehensible
Recognizable
Culturally Supported

Adopted from Scott (2001, p. 52).

Regulative forces induce coercive mechanisms to shape organization structures. For
example, a classic example involves the Department of Justice issuing monetary
incentives to police agencies in an effort to induce them to adopt strategies to alter
structure (Renauer, 2007). While this last notion is shared with resource dependency
theorists, for an intuitionalist it recognizes authority relations and the role of
legitimate coercion (Scott, 1987). Normative forces seek compliance based upon
social obligation, which includes adherence to norms and values that are indicated by
certifications and accreditations. Organizations failing to adhere to these norms and
values face punishment or ridicule from the populations they serve and fraternal
organizations. Cultural-cognitive aspects of institutional theory emphasize a
vocational orthodoxy as a tool to achieve legitimacy. Organizations often create
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structures and policy to mimic other organizations because it is perceived as the
'right thing to do,' or simply as 'jumping on the bandwagon' (Renauer, 2007).
One aspect of institutional theory to clarify, and for future research to
address, is the nature of Scott's three pillars of institutions. Given his description of
the institutional factors that shape organizations as "pillars," the essence of these
institutional forces being discrete elements is portrayed. Although Scott never states
that the pillars are discrete, or silo-like, the literature fails to consider the fluidity
between the regulative, normative, and cultural aspects of institutions. For example,
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) found that as a normative pressure, hospitals in the
U.S. are not required to gain accreditation from the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals. However, the hospitals found it in their best interest to
gain such accreditation for purposes of legitimacy, which perhaps illustrates also a
cultural-cognitive aspect of vocational orthodoxy.
The same argument can be extended to police departments seeking
accreditation from The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies (GALEA). This is not a mandatory accreditation and can be quite costly for
the agency to pursue; yet, they obviously gain some legitimacy from it. Much like
hospitals, one can argue that it is a normative pressure. However, while it may
initiate itself as being normative, CALEA requires changes to organization structure
and operation to become certified. Therefore, the normative pressure quickly
becomes a coercive force. This is but one example where Scott's delineation between
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the three pillars is fluid. Future work that applies institutional theory to organizations
will aid in flushing out this fluid nature between the pillars. Scott did note in later
publication (Scott, 1992) that researchers have tended to focus upon one pillar or
another, but that in fully developed institutions, all three of these pillars are present.
Scott (1987) has been one of the few authors keen enough to recognize the lack of
development in institutional theory and dare say, even its misapplication. He even
went as far as to author an article (Scott, 1987) about the "adolescence" of
institutional theory describing the theory as awkward and not fully developed and he
subsequently calls for future research to assist in its development.
Contingency theory and institutional theory need not be mutually exclusive,
as stated by Wilson (2006). One can immediately notice that both theories give a
strong role to environmental attributes. That is, both contingency and institutional
theory posit that the context in which an organization operates ultimately effects how
it is structured and carries out its business. For contingency theory, it is the context
of the task environment and for institutional theory; it is the political and cultural
context. Renauer (2007) makes a similar argument that institutional and contingency
theory are cut from the same cloth. Renauer elaborates that there is an "old
institutionalism," which looks at the task environment and a "new institutionalism,"
that focuses upon issues of legitimacy. In essence, Renauer argues that distinctions
are minor and the major focuses of the organizational theories are on the
environments in which they operate.
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Meyer and Rowan (1977) recognized long ago the aspect that organizations
are frequently embedded in multiple contexts. They formulated a theory that one
context encouraged structures that facilitated coordination and control of production
based upon local relationships and another based upon the institutional premises of
relationships between and among the organizational society and leadership. As
mentioned, institutional theorists have for some time given a strong role to the
environment (Perrow, 1986). However, the variables that institutionalists use are
frequently more value-laden, encompassing notions of: norms, rumors, myths,
symbols, knowledge, traditions, and standards. Therefore, the so-called 'competing
theories' can be reconciled to some degree because every organization, to include the
police organization, must deal with technical aspects as well as managing
institutional aspects. The variability comes from the degree to which different
organizations balance these two notions.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This section poses a series of research questions and relevant hypotheses
based upon the review of the organization structure literature, literature on open
systems organizational theories, and the discussion of police organization types
presented in the previous section and chapter. The hypotheses concern the links
between organizational and external contingencies, as well as institutional
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environments in relation to organization structures across varying police organization
types.
Police Organization Types
The literature review discussed the previous research on large municipal
police organizations and the lack of research conducted on Sheriffs Offices and
smaller municipal police organizations. Therefore, the following question must be
posed to ascertain if there are any differences among police organization types that
warrant further research.
Question 1: Do Sheriff's Offices, municipal police organizations serving
jurisdictional populations under 25,000, and municipal police organizations
serving populations over 25,000 differ in their formal organizational
structures?
If Falcone and Wells (1995; 2002) are correct in their conjecture that Sheriffs
Offices and smaller police agencies are unique policing entities, then the following
series of hypotheses should hold true.
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference across Sheriffs Offices, municipal police
agencies serving populations under 25,000, and larger
municipal police agencies in the degree to which they are
formally structured.
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Hypothesis 2: There are differences in vertical differentiation among
Sheriff's Offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.

Hypothesis 3: There are differences in functional heterogeneity among
Sheriff's offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.

Hypothesis 4: There are differences in occupational differentiation between
Sheriff's offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.

Hypothesis 5: There are differences in spatial organization between Sheriff's
offices, municipal police agencies serving populations under
25,000, and larger municipal police agencies.

Hypothesis 6: There are differences in formalization organization between
Sheriff's offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.
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Hypothesis 7: There are differences in the administrative intensity between
Sheriff's offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.

Organizational Contingencies
Previous organization research (Blau, 1970) and police organization research
(Langworthy, 1985; 1986, Maguire, 2003, Paoline and Sloan, 2003) has illustrated
that organizational contingencies such as size and technology account for the
majority of the reason of why certain organization structures exist over others. What
remains to be seen is how well this holds across the different police organization
types, and therefore the following question is posed.
Question 2: How well do organizational contextual factors, as measured by
organization size and task scope, predict dimensions of formal structure
across organization types?
If Sheriffs Offices and smaller municipal police agencies are unique policing
entities and have different burdens of organization size as well as varying task
scopes, then the following hypothesis should speak to this.
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Hypothesis 8: Organizational contingencies are a significant predictor of
structure in larger municipal police organizations, explaining a greater
degree of the structural dimensions, but not for smaller organizations and
Sheriff's Offices.

The literature review illustrates that environmental contingencies have had mixed
effects in the research on police organization structures. The academic community
has not investigated how environmental contingencies influence the structures of all
types of police organizations. Therefore, the following question is posed to address
this.
Question 3: How well does environmental complexity and uncertainty, as
measured by; racial heterogeneity, 2000 employment rate, 1990-2000 change
in median household income, and the 1990-2000 change in population,
explain and predict dimensions of formal structure over and above
organizational context across Sheriff's Offices, municipal police agencies,
and small municipal police agencies?
Structural contingency theory states that an organization must be in strategic fit with
the environment it operates in order to survive and achieve efficiency. However,
Sheriffs are term-elected officials and therefore do not have the same immediate
requirements to seek atechnical/rationalfit. If this speculation has merit, the
following hypothesis should address this.
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Hypothesis 9: Environmental contingencies, in the form of environmental
uncertainty, are significant predictors ofstructure above and beyond
organizational context in both large and small municipal agencies, but do not
have a significant effect on Sheriffs Offices structures.

Institutional Environment
Organizational theorists such as Scott (1992) have attempted to carve out a
large role for the inclusion of institutional theory. Some police organization research
has slightly touched upon it, but as the previous chapters have illustrated, it remains
to be seen how well the institutional environment predicts organization structure.
The following question is posed to address this.
Question 4: Do institutional factors, as measured by; CALEA accreditation,
adoption of community policing, crime rate index, federal funding, urban
presence, union influence, and region of the agency significantly predict
dimensions of formal structure over and above organizational context and
environmental uncertainty and complexity?
Manning (1987) describes the police as symbolic institutions comprised of powerful
symbols. Likewise, Crank and Langworthy (1992) describe the police as being
pressured to seek certain actions based upon myths, of which many are normative. If
this is the case, then the institutional environment should be a significant predictor of
all police organizations and the following hypothesis will speak to this.
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Hypothesis 10: Institutional factors are significant predictors above and
beyond organizational contingencies and the external environment across all
organization types, explaining a greater degree of the structural
configuration.

Summary
The review of the literature illustrates that police organization research up to
this date has predominantly focused upon larger municipal police agencies. There are
only two conceptual papers addressing the organization of Sheriffs Offices and
smaller municipal police agencies. The statements made about these latter police
organization types are largely anecdotal assumptions and remain statistically
untested. Furthermore, researchers have routinely focused upon structural
contingency theory while giving institutional theory only a cursory treatment. Given
this situation, the body of work presented here can be viewed as the most holistic and
theoretical integrating research on police organization structures to date. If the
normative literature is correct, then there is indeed a difference in structural
arrangement between Sheriffs Offices, municipal police agencies that serve
jurisdictions with populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police agencies.
Moreover, organizational contingencies will only explain structure in larger
municipal agencies; environmental contingencies will only explain structure in
municipal agencies; and institutional factors will significantly add explanatory power
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to all police organization types. Figure 1 is a visual presentation of the hypothesized
relationship between organizational, environmental, and institutional contingencies
and the different police organization structures.

Figure 1. Conceptual Relationship of Contingencies and Structures.
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CHAPTERIV

METHODOLOGY

A quantitative approach at the organizational level of analysis is taken to investigate
the determinants of structure across Sheriffs Offices, municipal police agencies that
operate in jurisdictions with populations under 25,000 citizens, and municipal
organizations that operate in jurisdictions with populations over 25,000.

DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY

The data used to conduct this research encompasses a number of secondary
data sources. The primary data set utilized is accessed from ICPSR (#4338) and is
titled, Developing a Comprehensive Empirical Model ofPolicing in the United
States, 1996-1999. This data set is a result of the Department of Justice, National
Institute of Justice Grant 2002-U-CX-0016 (Falcone & Wells, 1999). The dataset
was constructed by Falcone and Wells through the integration of data available in
several separate national data sets on police agencies and communities. The base
data source used for the construction of the data set is the 1999 Law Enforcement
Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey [LAW
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ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS
(LEMAS), 1999 (ICPSR 3079)].
The LEMAS survey is distributed every three years and collects data on
personnel, expenditures and pay, operations, community policing, equipment, written
policies, and related organization features. Langworthy (2002) has described
LEMAS as one of the most comprehensive police organizational research platforms
currently available. The associated survey is designed and disseminated by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and is distributed to a nationally representative
sample of publicly funded State and local law enforcement agencies in the United
States. The universe sample for the 1999 LEMAS survey consisted of 17,540 law
enforcement agencies encompassing municipal police, sheriffs departments, tribal
police, county police, state police, and special district police. BJS separates law
enforcement agencies into two groups for purposes of sample selection: selfreporting and nonself-reporting agencies. An agency is considered self-reporting if it
meets one of the following criteria:
•

It is a state police agency.

•

The agency has over 100 or more sworn full-time equivalent officers.

All other agencies failing to meet one of the above criteria are considered nonselfreporting and are chosen by a stratified random sample based upon size of population
served and number of sworn personnel. The 1999 LEMAS survey included 883 selfreporting agencies and 2,363 nonself-reporting agencies. This data set includes 964
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Sheriffs Offices and 1,998 municipal police agencies that are extractedfromthe
1999 LEMAS survey. To date, this data represents the most comprehensive
empirical source available to police organization researchers.
Although this data provides a platform to expand upon previous research, its
reliance upon the LEMAS dataset introduces several possible methodological
concerns. The immediate concern is that part of the sample police agencies is not
random. BJS utilizes a purposive sample of all agencies encompassing over 100
sworn personnel and all state police agencies and therefore these agencies are likely
over-represented. The positive aspect to the use of the survey is that the return rate is
typically over 90% (BJS). As a result, researchers have a fair amount of data on
agencies that have over 100 sworn officers. To follow, BJS splits their sampling into
two categories. As mentioned, larger agencies are sampled purposively, yet agencies
under 100 personnel are sampled in a stratified random sample. Merging these two
sampling methods might induce additional sampling error.
Another issue that plagues the use of the LEMAS set is one that has been
noted by previous police organization researchers (Maguire & Katz, 2002; Wilson
2006). Like many secondary data sources, the accuracy of the dataset is largely
contingent upon the respondent. Those that are tasked with filling out the survey for
the agency may lack a coherent knowledge about the operations of the organization,

they may lie, or even fail to understand survey questions. Although LEMAS
provides the police researcher with a host of intriguing information that for the most
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part could only be speculated upon before the survey's introduction in 1987, it is
constantly being refined. Therefore, continuity among the survey questions asked of
practitioners varies from survey wave to wave. The LEMAS 2003 wave is the most
recent available data set, yet some survey questions have changed. In particular, the
survey no longer requests information about personnel assigned to administrative
duties so it is difficult to construct a measure of administrative intensity. This is a
primary reason why the 2003 survey was not chosen for this study. Additionally, one
should note that research comprising any temporal aspect of agencies under 100
sworn personnel is difficult as each survey wave randomly chooses these agencies.
Therefore, agencies under 100 sworn officers that are presented in LEMAS
consistently change. Finally, the survey does not allow agencies under 100 sworn
personnel to provide information about the existence of full-time specialty units.
This proves to be a major roadblock when constructing measures of functional
differentiation. Despite the significant shortcomings of the LEMAS survey, it still
proves to be a powerful tool for police organization research (Langworthy, 2002),
and frankly the only primary quantitative source available to researchers.
To augment the LEMAS based dataset, the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census is
included to represent changes over time in community and environmental variables.
Additionally, datafromthe Department of Justice (DOJ) on agency funding for
community policing initiatives is included. This DOJ data documents funds allocated
to agencies under the Universal Hiring Program grants. Information on law
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enforcement accreditation is drawnfromThe Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (GALEA). The CALEA website allows the user to
access all information on organizations that have been awarded accreditation.

MEASURES

Five categories of measures were used in this study. They were: (a) measures
that indicated an agency's level of organization control, (b) measures that indicated
the agency's level of organization's complexity, (c) measures of the organization's
internal context, (d) measures of the organization's external environmental
contingencies, and (e) measures of the organization's institutional environment.
Organization Control
Administrative Intensity. Administrative intensity is the proportion of full
time sworn personnel whose primary duties include administrative tasks. This
variable is taken from the Falcone and Wells dataset and originally constructed from
LEMAS section III question 2, which asks how many personnel are devoted to such
tasks (e.g. Chief, Sheriff, internal affairs, etc.). The ratio is computed by taking the
number of sworn administrators, divided by the number of sworn field personnel,
and then multiplied by 100. The higher the ratio of sworn administrators to field
personnel, the greater the intensity of the organization's administrative component.
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Formalization. Both Langworthy (2002) andMaguire (2003) describe
formalization as the degree to which an organization is governed by formal rales and
procedures. The formalization variable is from the Falcone and Wells dataset and is
constructed as an index from LEMAS section IV/ Question 1. This is a series of
questions (10) that pertain to the existence of written formal policies in a myriad of
categories that exist for an agency. The agency, quite simply, responds whether they
have a written policy for the category. The higher the score on the index, the more
policies that exist, and therefore the greater the degree of formalization.
Organization Complexity
Vertical Differentiation. Langworthy (2002) describes vertical differentiation
as the height of the organization. Maguire (2003) also uses height as an indicator of
vertical differentiation. This variable is calculated in the same manner as the
aforementioned researchers as the difference between the chief executive officer's
salary and the salary of the entry-level officer. The variable comesfromthe Falcone
and Wells dataset and is originally constructedfromLEMAS Section V/Question 3,
which asks the salary level of those two ranks. The greater the degree of separation
between the two salaries, the greater the potential for increasing steps of salary and
therefore greater height within the organization.
Functional Differentiation. Langworthy (2002) describes functional

differentiation as "the degree to which an organization distinguishes elements of its
tasks and assigns them to special units" (34). Functional differentiation is taken from
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the Falcone & Wells dataset and originally derivedfromLEMAS Section III/
Question 2. It is computed using the Blau/Rushing diversity index of sworn
personnel assigned to specific work categories over all sworn personnel. Langworthy
(2002) cautions against using the count of the number of specialized units as it they
are "boutique units" and overlook basic policing functions such as patrol,
investigations, and so forth (p. 34).
Occupational Differentiation. Occupation differentiation is the specialization
of work and degree to which an organization employs such specialists. Both
Langworthy (2002) and Maguire (1997; 2003) argue that the greater the proportion
of civilians employed within a police organization, the greater the degree of
specialization and knowledge complexity. This variable is takenfromthe Falcone &
Wells dataset and originally constructedfromLEMAS Section Hi/Question 2, which
asks for the number of non-sworn personnel employed by the organization. The
variable is computed by taking the number of full-time sworn personnel divided by
the number of full time personnel in the agency and the multiplied by 100. In
essence, this variable represents the degree to which an organization has assigned
tasks to civilian personnel.
Spatial Differentiation. Langworthy (2002) and Maguire (2003) both
describe spatial differentiation as the number of fixed substations separate from
headquarters. Although Maguire (2003) also adds the number of patrol beats,
Langworthy (2002) cautions against this as the number of stations is more indicative
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of Blau's (1970) construct of spatial differentiation. This variable is takenfromthe
Falcone & Wells dataset and originally constructedfromLEMAS Section 1/
Question 2, which asks for the number of stations the organization operates.
Organizational Context
A multitude of organizational context indicators are used to test structural
contingency theory.
Organization Size. I simply measured organization size as the total number of
full-time personnel, both sworn and non-sworn, employed by the organization. This
is consistent with Langworthy (1983) and Maguire (2003). The variable isfromthe
Falcone & Wells dataset and is constructed from a sum of items 171 and 173 from
Section HU Question 2 on LEMAS.
Task Scope. Task Scope is a 23-item index that asks responding agencies for
the functions over which they have primary responsibility. The variable isfromthe
Falcone & Wells dataset and constructed from LEMAS Section 1/ Question 1.
Population Change. Population change is the percent change in population of
a jurisdiction between 1990 and 2000. The Falcone and Wells dataset provide the
population count for 1990 and the 2000 U.S. Census is used to compute the rate of
change. The percent change is calculated as:
2000 Population - \990Population „. inn
1990 Population
J

m
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2000 Unemployment Rate. The 2000 unemployment rate for each jurisdiction
is calculated as:
f NumberllnemployedV
\ CivilianLaborForce J

,-\

Racial Heterogeneity. The racial heterogeneity index utilizes the
Blau/Rushing method indicated by populations in all racial categories. This variable
is takenfromthe Falcone and Wells dataset and was originally obtained from the
County-City Data Book 1994.
Change in Median Household Income. The change in median household
income indicates the percent change of a community's household income between
1990 and 2000. The Falcone and Wells dataset provide 1990 median household
incomefiguresand the 2000 U.S. Census is augmented to calculate the percent
change as:
[2000Income - \990Income]
*100
I9901ncome

(3)

Institutional Environmental Variables
GALEA Accreditation. The Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) is a body which certifies police
organizations as meeting a specified professional standard. Participation in the
accreditation process is purely voluntarily. However, once an agency decides to
pursue the accreditation it must conform to CALEA standards and be reviewed by a
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panel. This is a dichotomous (dummy) variable to represent whether the agency is
accredited or not. Information to construct this variable is gatheredfromGALEA.
Community Oriented Policing Index. This index is a continuous variable in
the Falcone & Wells dataset and is originally constructedfromLEMAS as a sum of
all items in section V asking about the use and implementation of community
policing concepts. The higher the score on the index, the greater the degree the
organizations uses the community policing concept.
Urban Presence. From the Falcone & Wells data set, this variable indicates
the type of urban area in which a police organization is located. The variable is
constructed as a dichotomous (dummy) variable representing whether the agency is
located in an urban or non-urban setting. The information for this variable was
originally constructedfromthe U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service.
Union Influence. Union influence is located in the Falcone & Wells dataset
and is constructed from 1997 LEMAS Section TV/ Question 10 and 11. It is an
indexed variable that measures the degree that unions, and the collective bargaining
process is present within the organization.
Funding. Information for this variable comesfromthe Office of Justice
Programs Universal Hiring Grant Program. To create the variable, the total dollar

amount the agency received is divided by the total number of personnel in the
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organization. This is consistent with similar techniques of Maguire (2003) and
Wilson (2006).10
Index Crime Rate. This variable is takenfromthe Falcone and Wells dataset
and constructedfromthe Uniform Crime Report. It is an average of the index crime
rate for year 1996-1999.
Region. This variable is taken from the Falcone and Wells dataset and
represents the region in which the agency operates. There are four regions; South,
Northeast, Midwest, and West. The South region serves as the reference category
and the Northeast, Midwest, and West regions are all dichotomous variables (dummy
coded) representing whether the agency is located in that region, or elsewhere.
Control Variable
Law Enforcement Oriented. This variable is the percent of full-time sworn
personnel whose regular duties include responding to calls for service. A high
percentage of this variable indicates that the police agency is more law enforcement
oriented. This becomes particular useful when speaking about Sheriffs Offices,
which may be less law enforcement oriented than other Sheriffs Offices and
municipal police agencies. This variable is takenfromthe Falcone & Wells Dataset
and is created from Section HI/ Question 2 &3 of LEMAS.

Funding information was provided to me by Brian Renauer in the Department of Criminology and
Criminal Justice at Portland State University.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample of Independent Variables
Variable

Minimum

Maximum Mean

SD

EMP
EMP

1
0

51348
25

223.96
1348

1260.59
3.975

2324
2328

Continuous
Continuous

EMP

0

.8847

.247

.219

2328

Continuous

EMP/2000
Census

•A
42.77

109.48

11.505

16.87

2328

Continuous

2000
Census

0

30.70

5.936

2.952

2328

Continuous

EMP/2000
Census

-113

130

42.55

13.89

2328

Continuous

CALEA

—

EMP
EMP

-66.890
*>•*

8.795

.290

2.92

2323
2318

Union Influence
Funding (per
employee)
1996-1999 Index
Crime Rate
NE Region

EMP
DOJ/COPS

0
0

5
87781.57

2.63
4017.69

1.642
6921.56

2209
2326

Continuous
Dummy
(NonMetro is
reference)
Continuous
Continuous

EMP

0

33257.34

5114.39

3766.86

2013

Continuous

EMP

—

-

-

~

2328

Midwest Region

EMP

2328

West Region

EMP

2328

Dummy
(South is
reference)
Dummy
(South is
reference)
Dummy
(South is
reference)

Agency Context
Size
Task Scope
Environmental
Stability
Racial
Heterogeneity
Percent
Population
Change 19891999
2000
Unemployment
Rate
Percent Change
in Median
Household
Income 19891999
Institutional
Variables
CALEA
Accreditation
Adoption of COP
Urban Presence

N

Variable
jYpe

Source

2327 Dummy
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Structural Variables
Variable
Vertical
Differentiation
(Organization
Height)

Source
EMP

Minimum
77.44

Maximum
600

Mean
201.15

SD
60.53

N
2147

Variable Type
Continuous

Functional
Differentiation
Occupational
Differentiation
(Percent
Civilianized)
Spatial
Differentiation
(Number of
Stations)
Administrative
Density

EMP

0

.9120

.340

.218

2306

Continuous

EMP

0

89.60

24.91

16.97

2325

Continuous

EMP

1

99

4.69

2326

Continuous

EMP

0

100

15.76

2325

Continuous

14.09

DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY

This is a quantitative exploration that employs two methodsfromthe General
Linear Model - Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) and Hierarchical
Multiple Regression (HMR) utilizing functional sets. n The descriptive statistics in
Tables 4 and 5 presented approximately 2,328 cases for most variables. Listwise
deletion methods were instituted during the analysis so that only cases having data
for all variables in a given model were used. The cases that were deleted listwise
were analyzed and found to be missing completely at random (MCAR), and
therefore did not warrant imputation.
n Hierarchical Multiple Regression should not be confused with the more recent advent of
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). Although the two are derivatives of linear regression, they are
two separate and distinct methods.
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The merged and completed dataset produced a useable sample of 660
Sheriffs Offices, 594 municipal agencies serving jurisdiction with populations under
25,000, and 644 larger municipal police organizations for formalization,
administrative intensity, and: functional, spatial, and occupational differentiation
models. For the vertical differentiation model, 628 Sheriffs Offices, 586 municipal
police agencies serving jurisdictions with populations under 25,000, and 643 larger
municipal police organizations were utilized.
MANOVA
Research Question 1 deals with a global investigation into whether one can
state if there are differences in organization structure between Sheriffs Offices,
municipal police organizations, and municipal police organizations serving
populations under 25,000. Therefore, an Analysis of Variance is a useful method to
determine the differences through the comparison of means for statistical difference
on the dependent measures of organization structure. Such a method has been
employed in the past (Chowdhury and Miles, 2006) when researching differences in
structure between relevant organization types. Since this research has six different
measures of organization structure, it is useful to employ MANOVA because it
allows for the comparison of structural configurations between organizations
simultaneously using all of the dependent variables. The MANOVA procedure will
address hypotheses 1 through 7.
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Hierarchical Multiple Regression
HMR is an extension of the General Linear Model and described as a useful
method for theory building in organization research (Swanson and Holton, 2005). In
HMR, a set of independent variables (IV) is entered in a sequential manner to predict
the dependent variable. Using functional sets, the researcher will group independent
variables into sets a priori based upon the logic of the research and nature of the
corresponding research questions (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003). Each set
is entered sequentially (in an individual step) regressing the dependent variable (Y)
on the set to determine how well the set predicts the dependent variable. Subsequent
sets are then added to investigate how well the added set predicts the dependent
variable above and beyond the previous set(s). This is accomplished by partitioning
into increments the proportion of the dependent variable's variance (R2) due to the
addition of each of the newly introduced sets (Cohen, et al., 2003). Equation 4 is an
example of how the HMR equation is set up.
Set A
A

SetB
^

t

A

^

Y=Bo+B1X1+B2X2+B3X3+ B^+BsXs+BiXs

(4)

Although this method utilizes the ordinary least squares regression equation,
its most striking difference from the traditional approach is that it places an increased
emphasis on the significant addition of added variance at each step, rather than solely
focusing on the significance of the coefficients. If the addition of a set of variables
significantly adds to the variance, then one may identify the significant variables
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within that set as predictors of the set, or construct (Cohen, et al, 2003). This method
is the most appropriate method to use in addressing research questions two, three,
and four since the nature of the questions inherently deal with partitioning the
variance among sets of indicators.
A separate HMR analysis is first performed for the aggregate sample.
Although this analysis will not address any specific research question, I view it as
both a descriptive and diagnostic tool to investigate possible differences across the
police organization type models and check for possible errors in data. I then perform
HMR analysis for each of the dependent structural dimensions on Sheriffs Offices,
municipal police agencies serving populations over 25,000, and municipal police
agencies serving populations under 25,000. Research question two, dealing with
organizational contingency isfirstintroduced as a set, then environmental
contingencies are introduced, and finally institutional environmental conditions are
introduced. This strategy allows for comparisons of the proportion of the dependent
variables' variance to be compared across groups for each of the dependent structural
measures and therefore specifically addresses the associated hypotheses of research
questions two, three, and four.
For each of the models predicting the six structural dimensions, the
associated equation relating to the proportion of explained variance can be
represented as:
R Y.OEI = R YO + R Y(OE) + R Y 0OE)

(5)
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Where 'O' is the organizational contingencies; 'E' is the external contingencies; and
T is the institutional environment.
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CHAPTERV
RESULTS
Results are reported for the analytic steps outlined in the previous chapter.
First, one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted in order
to assess whether there were significant differences among the dependent structural
dimensions between Sheriffs Offices, municipal police agencies serving populations
under 25,000, and municipal police agencies (Hypothesis 1-7). Second, Hierarchal
Multiple Regression (HMR) was used to test hypotheses 8,9, &10 in determining the
effects that agency context, environmental complexity, and institutional environment
had upon each of the dimensions of formal structure across police organization types.
MANOVA

A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to
test Hypotheses 1 through 7 in determining if there was a significant difference
between Sheriffs Offices, municipal police agencies serving populations under
25,000, and municipal police agencies serving populations over 25,000 in each of the
dimensions of formal organization structure. Significant differences were found
among the three organization types on the dependent measures, Wilks's A =.331,
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F(12,4280)=263.465, p<001. The multivariate rj2 based on Wilks's A was strong,
.425.
Table 6. Analysis of variance on structural dimensions.

207.597(71.896)

Small Municipal
Agency
(n=683)
Mean(SD)
172.082(40.105)

Municipal
Agency
(n=691)
Mean (SD)
222.144(50.927)

.522 (.213)

.254 (.131)

.203 (.105)

33.911 (21.421)

17.7(10.80)

22.329(8.438)

3.01(4.285)

1.52 (.949)

4.67(6.78)

20.236(19.468)

13.288 (10.639)

6.372(4.538)

8(2.552)

8.10(2.2)

9.06(1.725)

Sheriffs Office
(n=774)
Mean (SD)
Vertical
Differentiation
Functional
Differentiation
Occupational
Differentiation
Spatial
Differentiation
Administrative
Intensity
Formalization

F(df)

V

142.399
(2,2145)***
855.476
(2,2145)***
226.045
(2,2145)***
78.752
(2,2145)***
196.025
(2,2145)***
50.035
(2, 2145)###

.117
.444
.174
.068
.155
.045

***p<001; **p<01; *p<05

Analysis of variances (ANOVA) on each dependent variable were conducted
as follow-up tests to the MANOVA.12 Using the Bonferroni adjustment method, each
ANOVA was tested at the .008 level. B The ANOVA results for each dependent
variable are displayed in table 6. Post hoc analyses to the Univariate ANOVAs of
each dependent variable consisted of conducting pairwise comparisons to find which
organization types differed among each of the structural dimensions. A Levene's test
for the equality of variances was significant at the .001 level, suggesting that the
variance across the groups was not equal. Although parametric tests in the family of
12

Diagnostics of the measures of spatial differentiation and administrative intensity revealed nonnormality in the distribution of the data. MANOVA and ANOVA are robust against such departures
of normality.
13

The/) values of MANOVA do not take into account that multiple ANOVAs have been conducted.
Type I error is controlled by dividing z,p value of .05 by the number of ANOVAs conducted.
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the general linear model require equality of variance across groups, analysis of
variance is very robust against violations of this assumption (Green and Salkind,
2005; McNabb, 2002). Since equality of variance could not be assumed, each
pairwise combination was tested at the .008 level divided by 3 (.002 level) utilizing
the Dunnett's T3 test, which does not assume equality of variances.14 All pairwise
combinations of police organization type on each dependent variable were
significant at the .001 level, except there was not a significant difference of
formalization between Sheriffs offices and small municipal police agencies. The
results of the post-hoc MANOVA analysis are presented in table 7.

Bonferroni adjustment was again used to control for Type 1 error where the desired significance
level (p<. 05) is divided by the number of groups in the pairwise comparisons.
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Table 7. MANOVA post-hoc results
Dependent Variable

Organization Type (I)

Organization Type (J)

Vertical Differentiation
(Organization Height)

Sheriffs Office

Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Sheriff's Office
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Municipal Agency
Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency

Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency
Functional Differentiation
(Functional Heterogeneity
Index)

Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency

Occupational
Differentiation (Percent of
Employees Civilian)

Sheriff s Office
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency

Spatial Differentiation
(Number of Stations)

Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency

Formalization Index

Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency

Administrative Intensity

Sheriffs Office
Small Municipal Agency
Municipal Agency

***p<.001; **p<01; *p<05

Mean
Difference
35.902***
-14.248***
-35.902***
-50.150***
14.248***
50.150***
.268***
.318***
-.268***
.050***
-.318***
-.050***
15.010***
10.615***
-15.010***
-4 39***
-10.615***
4 39***
1.387***
-1.691***
-1.387***
-3.078***
1.691***
3.078***
-.290
-1.253***
.290
-.964***
1.253***
.964***
7 47***
1454***
-7.47***
7.06***
-14.543***
-7.068***
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Given the results of the MANOVA, the null hypothesis that Sheriffs Offices,
small municipal police agencies, and municipal police agencies share the same
degree of organizational complexity and control is rejected. This provides some
degree of evidence that the organization types are different and supports research
hypotheses 1,2,3,4,5, and 7. Research hypotheses 6 stated that there would be
significant differences of formalization between organization types but could not be
supported after post hoc tests revealed there was no significant difference between
Sheriffs Offices and small municipal agencies. To assist in explaining what factors
lead to the formation of given structure and subsequently what theories explain this
formation, I move to Hierarchal Multiple Regression.

HIERARCHICAL MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Hierarchal Multiple Regression Diagnostics and Multivariate Assumptions
The use of multiple regression techniques requires the satisfaction of several
assumptions. The ultimate effects of violations of these assumptions on regression
models is actively debated by theorists. One assumption is that there is an absence of
multicollinearity or linear dependency between independent variables. To diagnose
this issue researchers examine correlations between the independent variables.
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The analysis did notfindany severe multicollinearity between independent
variables.15 Additionally, Durbin-Watson statistics were analyzed to determine if
there was any serial correlation among the residuals in the regression models. All
models produced acceptable Durbin-Watson statistics.
Another assumption is that the data being analyzed is normally distributed.
Several of the variables, both dependent and independent, were found to depart from
the normal distribution. Maguire (2003) encountered a similar problem during his
analysis that he was not able to fully rectify. Organization size and agency funding
suffered from heavy positive skew and kurtosis. Organization size has proven to
consistently be skewed in police organization research and is usually logarithmically
transformed (Maguire, 2003; Paoline & Sloan, 2003; Wilson, 2006). Fortius
research, the natural log of organization size is taken and a constant of 10 is added.
Typically, a researcher will add a constant of the minimum value or one plus the
minimum value. However, in this data a constant of 10 was needed to keep the
minimum values above zero. The logarithmic transformation was successful in
normally distributing the data. The natural log of funding per employee the agency
received also alleviated skew and kurtosis. The 1996-1999 index crime rate had an
acceptable skew statistic, but suffered from mild kurtosis. To alleviate the kurtosis,
the variable was square root transformed.
is

In the initial model specification, jurisdiction size was to be used as a control variable but it had a
significant strong linear relationship to organization size. Additionally, the percent change of families
below the poverty between 1990-2000 was specified as a predictor in the environmental contingency
set but it had a significant linear relationship with percent change in median household income and
was subsequently dropped from the analyses.
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Two measures of structural dimensions were also not normally distributed,
spatial differentiation (number of stations) and administrative intensity. Maguire
(2003) found spatial differentiation to suffer from heavy skew and kurtosis and
attempted to alleviate the issue through logarithmic transformation. Although this
mitigated his problems of normal distribution, it did not solve it. I also take the
natural log of the variable andfindit to be successful in normally distributing the
variable. Both Maguire (2003) and Paoline and Sloan (2003) found administrative
intensity to suffer from heavy positive skew. This data set proved to be no different
and the natural log was also taken of this variable, which alleviated the problem and
normally distributed the variable.
Finally, the issue of outliers must be addressed. Police organizations come in
a variety of shapes and sizes. Agencies like the New York City police department,
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office, and Cook County Sheriffs Office frequently
are diagnosed as outliers. This research follows Maguire's (2003) argument that the
considerable diversity among organizations says something in and of itself about the
gamut of police organizations. Therefore, like Maguire (2003), rather than
'trimming' or over-fitting the model, these case are retained.16

Diagnostics showed that population change had severe skew because of oudiers. Some
communities had explosive growdi in the last 10 years. All models were run with those outiiers and
without. Subsequently I was forced to eliminate the communities with population changes over 120%
because of the effects it had on the coefficients and their statistical significance.
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Hierarchal Multiple Regression Results
Hierarchal multiple regression models were used to test hypotheses 8,9, and
10. Three linear hierarchical regression analyses were run for each dependent
measure of organization complexity and control. While the first model represents the
full sample of police organizations in the dataset, the second, third, and fourth
models are regression equations for each police organization type. In these
regressions (one for each dependent variable), Size, task scope, and the control of
law enforcement orientation was first introduced as a block. Next, racial
heterogeneity, the 2000 unemployment rate, percent change in median household
income between 1989 andl999, and percent population change between 1990 and
2000 was introduced to represent environmental contingencies. Finally, CALEA
accreditation, community oriented policing index, urban presence, union influence,
funding, 1996 to 1999 index crime rate, and region was introduced to represent the
institutional environment. Tables 8 through 13 present the results of this analysis.
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Table 8. Vertical Differentiation as Dependent Measure

Intercept
STEP1
Control
Law Enforcement
Orientation
Organizational
Contingency
Size (In)
Task Scope Index
R2
STEP 2
Environmental
Contingencies
Racial Heterogeneity
Index
2000 Unemployment
Rate
Change in Median
Household Income
Population Change
R2 Increment
R2
STEP 3
Institutional
Environment
CALEA
COP Index
Urban Presence
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index
Crime Rate
NE Region

Midwest Region
West Region
R2 Increment
R2

FULL SAMPLE
n=1854

SHERIFF OFFICE
n=628

MUNICIPAL
n=643

117.996

96.334

SMALL
AGENCY
n=586
79.116

P

P

P

P

-.067**

-.047

-.002

-.050

.573***
-.036
.367

.574***
-.047
.387

.404
-.030
.170

.436***
-.047
.192

.094***

.063***

.003

.062

.036

-.005

.097**

.030

.039*
.015***
.382

.009
.040***
.427

.045
.016*
.186

.041
.006
.198

.010
.042*
-.006
-.047*
-.002
-.080***

.027
.060
-.045
-.072*
-.017
.059

.003
.033
.026
.041
-.050
-.053

.016
.021
.004
-.014
.061
-.112*

.030

- 140***
-.131***
.038***
.420

-.051

-.116**
-.193***
.053***
.480

Beta coefficients reported are from the final step of each analysis
***p<001; **p<01; *p<.05

190***
-.033

.140*

-.071
.031
.043***
.229

131.391

.091*
.005

.053

-.159***
- 164***
.063***
.261
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Table 9. Occupational Differentiation as Dependent Measure

Intercept
STEP1
Control
Law Enforcement
Orientation
Organizational
Contingency
Size (In)
Task Scope Index
R2
STEP 2
Environmental
Contingencies
Racial Heterogeneity
Index
2000 Unemployment
Rate
Change in Median
Household Income
Population Change
R2Increment
R2

FULL SAMPLE
n=1898

SHERIFF OFFICE
n=660

MUNICIPAL
n=644

-32.35

SMALL
AGENCY
n=594
-6.039

-.339

P

P

P

P

. 304* * *

.675***

.540***
.009
.028

,740***
-.048
.252

14.406

.063

•.006

.351***
.075
.092

.074
.118***
.045

-.052*

-.059

-.115*

-.088*

-.006

.016

-.052

-.078

.049*

.027

.142***

-.082*

.036
.059***
.088

.005
.009
.265

.015
.047***
.144

.065
.082***
.127

STEP 3
Institutional
Environment
-.082*
CALEA
-.044*
-.100**
COP Index
-.087***
-.113**
Urban Presence
-.165***
.029
Union Influence
.018
Funding (In)
.002
.010
1996-1999 Index
-.328***
-.088*
Crime Rate
NE Region
- 319***
-.083*
.036
Midwest Region
-.046
West Region
.040
-.001
R2 Increment
.186***
.032***
R2
.274
.297
Beta coefficients reported are from the final step of each analysis
***p<.001; **p<01; *p<05

-.008
_|29***
-.033
.067
-.039
-.022

-.010
.070*
.083**
.005
.005
.003

-.271***
-.114*
.044
.059***
.203

-.439***
-.152***
.232***
.259***
.386

95

Table 10. Functional Differentiation as Dependent Measure
MUNICIPAL
n=644

1.062

SMALL
AGENCY
n=594
.849

P

P

P

P

-.519***

-.729***

-.346***

-.058

-.072*
.037
.270

-.283***
.043
.340

-.581***
.025
.227

.092
.006
.012

-.016

-.073

.128**

-.002

FULL SAMPLE
n=1898
Intercept
STEP1
Control
Law Enforcement
Orientation
Organizational
Contingency
Size (In)
Task Scope Index
R2
STEP 2
Environmental
Contingencies
Racial Heterogeneity
Index
2000 Unemployment
Rate
Change in Median
Household Income
Population Change
R2 Increment
R2
STEP 3
Institutional
Environment
GALEA
COP Index
Urban Presence
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index
Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest Region
West Region
R2 Increment
R2

.925

SHERIFF OFFICE
n=660

.202

.043*

.009

-.052

.152**

.077***

.032

.011

.083*

-,021
.032***
.302

-.082*
.004
.344

-.019
-.031
-.131***
-.127***
-.028
-.315***

-.020
.050
.088
-.095**
-.098**
.022

.00
.013
-.066
-.035
-.035
-.007

.058
-.017
-.036
-.004
-.036
-.104

-.115***
-.042
-.060**
.122***
.424

-.033
-.014
.048
.025**
.369

-.116
-.094*
-.026
.021*
.283

-.010
-.031
-.113*
.019
.048

Beta coefficients reported are from thefinalstep of each analysis
***p<001; **p<01; *p<.05

.059
.035***
.262

-.048
.017*
.029
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Table 11. Spatial Differentiation as Dependent Measure

Intercept
STEP1
Control
Law Enforcement
Orientation
Organizational
Contingency
Size (In)
Task Scope Index
R2
STEP 2
Environmental
Contingencies
Racial Heterogeneity
Index
2000 Unemployment
Rate
Change in Median
Household Income
Population Change
R2 Increment
R2
STEP 3
Institutional
Environment
CALEA
COP Index
Urban Presence
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index
Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest Region
West Region
R2 Increment
R2

MUNICIPAL
n=644

-1.047

SMALL
AGENCY
n=594
-.184

P

P

P

FULL SAMPLE
n=1898

SHERIFF OFFICE
n=660

-1.216

P

-1.798

.075***

245***

-.037

.013

.687***
.003
.459

720***
.038
.486

.099
.048
.087

.560***
-.055
.408

.097

.022

.014

-.021

.037*

-.002

.091*

-.073*
-.004

.030

.016

-.035
.005***
.464

.00
.005
.491

.011
.024**
.110

-.043
.025***
.433

.041*
.065***
-.047*
-.026
.052**
.012

.015
.120***
-.033
-.011
.024
-.016

.041
.124**
-.014
.003
.006
.211***

.053
.054
-.024
-.014
.081**
.091*

.006
-.017
.032
.012***
.476

.044
-.029
.121***
.029***
.520

.089
-.025
-.046
Q42***
.151

-.008
-.056
-.017
.024***
.457

.036

Beta coefficients reported are from thefinalstep of each analysis
***p<001; **p<.01; *p<05
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Table 12. Administrative Intensity as Dependent Measure

Intercept
STEP1
Control
Law Enforcement
Orientation
Organizational
Contingency
Size (In)
Task Scope Index
R2
STEP 2
Environmental
Contingencies
Racial Heterogeneity
Index
2000 Unemployment
Rate
Change in Median
Household Income
Population Change
R2 Increment
R2
STEP 3
Institutional
Environment
CALEA
COP Index
Urban Presence
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index
Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest Region
West Region
R2 Increment
R2

MUNICIPAL
n=644

4.372

SMALL
AGENCY
n=594
4.688

P

P

P

P

-170***

-.236***

-.219***

.043

-.432***
-.005
.267

-.512***
-.051
.252

-.575***
.042
.222

FULL SAMPLE
n=1914

SHERIFF OFFICE
n=660

4.065

2.244

-.158**
.042
.021

.023

-.040

.041

.071

.031

.040

-.044

.088

.088**

.028

.045

.078***
-.028
.018***
.285

-.097**
.016**
.268

.056
.013*
.235

-.017
.009
.030

-.001
-.045*
-.120
.004
-.012
-.150***

-.034
-.001
-.012
.023
-.062
.368

.030
-.048
-.064
.044
-.032
.003

.040
-.013
-.086*
.047
.015
-.108

-.093**
-.014
.004
039***
.324

-.020
.019
.040
.008
.276

-.139*
-.086
.002

-.078
-.015
.034

.021

.018

.256

.048

Beta coefficients reported are from the final step of each analysis
***p<.001; **p<01; *p<.05
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Table 13. Formalization as Dependent Measure

Intercept
STEP1
Control
Law Enforcement
Orientation
Organizational
Contingency
Size (In)
Task Scope Index
R2
STEP 2
Environmental
Contingencies
Racial Heterogeneity
Index
2000 Unemployment
Rate
Change in Median
Household Income
Population Change
R2 Increment
R2

FULL SAMPLE
n=1898

SHERIFF OFFICE
n=660

SMALL
AGENCY
n=594

MUNICIPAL
n=644

6.412
P

6.351
P

7.059

6.103

.013

-.014

.034

.005

.100**
.076**
.087

.092
.128**
.090

.117*
-.047
.012

.115*
.120**
.064

-.026

-.049

.008

-.003

-.001

-.044

.058

-.016

.015

.016

.002

.031

.00
.002
.088

-.009
.007
.096

.016
.004
.016

-.004
.009
.073

.064**
.229***
.037
.030
.028
.015

-.008
.158***
.038
.047
.095**
.018

STEP 3
Institutional
Environment
CALEA
COP Index
Urban Presence
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index
Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest Region
West Region
R2 Increment
R2

.087*
.292***
-.011
.036
-.053
-.089

.006

-.048

.066

.010
.004
.054***
.143

-.036
-.093*
.040***
.136

.105*
.058
.103***
.119

Beta coefficients reported are from the final step of each analysis
***p<001; **p<01; *p<05

.127**
198***
-.027
.016
.038
.007
.016

-.041
.084
.066***
.139

Tables 14 through 16 present a summary of the results for the total explained
variance each set had upon the dependent structural dimensions.
Table 14. Total Explained Variance for Sheriffs Offices

Organization Height
(Vertical
Differentiation)
Civilianization
(Occupational
Differentiation)
Functional
Heterogeneity
Number of Stations
(Spatial
Differentiation)
Administrative
Intensity
Number of Policies
(Formalization)

Organizational
Contingency
R 2 =387

External Environmental
Contingency
R 2 =427***

Institutional
Environment
R 2 =480***

R 2 =252

No Added Variance

R2=.297***

R 2 =344

No Added Variance

R 2 =369**

R 2 =486

No Added Variance

R 2 =520***

R 2 =252

R 2 =268**

No Added Variance

R 2 =090

No Added Variance

R 2 =136***

*p<001; **p<01; *p<05

Table 15. Total Explained Variance for Smaller Municipal Agencies

Organization Height
(Vertical
Differentiation)
Civilianization
(Occupational
Differentiation)
Functional
Heterogeneity
Number of Stations
(Spatial
Differentiation)
Administrative
Intensity
Number of Policies
(Formalization)

Organizational
Contingency
R 2 ~170

External Environmental
Contingency
R 2 =016*

Institutional
Environment
R2=.229***

R 2 =092

j^ 2 = j44***

R 2 =203***

R 2 =227

R 2 =262***

R 2 =283*

R 2 =087

R 2 =110**

R 2 =151***

R 2 =222

R2=235*

N o Added Variance

R 2 =012

No Added Variance

T>2_ J J^***

***p<001; **p<01; *p<05
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Table 16. Total Explained Variance for Larger Municipal Agencies

Organization Height
(Vertical
Differentiation)
Civiiianization
(Occupational
Differentiation)
Functional
Heterogeneity
Number of Stations
(Spatial Differentiation)
Administrative Intensity
Number of Policies
(Formalization)
***p<.001; **p< 01; *p<05

Organizational
Contingency
R2=192

External Environmental
Contingency
No Added Variance

Institutional
Environment
R2=261***

R2=045

R2=.127***

R2=386***

R2=012

R2=029*

No Added Variance

R2=408

R2=433***

R2=457***

R2=021
R2=.064

No Added Variance
No Added Variance

No Added Variance
R2=139***

Organizational Contingency
Hypothesis 8 stated that organizational contingencies would be a significant
predictor of larger municipal organizations, but not for smaller Sheriffs Offices and
smaller municipal agencies. For each of the dependent measures, the HMR models
explain a greater degree of the variance for Sheriffs Offices over smaller municipal
police agencies and municipal agencies. While organization contingency appears to
be a poor predictor for small municipal agencies, it explains a greater portion of
dependent organization structure measures for Sheriffs Offices over other police
organization types. Hypothesis 8 is therefore not supported, as the HMR model
illustrates that the opposite appears to be more likely. On each dependent structural
measure, Sheriffs Offices routinely had higher R2 statistics, to include: Vertical
DifferentiationR2= .387F(2,624>=104.591; occupational differentiationR2=252

F(2,656)=56.423; functional differentiation R2=.340 F(2,656)=18.181; spatial
differentiation R2= .486 F(2,656>=237.522; administrative intensity R2= .252
F(2,656)=97.317; formalization R2=.090 F(2,656)=24.20.
Within the organization contingency set, organization size was a significant
predictor of structure in Sheriffs Offices in all dimensions except formalization.
Additionally, when Sheriffs Offices were disaggregated from the full sample, the
regression coefficients for the size variable increased and were consistently greater
than other police organization types. For smaller municipal agencies and larger
agencies, the results were somewhat more inconsistent. Size was a significant
predictor of vertical differentiation for larger municipal police agencies (p= .436,
p<001), but not for the larger organizations. Increasing size significantly predicted
occupation differentiation (fS= .351, p<.001) in smaller agencies but had no
significant effect on larger municipal organizations. Likewise, size had a significant
inverse relationship with functional differentiation for smaller agencies
(p"= -.346, p<.001) but once again no significant effect on larger municipal
organizations. Conversely, size was a significant predictor of spatial differentiation
for larger municipal (P=.560, p<.001) organizations but not for smaller police
organizations. Among the organization control dimensions, size significantly
predicted formalization (fi= .117, p<.05) and administrative intensity (p= -.575,
p<001) in smaller municipal police organizations as well as formalization (P=.115,
p<.05) and administrative intensity (§= -.158, p<.01) in their larger counterparts.
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Of notable interest is the lack of a significant relationship found between task
scope and the dependent organization measures. Task scope was a significant
predictor of occupation differentiation for larger municipal police organizations
(P=.l 18, p<001) but not for Sheriffs Offices and smaller police organizations. Task
scope did, however, significantly predict formalization for Sheriffs Offices (P=. 128,
p<.01) and municipal police organizations (|3=.120, p<01), but not for smaller
municipal organizations. This suggests that the majority of explained variance in
most of the models likely emanatesfromorganization size.
Environmental Contingency
Step 2 of the HMR model relates to the hypothesis that environmental
contingencies, in the form of environmental uncertainty and complexity predicts
structure in both large and small municipal agencies, but does not have a significant
effect on Sheriffs Offices (Hypothesis 9). The addition of the environmental
variables set, after controlling for organization contingency did not significantly
increase the proportion of explained variance of the model for Sheriffs Offices in
four of the six dependent measures. The addition of the environmental variables only
had a significant predictive effect for Sheriffs Offices, over and above organization
contingency, on vertical differentiation (R2change= .040, F(4,620>=10.85 p<.001)
and administrative intensity (R2 change= .016, F(4,652)=3.528 p<.01) with
population change negatively related to the level of administrative intensity
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(p"= -.097, p<.01) and change in median household income having a positive
significant relationship ((3= .088, p<..01).
For smaller municipal police agencies, the addition of the environmental
variables set significantly added to the increase explained variance for: vertical
differentiation(R2=016 F(4,578)=2.785 jK.05); occupational differentiation
(R2=. 047 F(4,586)=7.964 p<.001); functional differentiation (R2=.035 F(4,586)=7.0
p<.001); spatial differentiation (R2= .024 F(4,586)=3.874 p<.01); and administrative
intensity (R2=.013 F(4,586)=2.476 p<.05). Simply stated, after controlling for
organization contingency, the addition of the environmental set of variables added
significant explanatory power to all dependent measures except formalization for
smaller municipal police agencies. This suggests that municipal police departments
located in jurisdictions that have populations under 25,000 arrange their organization
structures to some degree around the community.
For larger police organizations, there was only a significant increase in
explained variance for occupational differentiation (R2 change .= 082,
F(4,636)=14.963 p<.001); functional differentiation (R2 change .017,
F(4,636)=2.777 p<.05); and spatial differentiation (R2 change .025, p<.001). Within
the environmental variable set, unemployment predicted spatial differentiation
( p= .091, p<.05) and functional differentiation ( p=.152, p<.01), while racial
heterogeneity predicted occupational differentiation (fJ= -.088. p<.05) and vertical
differentiation ( |3= .091, p<.05). This suggests that as unemployment increases in
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communities served by larger municipal agencies, they will become more spatially
located and more functionally complex. Additionally, as racial diversity increases in
the community, the lower the proportion of civilian workers it will have and the
taller the organization will be. Thus, larger municipal police departments in more
racially diverse jurisdictions tend to be slightly more mechanistic.
Therefore, the second step of the HMR analysis provides evidence to support
Hypothesis 9, although somewhat weaker for larger municipal police organizations.
Above and beyond organization contingency, Sheriffs Offices appear to largely be
insulated from their external environment compared to smaller municipal police
organizations and their larger counterpart. Conversely, the organization structures of
smaller municipal police agencies appear to be significantly effected by their
external environments.
Institutional Environment
The final step in the HMR model relates to Hypothesis 10, which stated that
institutional factors are significant predictors above and beyond organization
contingency and environment of all organization types, explaining a greater degree
of structural configuration than environmental factors. For the full sample of
agencies, the institutional theoretic measures accounted for a significant proportion
of each of the dependent structural measure's variance after controlling for the
effects of organization contingency and external environmental contingencies
(vertical differentiation R2 change = .038, F(9,1837)=13.323, p<.001; occupational
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differentiation R2 change= .186, F(9,1881)=53.645, p<.001; functional
differentiation R2 change=. 122, F(9,1881)=44.459, p<.001; spatial differentiation R2
change= .012 F(9,1881)=4.865, p<.001; formalization R2 change= .054
F(9,1881)=13.191, p<.001; and administrative intensity R2 change= .039,
F(9,1881)=l 1.965, p<.001).When the sample is aggregated, these results suggest that
after controlling for organization context, institutional environments of police
organizations are better predictors of complexity and control than external
contingencies.
When the heterogeneous sample is disaggregated, the same results largely
hold true, and in many cases the proportion of the variance explained for the
dependent structural dimensions above and beyond organization context and
environmental contingencies magnifies. For vertical differentiation, Sheriffs Offices
had an R2 change of .053 F(9, 611)= 6.975, p<.001, with union influence
(P—.072, p<05), Midwest region (p—. 116, p<01), and Western regions (p=-. 193,
P<.001) having a significant negative relationship. Small agencies had an R2 change
of .043, F(9,560)= 3.528, p<.001 with the organization being located in the
Northeast region as the only significant predictor (p=. 140, P<.05). For municipal
agencies, the R2 change was .063, F(9,623>=5.864 , p<.001, with the 1996-1999
crime rate index (p=-. 112, p<.05), Midwest region (P= -.159, p<.001), and West
region ({$= -.164, p<.001) all being negative predictors of the organization's height.

This suggests that the degree of vertical differentiation in an organization largely
varies upon the region in which the organization is located.
For occupational differentiation in Sheriff's Offices, the addition of the
institutional theoretic variables produced an R2 change of .032, F(9,643)= 3.275,
p<.001. Of the variables within this set, the following were inversely related to the
level of civilian employees in the organization: CALEA accreditation (|3= -.082,
p<.05); community oriented policing implementation (p= -.100, p<.01); urban
presence (P= -.113, p<.01); the 1996-1999 index crime rate (p= -.088, p<.05); and
being located in the Northeast region ((3= -.083, p<05). This suggests that a variety
of institutional forces constrain the level of civilianization in Sheriffs Offices.
Municipal agencies serving jurisdictions with a population under 25,000 had
an R2 change of .059, F(9,577)=4.783, p<.001. Within this set, level of community
oriented policing (|3= -.119, p<.001), being in the Northeast region (p= -.271,
fK.001), and being located in the Midwest region (P= -. 114, p<.05) were all
significant negative predictors of the ratio of civilian employees. This suggests that
smaller agencies located within the Northeast and Midwest with increasing levels of
community oriented policing tend to be less occupationally differentiated.
The addition of institutional environmental variables to municipal police
organizations serving jurisdictions with populations over 25,000 resulted in a much
higher proportion of explained variance for occupation differentiation. The R2
change is .259, F(9,627)=29.338, p<.001. Within this set, the level of community
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oriented policing (|3= .070, p<.05) and urban presence (|3= .083, p<.01) were
significant negative predictors. Additionally, all three of the regional variables were
significant. Larger agencies in the Northeast region had the lowest level of
civilianization (0= -.439, p<001), followed by the Midwest (P= -.152, p<.001), and
being located in the Western United States had an opposite effect by increasing
levels of occupational differentiation for larger municipal departments (p= .232,
p<.001). This provides some evidence that for larger departments the region in which
they are located has some mimetic effect on their levels of civilianization.
The institutional environmental variables significantly added to the
proportion of explained variance for functional differentiation in Sheriffs Offices,
R2 change- .025, F(9,643)=2.841, p<.01. Within the set, only Union influence (p=.095, p<.01) and funding (|5=-.098, p<.01) were significant predictors. Municipal
police agencies serving jurisdictions with populations under 25,000 had an R2
change of .021, F(9,577), p<.05, with the only significant predictor being whether
the agency was located in the Midwest (£=-.094, p<.05). The introduction of the
institutional theoretic variables did not significantly add to the proportion of variance
explained for functional differentiation. However, being located in the Western
region of the United States was a significant predictor (p= -.113, p<05).
The proportion of explained variance for spatial differentiation added to the
model after the inclusion of the institutional environmental variables for Sheriffs
Offices was an R2 change of .029, F(9,643)=4.303, p<001. Among the set the level
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of community policing positively predicted the number of stations (P=. 120, p<.001)
as well as being located in the West (P=.121, p<.001). For municipal agencies
serving jurisdictions with populations under 25,000 the R2 change was .041,
F(9,577), p<.001, with community oriented policing (P= .124, p<.01) and the 19961999 index crime rate ({5= .211, p<.001) positively predicting the number of stations.
Municipal agencies had an R2 change of .024, F (9,627)=3.081, p<.001 with funding
level (p=081, p<.01) and the 1996-1999 crime rate index (p= .091, p<.05) being
positive predictors of the number of stations.
For formalization levels in Sheriffs Offices, the addition of the institutional
environmental variables had a significant R2 change of .040, F (9,643)=3.33, p<.001.
Among the set, the level of community oriented policing ((J=.158, p<.001) and
funding level (0=095, p<.01) were positive predictors while being in the Western
United States was a negative predictor (p=-.048,p<.05). For municipal police
agencies serving jurisdictions with populations under 25,000 the R2 change was . 103,
F(9,577)=7.516, p<.001 with CALEA accreditation (p= .087, p<.05), level of
community oriented policing 03=292, p<.001) and being the Midwest (p= .105,
p<.05) all having a positive effect on the level of formalization. For larger municipal
police agencies the R2 change was .066, F (9,627)= 5.325, p<.001. Among the set
CALEA accreditation (P=. 127, p<.01) and community oriented policing (p= .198,
p<.001) were positive predictors.
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These results suggest the level of formalization is far more influenced by the
institutional environment rather than external environmental contingencies.
Remember that the introduction of the external environmental contingencies had no
significant change in the proportion of explained variance for the level of
formalization for all three organization types. Additionally, the level of
implementation of community policing appears to be the common predictor within
the set across all three of the organization types.
For administrative density, the introduction of the institutional theoretic
variables had no significant addition of explained variance for all organization types.
Although in the aggregated sample the introduction of these variables added 3.9% of
explained variance to the model at the p<001 level, when disaggregated from the
group, none of the incremental changes were significant. The absence of statistical
significance in the disaggregated sample suggests that group variability perhaps led
to a Type I error for the aggregated sample. If one were to make inferences to the
larger population of police organizations based upon the results of the aggregated
model, these results would in fact be false and not hold true for individual police
organization types.
Summary
Three hypotheses were tested using hierarchal multiple regression. The
hypotheses were concerned with incrementally and sequentially testing the effects of
a set of variables on dependent measures of organization complexity and control.

110
Hypothesis 8 stated that organizational contingency would be a significant predictor
of larger municipal organizations, but not for smaller Sheriffs Offices and smaller
municipal agencies. This hypothesis was not supported as the opposite appeared to
be true in the regression models. Organizational contingency routinely explained a
greater degree of variance for the dependent measures as compared to municipal
police organizations serving populations under 25,000 and larger municipal police
organizations.
Step 2 of the HMR model tested the hypothesis that environmental
contingencies, in the form of environmental uncertainty and complexity would
predict structure in both large and small municipal agencies, but would not have a
significant effect on Sheriffs Offices. This hypothesis was supported, as the addition
of environmental contingencies did not produce a significant increase in the
explained variance on four of the six dependent structural dimensions of Sheriffs
Offices. Conversely, the addition of the environmental contingencies did have a
significant increase in five of the six dependent structural dimensions for smaller
municipal police agencies. For larger municipal police agencies, there was a
significant increase in the explained variance for three of the six dependent structural
dimensions.
Finally, hypothesis 10 which stated, institutional factors are significant
predictors above and beyond organizational contingencies and the external
environment across all organization types, explaining a greater degree of the
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structural configuration, was accepted. The addition of the institutional
environmental set routinely added a significant amount to the explained variance
controlling for organizational contingencies and environmental contingencies for all
organization types across most dependent structural measures. For larger municipal
agencies, the addition of the institutional set did not have a
significant effect on functional heterogeneity and the set did not have a significant
effect on administrative intensity for all organization types, despite the fact that it
was significant for the aggregated sample.
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CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

When one speaks of new policing reforms, strategies, and research on police
behavior, the topic of formal police organizational structures inevitably arises. In this
research, I argued that if a police organization's structure has a causal or indirect
relationship with the implementation of strategies, officer behavior, or reform, then
examining what contributes to the formation of these structures has practical policy
implications at the local governance level as well as the organizational level.
Moreover, exploring how varying factors and theories contribute to organization
structure across different police organization types aids in building theory and
subsequently informing the criminal justice practitioner and local government policy
maker about the adequacy of'one size fits all' policies to be disseminated across the
spectrum of police agencies. In this chapter, I revisit the research questions and
related hypotheses, provide an overview of the results, and subsequently discuss the
implications of the findings as they relate to theory and research.
Four research questions were addressed during this research. The first
research question addressed whether there was a difference in structure between
Sheriffs offices, municipal police agencies serving jurisdictional populations under
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25,000, and municipal police agencies serving jurisdictions with populations over
25,000. The following seven hypotheses addressed this question:
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference across Sheriffs Offices, municipal
police agencies serving populations under 25,000, and larger
municipal police agencies in the degree to which they are
formally structured.
Hypothesis 2: There are differences in vertical differentiation among
Sheriffs Offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.
Hypothesis 3: There are differences in functional heterogeneity among
Sheriffs offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.
Hypothesis 4: There are differences in occupational differentiation between
Sheriffs offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.
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Hypothesis 5: There are differences in spatial organization between Sheriffs
offices, municipal police agencies serving populations under
25,000, and larger municipal police agencies.
Hypothesis 6: There are differences in formalization organization between
Sheriffs offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.
Hypothesis 7: There are differences in the administrative intensity between
Sheriffs offices, municipal police agencies serving
populations under 25,000, and larger municipal police
agencies.
The second research question examined how well the organizational
contingencies, as measured by organization size and tasks scope, predicted the
formal structure across the three organizational types. The following hypothesis
addressed this question:
Hypothesis 8: Organizational contingencies are a significant predictor of
structure in larger municipal police organizations, explaining a
greater degree of the structural dimensions, but not for smaller
organizations and Sheriffs Offices.
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The third research question addressed how well environmental contingencies,
as measured by; racial heterogeneity, 2000 unemployment rate, change in median
household income, and the change in population between 1990 and 2000 explain and
predict dimensions of formal structure over and above organizational contingencies
across Sheriffs Offices, municipal police agencies, and small municipal police
agencies. The following hypothesis addressed this question:
Hypothesis 9: Environmental contingencies, in the form of environmental
uncertainty, predicts structure in both large and small
municipal agencies, but does not have a significant effect on
Sheriffs Offices.
The fourth, and final research question addressed whether institutional factors, as
measured by; CALEA accreditation, adoption of community policing, crime rate
index, federal funding, union influence, urban presence, and region significantly
predict dimensions of formal structure over and above organizational contingencies
and environmental uncertainty and complexity. The following hypothesis addressed
this question:
Hypothesis 10: Institutional factors are significant predictors above and
beyond organizational contingencies and the external
environment across all organization types, explaining a greater
degree of the structural configuration.
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DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES

Hypotheses 1 through 7 were tested by comparing the different structural
elements across the different police organization types through the use of
MANOVA. There was a significant difference across the three organization types
among each of the elements of the formal structure, with the exception that there was
not a significant difference in levels of formalization between Sheriffs Offices and
municipal police agencies serving jurisdictional populations under 25,000. Larger
municipal agencies are more vertically differentiated than SherifFs Offices and
smaller municipal agencies. This means that municipal police agencies serving
jurisdictional populations over 25,000 have an increased distance between the salary
of the chief executive officer and the entry-level line officer compared to the other
two police organization types.
Sheriffs Offices were considerably more functionally differentiated than
municipal police agencies and larger municipal police agencies were the least
functionally differentiated among the organization types. This means that Sheriffs
Offices have a greater diversity in the manner in which they assign personnel to
functional categories (e.g. investigations, technical support, etc.). Of course, one can

easily argue that Sheriffs Offices have a mandate to be more functionally
differentiated given they are tasked with providing court security, civil services, and
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jail services. Whereas, many municipal police agencies do provide similar services
they are certainly not constitutionally mandated by the state. Given this issue, a
separate follow-up ANOVA was conducted controlling for the law enforcement
orientation of the organizations.17 After the test, Sheriffs Offices still remained more
functionally differentiated than the municipal police organizations.
Sheriffs Offices were also more occupational differentiated than the
municipal police organizations. This simply indicates that Sheriffs Offices utilize a
greater proportion of civilian workers than their municipal counterparts do.
However, many have argued that occupational differentiation is an indicator of the
level of community policing implementation as community police reformers
advocate for increasing civilianization (Maguire, 1997). The larger municipal police
organizations also proved to be more occupationally differentiated than the smaller
municipal organizations.
Larger municipal police agencies were the most spatially differentiated and
smaller municipal police organizations were the least differentiated. This comes as
no surprise as larger organizations tend to utilize more stations, precincts, or contact
offices as they frequently have responsibility for higher density geographic areas.
Small municipal police organizations tend to be located in smaller spatial areas and
although Sheriffs Offices regular have responsibilities for larger geographic areas,
they tend to be significantly less dense in regards to population.
17

The law enforcement orientation control variable is the percent of personnel in the agency
responsible for responding to calls for service.

118
Sheriffs Offices had the greatest degree of administrative intensity and larger
municipal police organizations had the least. This means that Sheriffs are devoting a
greater amount of their resources to the administrative component of the organization
rather than the line function. This may be due to the fact that Sheriffs Offices were
also significantly more functionally complex than the municipal agencies.
Remember that larger municipal police agencies were also the least functionally
differentiated. Therefore, one might speculate that increasing levels of functional
complexity possibly lead to increasing intensity of the administrative component.
Larger municipal organizations were the most formalized. This means that
larger municipal police agencies have a higher number of written policies governing
organizational and employee behavior. There was not a significant difference of
levels of formalization between Sheriffs Offices and smaller municipal police
agencies. This is the only structural category in which Sheriffs Offices and the
smaller municipal police agencies were similar.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTINGENCIES

Hypothesis 8 was tested by examining the relationship between organization
size and task scope and each of the dimensions of structural complexity and control
across the police organization types. This hypothesis was not supported, as the
opposite appeared more likely. For each of the constructs of organization structure,
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organizational contingency consistently explained a greater degree of the formal
structure in Sheriffs Offices versus smaller and larger municipal police agencies.
The majority of the variance in these models is explained by organization size. This
suggests that Sheriffs Offices are not necessarily uniquefrommunicipal police
organizations in the demand that increasing size places upon the differentiation of
the structure and control of the organization. Rather, according to this research, the
manner in which Sheriffs Offices structure themselves appears to be more heavily
influenced by the organization's size compared to municipal police organizations.
Organizational contingencies routinely accounted for the majority of the
variance of the formal structures in the models. More precisely, organization size
was the predominant predictor. This finding is consistent with both previous
organization research (Blau, 1971; Hsu, Marsh, andMannari, 1983; Meyer, 1972;
Terrien and Mills, 1955) and police organization research (Langworthy, 1983;
Maguire, 2003; Paoline and Sloan, 2004). However, unlike Maguire (2003), I found
size to be a significant predictor of administrative intensity for all agencies, and a
significant predictor of formalization in municipal agencies. Similarly, Wilson
(2006) found no relationship between size and any dimension of structure. The most
likely explanation for this situation is the inclusion in this research of agencies that
have less than 100 sworn officers.
Task scope was only a predictor of occupational differentiation and
formalization in larger municipal police organizations. This is contradictory to
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Maguire's (2003) findings that the complexity of the tasks a police organization
faces, does not influence the manner in which it organizes. Additionally, Maguire
(2003) found a relationship in municipal police organizations between task scope and
functional differentiation, while this research does not. At the same time, the result
offindingtask scope to be a significant predictor of formalization in larger municipal
organizations is consistent with Wilson's (2006) research. Given the results, the lack
of a consistent relationship between task scope and structure largely concurs with
previous police organization research (Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 2006), which
contradicts Langworthy's research (1983) and Perrow's (1998) thesis on the nature
of the relationship between technology and structure. However, these results should
be taken with caution due to the methodological constraint of using LEMAS to
construct task scope as an indicator of organizational technology.
For police organizations, this means that size is predominantly a driving
factor in how they organize. The demands of increasing size on the structure appear
to be especially true for Sheriffs Offices. As size increases in a Sheriffs Office,
they will become significantly more vertically, occupationally, and spatially
differentiated while at the same time becoming less functionally differentiated. The
explained variance and corresponding coefficients for the structural dimensions for
Sheriffs Offices was consistently and significantly much higher than that of larger
municipal police organizations. While larger municipal police organizational
structures are influenced by their size as the previous literature indicates (Maguire,
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2003), it appears they are not under the same stress as the Sheriff's Office. Given
the relatively low levels of explained variance for larger municipal police
organizations, additional factors likely assist in explaining their structures.
For municipal agencies with over 100 officers, Maguire (2003) found that
size explained considerably more variance than this research. There may be several
possible scenarios for this issue. First, Maguire's measure of vertical differentiation
also encompassed notions of centralization. Due to the data used in this research,
such a measure could not be constructed. Additionally, Maguire only used agencies
with over 100 officers. This research classifies larger agencies as any organization
serving a jurisdiction with a population over 25,000 people. Therefore, the majority
of organizations defined as large in this research have less than 100 officers. For
these agencies, size may not be as large of a contributing factor as thought. Yet,
concurrently size continues to provide a great deal of explanatory power for the
smaller municipal police organizations. As a result, it might be possible that there is
somewhat of a plateau or leveling of the effects of size on municipal agencies that
could be classified as mid-sized. This aspect of the size-differentiation hypothesis
has not been explored and deserves further attention in the future. Additionally,
Maguire was also able to control for age of the organization, which contributed to the
explained variance of organization context. The inability to include the
organization's age within this research greatly inhibits a more detailed expansion of
theory.
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENCY

Hypothesis 8 was tested to examine the impact that environmental
contingencies had upon the formal structure across the police organization types
above and beyond the organizational contingencies. The results support the
hypothesis that environmental factors have a significant impact on all municipal
police organizations (although a lesser impact on the larger municipal agencies), but
not on Sheriffs Offices. The addition of environmental contingencies only assisted
in added explained variance for vertical differentiation and administrative intensity.
These findings suggest that for the most part, Sheriffs Offices appear to be
predominantly insulatedfromthe complexity and change of their external
environments in regards to their organization. I will discuss possible theoretical
explanations for this finding later in the chapter.
Previous research (Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 2006) has found little relationship
between environmental contingencies and the formal structure of police agencies.
This research has provided mixed results across the different police organization
types. For larger municipal police organizations, the external environment set
appeared to only have a discemable impact on the complexity of the structure, yet
not on aspects of structural control. This is consistent with Maguire's (2003) findings
on large municipal police organizations.
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However, for smaller municipal police agencies the external environment set
showed a significant effect on every aspect of the formal structure with the exception
of formalization. Although the added explained variance to the model was minimal
(ranging from 1.3%- 4.7%), it illustrates that smaller municipal police agencies may
be more heavily influenced by their external environment than their larger
counterparts and Sheriffs Offices. Structural contingency theory states that an
organization must find a proper fit between its external environment and structure to
maximize its efficiency (Scott, 1992). The results presented here provide some
evidence for this theory as Falcone and Wells (2002) state the success of smaller
police organizations flows from the relationships they have with the communities
they serve. Therefore, smaller police departments might seek an intentional 'fit'
between their organization structure and the community that is not necessary for the
Sheriffs Office. Additionally, this supports more recent propositions by Maguire
and King (2007) that smaller municipal departments are considerably more fluid than
other police organizations, and therefore more likely affected by the external
environment.
The reactionary structuring of these organizations to the environment may
also be latently influenced by municipal political pressures placed upon the
department to conform to the perceived needs of the community. As a result of the
political/power relationships that exist within these jurisdictions, smaller municipal
police departments are inherently unstable as theyfrequentlyface dissolution
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(Maguire and King, 2007). The lack of stability and durability leads the departments
to organize around technical/rational components in an effort to provide evidence for
the justification of their existence. Those that do not provide the proper evidence will
face organizational death. Maguire (2003) suggests that structural contingency
theory is not adequate to explain police organization structures because they do not
face market forces and therefore are provided the opportunity of being permanent
failing organizations, as they do not die. While this may certainly be true for large
police organizations, it does not hold for the smaller municipal police organizations.
Therefore, this research suggests that smaller municipal organizations are different
from the larger organizations because they may be easily dissolved and must seek a
technical/rational fit for survival.
Sheriffs Offices were relatively unaffected by the dynamic of their external
environment. The environmental set has significant influence on vertical
differentiation and mere was a minimal impact on administrative intensity (1.6%
added variance). This suggests that Sheriffs Offices have largely been successful in
sealing off their operations from the complexity and uncertainty that may surround
them. The findings do, however, seem to contradict the speculations and untested
hypotheses of the lone academic piece of work dedicated to Sheriffs Offices
(Falcone & Wells, 1995). Falcone and Wells (1995) posit that because the Sheriff is
popularly elected, the organization would maintain more of an open system with
permeable boundaries between the organization and its external environment. There
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are several possible speculations that may explain these findings of which I will
speak to. However, all are untested in this research and deserve further research
attention.
Thisfindingis consistent with Scott (1992) and Thompson's (1967)
conjectures about a public bureaucracy's effectiveness at buffering their daily work
from the changing and sometimes chaotic environment that surrounds them.
Additionally, as Scott (2004) notes, some organizations provide services that are not
well specified and the competition among these organization types is weak.
Subsequently, environmental factors have little influence on their structures.
Sheriffs Offices provide a wide range of public safety services as well as many civil
services that are foreign to their municipal counterparts. Coupled with the confusing
difference that the executive position of the police agency is elected, their work
technology and function may appear ambiguous to the lay public causing them to
question the actual functions of the organization. This results in a lack of pressure for
the agency to seek a technical fit with its external environment.
Moreover, Scott's (2004) point is buttressed by the fact that Sheriffs Offices
are frequently constitutional creations and therefore do not face issues of
competition, resulting once again in the lack of needing to find a technical fit
between the structure and the environment. Although municipal police departments
do not face competition in a pure market sense, their chief executives serve at the
pleasure of the jurisdiction's governing body, and therefore, are easily removed from
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their posts. This may induce a structure more responsive to external surroundings.
Sheriffs, on the other hand, are elected, and in most states only able to be removed
by recall or administrative action set forth in the state's constitution. Municipal
governments may also choose to dissolve their police organization in favor of
contracting law enforcement services to the County Sheriff, neighboring municipal
department, or another county law enforcement body. This may particularly be the
case for smaller agencies and recent evidence reinforces this course of action
(Maguire and King, 2007). Therefore, as previously stated, municipal police
departments to some degree, face coercive influences and are more likely to
subscribe to a technical/rational model of organizing.
Additionally, the lack of influence of the external environment on Sheriffs
Offices may be contributable to the historical context of the Sheriff being a precursor
of the modern police department, and therefore able to obtain status as an artifact
embedded within socio-cultural context devoid of further influence. That is, because
of the history, and the nature of the position being one elected by the people, the
Sheriff may be viewed by the community as being a legitimate and competent holder
of the police power within a jurisdiction. Municipal Police Chiefs are often hired by
the City, Town, Village council, or appointed by the municipality executive (e.g.
Mayor). Therefore, the municipal Police Chief does not have the instant legitimacy
of the elected Sheriff because the executive's police power was not granted by the
people. This induces the municipal police chief to feel the need to alter the structure
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to seek fit with the community. Furthermore, the notion that the Office of the Sheriff
is a constitutionally created office in many states rather than an administrative
creation may contribute to the institutional legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
That is, the organization's legitimacy is embedded within a legislative framework
consistent with Anglo-American democratic principles rather than an administrative
creation by a city executive.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Hypothesis 10 was tested to examine the effect of institutional factors as
significant predictors above and beyond organization contingency and environment
of all organization types. This hypothesis was supported, as the institutional
environmental variables added explained variance to the measures of structural
complexity and control with two exceptions. The institutional environmental
variables did not add to the explained variance for administrative intensity across all
organization types. This is an interesting point as the institutional environment added
to the variance of administrative intensity (3.9%) when the sample was aggregated.
Additionally, the institutional environment did not add to the variance of functional
differentiation for the larger municipal police agencies.
The institutional environmental set of variables routinely added to the
explanation of the organization structures above and beyond the organizational and
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environmental contingencies, and consistently accounted for a greater degree of
structural explanation as compared to environmental contingencies. The region in
which a policing agency is located appears to be the most predominant and
consistent predictor of its organizational structure. This points to a cultural-cognitive
aspect of institutional legitimacy as well as a normativeframe.This is consistent
with Hunt and Magenau (1993), who have posited theories surrounding cultural
differentiation. Within a geographic region, there may be common beliefs and
orthodoxy that lead to mimetic structures. At the same time, there might be a binding
expectation for the appropriateness of a structure (Scott, 2004).
An excellent example of this within this research is occupational
differentiation. For larger municipal agencies, being located in the West had a
positive relationship to the level of occupation differentiation, yet for larger
municipal police departments in the Northeast, there was a negative relationship.
This suggests a number of theoretic explanations. First, occupational differentiation
(or civilianization) can be viewed as a departurefromtraditional police operations
and structure (Forst, 2000). Therefore, higher levels of occupational differentiation
can be considered a policing innovation.18 Levels of innovation may be higher for
many Western departments leading to a normative pressure to accept the practice of
increasing occupational differentiation. These results are consistent with Wilson's
(2006) findings that Western police agencies are typically more innovative and
18

Greater degrees of occupation differentiation (or civilianization) are encouraged under a
community policing philosophy in an effort to allow sworn officers increased time to regularly
interact with the community and problem solve.
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therefore have greater degrees of occupational differentiation (civilianization). Crank
and Langworthy (1992) describe these innovations, such as a change in structure, as
an institutional myth that spreads across police agencies.
Second, the regional effect is possibly attributed to the department's age,
which is untested in this research.19 Departments in the Northeast tend to be the
oldest police organizations in the United States, whereas departments in the West
tend to be the youngest. Previous research on police organizations that utilize
organizational age is scant. Although King (1999) found that older police
organizations had lower civilian employment rates, Wilson (2006) found no
significant effect of age on occupational differentiation. The age of an organization is
a variable that requires further attention and will be discussed later as a
methodological concern.
Although the regional location of an organization provides insight into the
structure, there is additional evidence that the type of police organization may also
be a factor. For example, while being a larger Western municipal police organization
increased the level of occupation differentiation, it did not have any impact on
smaller municipal organizations and Sheriffs Offices in the West. Likewise, being a
Sheriffs Office located in the West predicted the level of spatial differentiation,
while there was no relationship between the Western region and municipal agencies.

Institutional theory suggests that organizations are influenced by their inter19

Data regarding the age of police organizations is scant. If the existing age related data were used in
this research, the number of cases available to analyze would have been substantially reduced.
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organizational field, or context of the varying organizations in which they are
embedded (Dillard, Rigsby, and Goodman, 2004). This research speaks to this point
by suggesting that similar organization types within geographic regions share norms
and beliefs of what is perceived as a legitimate organizational structure.
Additionally, gaining Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies (CALEA) accreditation, which is a normative form of legitimacy governed
by accreditation, had an understandable relationship to the level of formalization in
municipal police agencies. CALEA sets forth certain standards that mandate the
implementation of a host of formal policies. Yet, for Sheriffs Offices there was no
relationship between CALEA accreditation and formalization. CALEA is still a
relatively novel and not yet fully instituted and therefore the number of agencies
accredited by CALEA is minute in comparison to the population size.
The implementation level of Community Oriented Policing was also a fairly
consistent predictor. This speaks to a normative legitimacy by altering structure in
the aid of innovation seeking. If a department has instituted a level of innovation,
then changes to the structure will occur. The implementation of Community Oriented
Policing had a significant relationship to the level of formalization and occupational
differentiation across all departments. Interestingly enough, the level of community
policing increased levels of formalization and decreased levels of occupational

differentiation, with the exception of larger municipal agencies. These results are
counter-intuitive, as one would expect higher levels of community policing (an
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innovative practice) to be associated with lower levels of formalization and
increasing occupational differentiation.
Wilson (2006) also found a relationship between the implementation of
community policing and levels of formalization. This, perhaps, speaks to Scott's
explanation that work activities are frequently decoupled from rule systems.
Additionally, Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Westphal and Zajac's (1998) research
posit that many organizations decouple between stated levels of innovation and
actual practices. The literature on decoupling suggests that organizations that are
early implementers of innovation are more likely to institute it as practice. Although
this research does not fully investigate time-periods of community policing
implementation, many of the larger municipal police agencies were early adopters of
a community based policing practice. This is an area of research mat deserves future
attention.
Variables that were indicative of coercive institutional pressures proved to
have little effect on the structure of the varying police organizations. Funding only
had a relationship for levels of formalization and functional differentiation in
Sheriffs Offices as well as a positive relationship to spatial differentiation in larger
municipal agencies. However, funding may be a latent predictor as the strong
influence of community oriented policing on structural configurations may also be

explained by it. Many organizations may have adopted community based policing
practices to obtain funding from the Office of Justice Programs (Renauer, 2007).
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Another unexpected result was the lack of a relationship between union presence and
the structure. Union presence had little impact, only having a negative relationship to
vertical and functional differentiation in Sheriffs Offices.

INTEGRATION OF THEORIES

Willis, Mastrofski, and Wesiburd (2007) claim that within the policing
literature there is a lack of empirical research examining the relationships between
the technical/rational model of contingency theory and institutional perspectives.
Wilson (2006) claims that contingency theory and institutional theory were often
seen as mutually exclusive and he had successfully integrated the two in the
application to police organizations. While early views of the two theories were often
seen as opposing, the inevitability that the two were somehow related was there all
along (Perrow, 1998). Wilson (2006) was correct in his assumption that indeed the
two were not mutually exclusive, yet his results were not comprehensive enough to
generalize all police organizations. This research also argues that the two theories
can be integrated. With the given results, the application of any one single theory
fails to adequately explain the existence of a given police structure across
organization types. When measures of structural contingency theory and institutional
theory are applied together, they provide a more comprehensive explanation of
police organization structures. Moreover, the application of an integrated theoretical

133
framework provides an illuminating explanation of different types of police
organizations, suggesting that varying factors of the two theories influence
organization structures differently across the various organization types.
Perhaps the most exciting aspect of this research's attempt to integrate the
theories is the evidence pointing to this last statement - the difference between
police organization types. In many respects, this justifies previous untested claims
that Sheriffs Offices and smaller municipal police agencies are different from the
large municipal agencies (Falcone and Wells, 1995; 2002). It also upholds Maguire's
(2003) claim that the larger body of organization theory does not necessarily have
the same impact on police organizations that it has on other types of organizations.
At the same time, it also provides new evidence that organization theories apply in
different manners to subgroups of police organizations.
Figure 2, which is adopted from Scott and Meyer (1991, p. 124) presents a
visual interpretation of how contingency theory and institutional theory compliment
each other when explaining the formation of organization structures across the police
organization types.
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Figure 2. Technical and Institutional Pressures Continuum.
Institutional Pressures
Strong
Strong
Technical
Pressures

•

Weak

Small Municipal P.D.
Larger Municipal P.D.

Weak

Sheriffs Offices

Smaller municipal police departments are located within the top left corner because
they are subject to both strong institutional and technical pressures. The larger
municipal police departments are also subject to both forces but this research has
indicated not to the same degree as the smaller departments. Scott (2003) notes that
this type of organization tends to exhibit strong institutional components, such as
advisory boards. Larger police organizations are increasingly utilizing advisory
boards. Anecdotal indications illustrate that smaller city, town, or village councils
frequently play a more active role in the administration of the police department.
Moreover, public council meetings in these types of governance structures are
frequently well-attended and considerably more participatory on the part of the
jurisdiction's citizens. Therefore, the council meeting itself could be considered as
serving in an advisory board capacity. This is a speculative point and deserves future
research and development.
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As previously discussed, Sheriffs Offices have stronger institutional
pressures and weaker technical pressures and therefore fall into the lower left corner
of figure 2. Scott (2003) describes this type of organization as not being rewarded for
the quality of the output, but primarily for conformity to professional and legal
requirements. Again, this assists in explaining why the Sheriff does not need to find
a technical fit between the organization and the external environment as there is little
reward for doing so. The Sheriffs Office view their professional and legal
obligations (e.g. providing search and rescue, marine law enforcement, etc.) as what
likely garners community support. The municipal police departments on the other
hand, are also judged by these standards but must also conform to some set of
community efficiency or effectiveness standards as well.
Summary
Sheriffs Offices, small municipal police agencies, and larger municipal
police agencies are significantly different in the manner in which their organizational
structures are configured. The more complicated task is explaining why they are
structured differently. Although an organization's size appears to be a driving factor,
the integration of contingency and institutional theory assists in explaining what
contributes to the varying levels of complexity and control in the structure of these
organizations.
A full integration of contingency and institutional theory has been utilized to
assist in this endeavor. Sheriffs Offices are largely insulatedfromthe

external/technical environment because they are more heavily pressured by the
institutional environment. Smaller municipal police agencies must react to both
technical and institutional pressures because the existence of the organizations is
inherently unstable. Larger municipal police organizations are more heavily
pressured by institutional forces but must still react to environmental/technical
pressures to satisfy their constituents.
Attempting to identify the superiority of one organizational theory over
another is a futile effort. Police organizations differ from each other and the
application of both theories is useful in explaining how they divide their labor and
coordinate their work. The methodology utilized in this research has assisted in
providing a great deal of evidence related to this latter point by systematically and
sequentially building upon previous research. Although this research contradicts
some previous research (Wilson, 2006), it is likely due to the heterogeneous sample
of police organizations and refinement of institutional theoretic constructs.
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CHAPTER VU

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research can be viewed as both methodologically sophisticated and
crude at the sametime.Although the analysis and subsequentfindingsare the most
theoretical integrative piece of work on police organization structures to date,
considerably work remains to be performed. The concluding chapter discusses many
of these limitations and provides recommendations for future research in this field.
Finally, the chapter closes with a conversation regarding the important administrative
and policy aspects of the research.
Implications for Research and Study Limitations
This research set out to answer a number of questions, but in the end has
produced more questions than answers. The research presented here has encountered
many of the methodological pitfalls encountered by previous police researchers
(Maguire 2003; Wilson, 2006) and at the same time has encountered some new
unexpected issues. The fact remains that researchers of police organizations are still
faced with constructing crude measures of organization structure. While measures of
vertical differentiation have frequently used height (Langworthy, 1986), the
argument for using it as a measure requires some degree of assumption. That is, one
assumes that if there is a larger distance between the salary of the lowest paid
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employee and the chief executive, there will be an increasing number of ranks or
levels between the two measures, which would be consistent with Blau's (1970)
supervisory strata. As stated before, this is an assumption and may not necessarily be
a reflection of practice. Therefore, it would be helpful if the Department of Justice
(DOJ) could add some measure of the number of ranks within LEMAS to assist
researchers and policy-makers in determining levels of concentration within a police
organization.
The crude constructs are likely also a contributor to the low variance in many
of the models. For example, in all of the models predicting formalization, the
explained variance does not exceed 15% in the final step. Typically, this is indicative
of a poor model, but all previous research has encountered the same issue (Maguire,
2003; Wilson, 2006). Additionally, this research was unable to utilize the 2003
LEMAS dataset as the DOJ has dismissed any cogent measure of administrative
intensity from the survey. Failing to utilize the latest data is aflawin this research
and a newly created flaw in LEMAS that deserves immediate attention. If we are to
truly understand complexity and control in police organizations then we should be
paying closer attention to constructing questions around the administrative
component of the agency. LEMAS also does not ask respondents to report on key
variables that may be of use when researching determinants of organization
structure. One such key variable is the number of calls (both emergency and nonemergency) that the department receives during the year. Since the formal structure
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of an organization by its nature deals with the division of labor and allocation of
resources, the rate of calls for service should be introduced either as a predictor, or as
a control variable.
For the most part, the researcher relying upon LEMAS is faced with static
snapshots of police organization structures due to sampling. LEMAS uses a random
sampling procedure during each wave of surveys for agencies that have less than 100
sworn officers. Therefore, attempting to gain longitudinal data on smaller agencies
has proven difficult. As a result, any temporal study of police organizations outside
of the large municipal organizations is almost impossible with the current data. To
compound this issue, agencies that have less than 100 sworn officers are still undersampled when compared to their true population. Although DOJ deems it necessary
to sample every agency that employ 100 officers or more, it only provides a
miniscule representation of police organizations in the United States. The DOJ's
Census of Law Enforcement Agencies in the United Stated provides a
comprehensive database of agency basics of almost all police organizations (e.g.
address, type of agency, etc.). If this tool could be further developed by BJS to
include some measures of the organization structure and function, then combined
with LEMAS, researchers would have a more powerful dataset.
Meeting the assumptions of parametric statistical tests continues to be an
issue for conducting research on police organizations. The diversity of sizes and
shapes of police organizations in the United States contributed to deviations from
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normal data distributions. Although many of the variables were mathematically
transformed to meet assumptions of the General Linear Model, transformations in
many cases change the nature of the variable. This does not mean that use of
parametric methods are useless to the analysis of police organizations. Many of the
parametric tests in this research were also conducted using non-parametric statistical
tests, which arrived at the same results, thereby strengthening many of the findings
from the analysis.
The use of any derivative of linear regression as a data analysis tool is also a
limitation, as it may not capture the true complex nature of the relationships between
an organization's context, complexity, and control. In using linear models, one
assumes that there is a linear directional relationship between the specified
independent variables and dependent variable. However, due to the complexity of the
social organization and the environment in which it resides, it may be likely that the
relationships are highly non-linear, non-directional, recursive, and dynamic on
multiple levels.
The issue of causal direction is of specific interest. Researchers frequently
assume that the environment has a linear causal relationship on the nature and
structure of the organization. Yet, many fail to consider the alternative of the
organization influencing the environment around it (Marion, 1999). Furthermore, the
work technology is often simultaneously used with environment as a predictor of
formal structure. According to many theorists (e.g. Kiel, 1994), the environment may
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influence the work technology, which in turn influences the structure of the
organization. Finally, does size influence the organization's structure or does the
nature of the structure place demands on size? These are questions that must be
teased out using innovative methods. Recent work performed in the realm of
organizational ecology using non-monotonic fuzzy set theory (Hannan, Polos, and
Carroll, 2007) holds great promise and may assist with mitigating the latter points.
Given the combined problematic conditions of LEMAS and meeting
statistical assumptions, two alternatives are likely directions for future research.
First, if researchers want to continue using quantitative methods, a researcher
developed survey using appropriate, and more indicative constructs of organizational
measures must be implemented. This would allow researchers to look at past
problematic issues with police organization measurement and specifically address
them. Although due to likely budgetary constraints it would not be able to obtain
such large samples as LEMAS, yet it would allow for a fully randomized method of
sampling different police agency types. A survey such as the National Organizations
Survey (Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 1997) directed toward policing would be
invaluable for both policing and organizational research. The National Organizations
Survey (NOS) covers topics such as:
•

Use of contingent employees and relationships with organizational providers
of contingent employees;

•

Staffing methods, internal job ladders and promotion chains;
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•

Internal work organization;

•

Job training programs, and employee benefits and incentives;

•

Organization formal structure, social demography, environmental situation,
and productivity and performance (NOS, 1997).

Employing a survey such as this would provide the researcher and police
administrators across the county with a far better understanding of how various
police agencies are organized, how they allocate resources, and what factors
contribute to these designs.
Second, the use of qualitative methods holds great promise for research into
police organizations. Qualitative methods will allow the researcher to gain a deeper
and richer understanding of the implications of culture and leadership issues in
organizations and how they translate into structural characteristics. Additionally,
qualitative research, particularly historical analysis, can aid research by exploring the
effects of an organization's age and time period in which it was born. Thompson
(1967) stated that each organization is a product of its own history. Past research
(King, 1997; Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 2006) has investigated this notion, but only
through quantitative methods using the number of years the agency has been in
operation as a predictor. This method does not take into account the full, vibrant, and
complex history that individual police organizations face and the structures it may
produce. Additionally, the number of agencies that report the year of their founding
is very scant. To confound this issue, many agencies do not know the year of their
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founding, and the year the agency reports can be contradictory with historical
records. Researchers of police organization structure must escape the purely
quantitative mindset and explore methodologies that are conducive to answering the
important questions at hand. Comprehensive case studies that employ a mixed
methodology deserve further attention.
Most importantly, if there is to be continued interest in examining the factors
that influence and shape police organization structures, then there must also be a
continued interest in using all types, sizes, and shapes of police organizations. This
research has excluded special district police agencies (largely because of the lack of
data), campus law enforcement agencies, and tribal agencies. Increasingly, many
colleges and universities are adopting a full-service policing model. The inclusion of
different police organization types in this research has provided some illuminating
results. In many of the models dealing with the aggregated sample of organizations,
some of the variables were statistically significant. However, when the sample was
disaggregated into different police organizations, the predictors were no longer
significant. This provides some insight into the methodological role that organization
type may play; suggesting that within group variance is critical and not taken into
account when using aggregated models. Therefore, more theoretically integrated
work must focus on police organizational and sub-organizational categories to
determine what contributes to their individual structures and operations.
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Policy Implications
Police administrative theorists and practitioners have long been concerned
with issues of how the organization structure of a police agency contribute to officer
behavior. Within the literature, there is an inordinate amount of research that points
to police organization structures having significant impacts on policing styles and
officer behavior (e.g. Swanson. 1978; Smith and Klein, 1983; Slovak, 1986; Worden,
1994). Therefore, knowing something about what may or may not influence the
adoption of a given structural arrangement is surely useful. Pugh, Hickson, Hinings,
and Turner (1968) stated that being able to pinpoint differences in structure between
organizations, and the determinants of these individual structures make it possible to
conduct more rigorous studies on; group composition, role conflict, and employee
performance and behavior. Although police researchers have recognized the
importance of structure, they have failed to address the arguments of Pugh et al.
concerning differences in structure among organizations. This research has built a
base upon which future studies can expand upon this notion.
From a public administration point of view, policymakers might like to
customize or tailor policing styles to their community. Research has shown that
organization structure is related to strategy and decisions (Frederickson, 1986) within
the organization. Therefore, if the type of organizational structure has some influence
on the style of policing (strategies), then knowing what contributes to structures and
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therefore policing style allows for the possible customization of management
principles and public safety policy to that organization.
The formal structure of an organization is also inherently about the allocation
and coordination of resources (Mintzberg, 1993). Having an understanding of the
influences of organizational context, external contingencies, and institutional
environment on varying police organization types will allow for the focusing of
proper resources to achieve appropriate organizational policy prescription and
reform. This research can assist in laying the groundwork for more complicated
causal models that map out the influence of contingencies on varying police
organization types and subsequently the levels of efficiency for police organization
types. From this standpoint, this study can only be viewed as being the "first step" in
this research area.
Another important policy aspect to this research is that 'one-size-fits-aU'
prescriptions may not be useful - varying factors influence different police
organizations. Policy makers and researchers have largely ignored this perspective in
the past, tending to prescribe policy believing that if it works for one police
organization, it will work for others. Maguire (2003) stated that when communitypolicing reformers ask police administrators to change their organization structures,
they may be asking the impossible because police executives may be reacting to
some external forces. This body of research argues that the important policy
implications are that public and police administrators must take into account the
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nature of the organization and its constraining forces before prescribing change or
initiating policy. Having an understanding of the organization types and what
contributes to their structure will assist in focusing the proper resources needed to
treat any perceived ill. That is to say, if the policing community determines that an
organizational attribute is positive, such as civilianization (occupational
differentiation), knowing what makes the institution of this structural feature
successful in some agencies and not others would be helpful to the police
administrator.
Conclusions
This research has illustrated that one can view police organizations as
structurally varied and uniquefromone another in their structural determinants.
Although many of the police organization types are influenced and constrained by
similar factors (such as size), the organizations appear to react differently to varying
pressures based upon type of organization and the external and institutional
environment. This research has provided some contributions to practice and
scholarship by first, illustrating that Sheriffs Offices and smaller police agencies are
a unique policing entity frequently shaped and constrained by differing forces than
their larger municipal counterparts. This therefore initiates a discussion regarding the
inadequacies of 'general policing models and theories.' Second, it has examined
previous and largely untested hypotheses concerning Sheriffs Offices. Finally, it
provided a more comprehensive integration of organizational theories.
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The importance regarding the factors that shape and constrain police
organization structures cannot be understated. The way an organization is structured
speaks to the manner in which it carries out its day-to-day work. Therefore, the
investigation of structural antecedents provides insight into why some police
organizations operate in the manner they do. For police administrators of Sheriff s
Offices, municipal police agencies that serve jurisdictions with populations less than
25,000, and for larger municipal police agencies, this research provides insight into
the driving forces (or lack thereof) of their structures, thereby informing
administrators on factors that are beyond their control in regards to allocating
resources. Theories of police administration traditionally focus on technical aspects
of management, but we must not forgot that police organizations are embedded
within varying organizational, environmental, and institutional contexts that
influence the manner in which the labor is divided and the work is carried out.
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LEMAS Questionnaire

CJ-44
Bureau of the Cerisua
Governments Division
Washington Plaza Bldg. 2 ,
Room 809
Washington, DC 20233-6800

O M B No. 1121-0212: A p p r o v a l Expires 06/16/2000
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE^
'BUREAU OF THE'CENSUS
ACTING AS COUECTING A3ENT FOR
199S SAMPLE SURVEY OF
SUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
U.S; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FORM CJ-44

Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics

(Please correct any error in name, mailing address, and ZIP Code)

INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY
ADDRESS
IOFFICIAL

tv Number and street or P.O. box/Route number
W

City

, k. Area code

l State | ZIP Code
1'
I
Area code . Number

E W 018

Wkm •
GENERAL INFORMATION
Please mail your completed questionnaire to the Bureau of the Census in the enclosed
postage-paid envelope before July 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 , or FAX, (each page) toll-free to 1 - 8 8 8 - 8 9 1 - 2 0 9 9 .
Please retain a copy of the Completed survey for your records.
If you have any questions, call Carolyn Gates toll-free at 1 - 8 0 0 - 3 5 2 - 7 2 2 9 , or email to
sslea@ census.gov

INSTRUCTIONS
If the answer to a question is "not available" or "unknown," write "DK" in the space provided.
If the answer to a question is "not applicable," write "NA" in the space provided.
If the answer to a question is "none" or "zero," write "0" in the space provided,
When exact numeric answers are not available, provide estimates and mark (X) the box beside
each figure that Is estimated. For example 1,234 El
Space for comments and/or explanations is provided on page 6 of the questionnaire.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
1. Indicate the functions for which your agency has
PRIMARY responsibility. Exclude functions which your
agency performs only upon request such as aiding,another
agency in an emergency. Marie (X) all that apply.
Traffic and vehicle-related
functions:
az2 D
oaa D
024 •
026 Q
o» G
027 D

Accident investigations
Parking enforcement
School crossing services
Traffic direction and control
Enforcement of traffic faws
Commercial vehicle
enforcement
Special public safety functions:
oza D Animal control
ow • Civtl defense
oao G Fire services
031 G Emergency medical services
Investigative support functions:
032 G Ballistics testing
038 D Crime lab services
034 G Fingerprint processing
Crime Investigation for:
03B G Homicide
oao Q Other violent crimes
oar G Arson
038 G Other property crimes
03s G Environmental crimes
040 Q Computer crimes

2. Enter the number of facilities or site* operated by your,
agency as of June 30,1999, which are SEPARATE FROM
HEADQUARTERS.
District/Precinct stations

Court-related functions:
041 G Executing arrest
warrants

OS

Fixed neighborhood/community substations

042 G Court security

043 G Serving civil process

Mobile neighborhood/community substations . .

Special operations:
044 G Bomb disposal
04s G Search and rescue
04s G Tactical operations
(SWAT*

Other - Specify

047 D Underwater recovery
Detention operations:
04a G Jail facility
048 G LockupAemporary
holding facility (for
overnight detention
separate from jail)
OBO O Holding cell (not for
overnight detention)
Special enforcement
functions:
OBI G Drug enforcement
052 Q Vice enforcement
Other functions:
os3 G Dispatching calls for
service
os4 G Training academy
operation

•
•
o

-g

D
3. During the 12-month period ending June 30,1999,
which of the following types of patrol units did your
agency use? Mark (X) all that apply.
Routine
Special
Did not
patrol
events
use
M1
08a
Automobile
°"a
D
G
m
095
Motorcycle
D
^ D
G
087
Foot
""G
G
'""'G
070
W1
Horse
°»D
G
G
073
m
Bicycle
. .072G
a
D
OT8
077
Marine
«6G
G
G
4. Does your agency participate in an operational
911 emergency telephone system or Its equivalent
(i.e. units can be dispatched as a result of a call)?
Mark (Xj.only one.
era i Q Y e s - Basic 911 system
aO Yes-Expanded/Enhanced 911 system
3ON0

5. For the 12-month period ending June 30,1999, enter the number of total calls/requests for service
received or initiated by your agency, and their source. Indicate fXJ under which category alarm*
aro Included ^\Jb (91 b iUc(non'911)
m
AUd(other),
• If y o u r agency does not respond t o calls f o r service, enter N A .
* Use other 12-month period if necessary,
• If the Information is not available or u n k n o w n , enter DK.
• Mark (XI the box next t o figures which are estimated.

and enter end date here.
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—*

Source of call/request/event
a . Total cells/requests
for service (b+o+d)

b. Emergency
911 system

c.

Non-911
phone number

d.

Other sources {officerinitiated, walk-In, etc.)

-a
6. Tor the total calls/requests entered In Item 5a, 5b, and 5c above, enter the number handled by
each method Meted below.
Method of handling call/request for service
Direct response by your agency
Responded to with the
dispatch of 1 or more
officers from your
agehcy

Handled by your
agency without the
dispatch of officer(s)
(e.g., phone report)

Referral to other agency
Referred to other law
enforcement agency
(e.g., jurisdictional
priority)

Referred to non-law
enforcement agency
(e.g., animal control,
public works)

a. Total calls (from 5a)
b. 911 calls (Sb)
\ c . Non-811 calls 15c)
Page 2

m

3

FORM CJ-441B-MB1

SECTION II - COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
3. Does your agency use computers for any of the
following functions?
Afar* (X) one per line. •
. y e s No
12s Crime analysis
1D 2D
126 Crime mapping
1D
2D
127 Criminal investigations (exclude word
• processing)
-.•
iD
2D
12* Dispatch (CAD)
iD
2D
i » In-field communications
1D 2D
IM In-field report writing
iD
2D
wi Internet access
1D 2D
2D
099 (1) Mainframe computer . . . 1 D 4. Does your agency maintain computerized files with
any of the following Information?
2D
oss (2) Mini-computer
1• Mark (X) one per line.
Yes No
ioo (3) Personal/desktop
m Alarms
1D
2D
2D
computer (PC)
1D iaa Arrests
1D
2D
154 Calls for service
iD
2D
z (4) Server.
1D 2Q
135 Criminal histories
1D 2D
iw Department inventory
1D
2D
b. Used IN THE FIELD by patrol officers
137 Driver's license Information
1D 2D
Agency uses Agency 13a Evidence
iD
2D
Type of computer
Mark
does not iae Field interview information.....
•inn{Xf and enter
1Q
2D
number in use.
use
140 Incident-based crime data
iD
2D
w
Incident
reports
i
D
2D
W4 (1) Laptop computer
iP •2D
142 Incident report narratives
1D 2D
IOS {2) Car-mounted mobile digital/
143 Linked files for crime analysis
1D
2D
2D
data terminal (MDT) . . . . i U •
144 Payroll
1D 2D
IOB (Z) Car-mounted mobile digital/
i4s
Personnel
1
D
2
D
Q2D
data computer (MDC)
wo Stolen vehicles
1D 2 D
iio (4) Hand-held digital/data
_
147 Stolen property - other than vehicles 1D
2D
zD
terminal
i u *
i4« Summonses
1D
2D
iiz (5) Hand-held digital/
140 Traffic accidents
. 1D 2 G
iD2D
data computer (MDC) .
iso Traffic citations
,
1D
2D
D
IGI Traffic stops
1D
2D
2D
114 (6) Other - Specify %
1D 152 Uniform Crime Reports - Summary. . 1D 2 G
1B3 Uniform Crime Reports - NIBRS
1D 2 D
1*4 Vehicle registration
iD
2D
155 Warrants
iD
2D
2a. Do your agency's patrol officers have direct access to
5. For which of the following types of data does your
the following types of Information through the use of
IN-FIELD COMPUTERS? Mark (X) one per tine.
agency use COMPUTERIZED gebcodlng and mapping?
Yes N o
Mark (X) one per line.
Yes No
17 Criminal history records
iD
2D
tea Arrests
1G 2 D
ie Driving records
1D
2D
157 Business locations (ATMs, bars, etc.). 1 D 2 D
18 Mapping programs
iD
2D
Calls for service
1D 2D
120 Prior call history at dispatched location
iD
2D
ise Census data (e.g., housing, income) . i Q 2 D
2t Stolen property . . ..
.1D 2 D
IM Crime incidents
i Q 2D
22 Wanted suspects
iD
2D
[61 Other - Specify
•%
T Q 2D
23 Wanted vehicles
1D 2 D
• NOTE - Us« June 50,1999 as the reference date for all
questions In this section.
1. Indicate whether your agency does or does not use each
computer type listed below. Mark (X) one per line.
• Mart (XI the box next to figures which ere estimated.
a. Used in ADMINISTRATIVE facilities (e.g. headquarters,
stations, etc.)
Agency uses Agency
Type of computer
Mark (X) and enter
does not
use
number in use.

•
•

D

a
a

b. Do your agency's patrol officers have access to a
zt software application that allows them to use IN-FIELD
COMPUTERS to perform crime analysis activities such
as examining time-of-day patterns or conducting
repeat calls for service analyses?
iDYes
2 D No
7. As of June 30,1990, how were field report data
PRIMARILY transmitted to the department's
central information system? Mark (X) one per line.
«5 Criminal incidents.
iso Traffic accidents . .
FORM CJ-44 (9-8-88)

6. Does your agency maintain an official site (i.e.,
"Home Page") on the World Wide Web/internet?
193 1 D Yes - Enter address {case specific) 7
2 D No

Paper
report

D
D

1
Wireless
transmission Telephone
line
(e.g* Cellular,
(voice)
UHR
(21

D
D

a
a

Computer
Data
medium
device
Not
(e.g., disk (e.g., laptop
transfer)
download) applicable |
(4)
(S>

D
D

D

•

D

ay
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SECTION III - PERSONNEL
•
•
•
•
•

General Instructions for questions 1 and 2
Include only paid employees
Sworn employees must have general arrest powers
For the purposes of this survey, full-time employees are those
who regularly work 35 hours or more per week
Mark (X) the box next to figures which are estimated
If the information is not available or unknown enter DK

Nonswom personnel

Sworn personnel
Full-time
(1)

Part-time
|2)

Full-time
131'

Psrwlme

(«>

187

L_

168

| _ 1«9

| _ .70

|_

.71

L, m

L 173

LIm

L

176

[_

178

L

'"

L

17.

U

179

1_

180

(_

181

L_

182

L

183

L

184

!__

185

|_

188

[_

188

j _

188

|_

WO

j__

1. Total authorized paid positions on June 30,1939
2.

Enter the actual number of full-time and part-time paid employees during
the pay period that Included June 30,1999. Sum of lines a through f.

a. Administration - Chief of police or sheriff, assistants, and other personnel working
In an administrative capacity. Include finance, human resources, and Internal affairs.
b. Held (law enforcement) operations - Police officers, detectives. Inspectors,
supervisors, and other personnel providing direct services. Include traffic,
patrol. Investigations, and special operations.
c. Technical support- Dispatchers, records clerks, data processors, and other
personnel providing support services. Include communications, fleet
management crime prevention, and training.
d. Jail operations - Correctional officers, guards, cooks, Janitors, and other
personnel who work in the jail.
e. Court operations - Bailiffs, security guards, process servers, etc.
f. Other, {e.g., crossing guards, parking monitors, etc.) - Specify p
187

3, Of the total number of full-time sworn personnel working in field operations
(2b above), enter the number of uniformed officers whose REGULARLY
4. As of June 30,1999. enter the number of full-time sworn personnel
serving as Community Policing Officers, Community Resource Officers,
Community Relations Officers or others regularly engaged in community
6. As of June 30,1999 enter the number of full-time sworn personnel
6. As of June 30,1999 how many of the following were employed by your
agency?

Sworn.personnel .
Full-time Part-time
ID
(21
181

1

a. Reserve/Auxiliary Sworn Officers

«

Nonswom personnel
Full-time
Part-time
(41
(31

|_
183

1

184

L

185

|

138

|_

b. Community Service Officers/PoIice Service Aides
c Nonswom volunteers not included In 6b above
SECTION IV - POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
1.

As of June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 , did your agency have w r i t t e n policies or procedures on the following?
Made (X) one per tine.
y
No

107 a. Code of conduct and appearance
we b.Citizen complaints
188 c. Use of deadly force/firearm discharge
awd. Discretionary arrest powers
301 e. Handling domestic disputes
202 f . Responding to the homeless
203 g . Working with juveniles
204 h . Use o f less-than-lethal force
20s (.Responding to people with mental illness
208 J. Maximum work hours allowed for officers
Page A

..

iD
1D
iD
rD
1D
iD
1D
1D
1D
1Q

2D
2D
2D
2D
2D
2D
2D
2D
2D
2D
FORM CJ-44 (8-S-88)

SECTION V - C O M M U N I T Y POLICING ACTIVITIES
1 . As of June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 , did your agency h a w a
communfty policing plan? Mark (X) only one.
207 1 Q Yes, formally written
2 D Y 0 8 , not formally written

5a. During the 12-month period ending June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 ,
did your agency survey t h e citizens In Its jurisdiction
t o gather any of t h e following information?
Mark (X) all that apply.

aDNd
2.

During t h « 2-year period ending June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 , w h a t
proportion of the following typos o f agency,
personnel received at least S hours o f community
policing training ( e g . , problem solving, SARA,
community partnerships, etc.}?
Mark (XI one per line.
Half
Less
or
than
All more half
None

a» New officer recruits. . . . . . . .
2o« In-service sworn personnel . .
sio Civilian personnel

3.

1D
iG
1D

>a

»D

iD

3D

>D

3D

<a

-a
*D

During the 2-year period ending June 3 0 * 1999,
w h i c h of t h e following did your agency do? Mark (X)
alt that apply

211 D Trained citizens in community policing {e.g., community
mobilization, problem solving)
212 D Gave patrol officers responsibility for specific
geographic areas/beats
213 G Assigned detectives t o cases based o n geographic
areasflseats
214 O Actively encouraged patrol officers to engage in
SARA-tvpe problem-solving projects on their beats
sis G Included collaborative problem-solving projects in
the evaluation criteria of patrol officers
216 Q Formed problem-solving partnerships with community
groups, municipal agencies, or others through
specialized contracts or written agreements
an D None of the above
4.

During t h e 12-month period ending June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 ,
which of the following groups did your agency
regularly meet with t o address crime-related
problems7 Mark {X) all that apply.

218
210
220
221
222
223
224
225
22»
227
228

G
G
G
G
D
G
G
G
G
G
G

Advocacy groups
Business groups
Domestic violence groups
Local public agencies {e.g., sanitation, parks)
Neighborhood associations
Religious groups
School groups
Tenants' associations
Youth service organizations
Senior citizen groups
Other - Specify j?

239 G Did not meet with any groups

FORM CJ-44 (6-6-091

23i
232
233
za*

G
G
G
Q

Public satisfaction with police services
Public perceptions of crime/disorder problems
Personal crime experiences
Other-Spec/rVjr

23e G Did not survey the general public - SKIP to question 6a
b. For which purposes, does your agency use the survey
information described In Ba above? Mark (X) all that apply.
237 G Allocating resources to targeted neighborhoods
23« G Prioritizing crime/disorder problems
239 G Formulating agency policy and procedures
240 G Redisricting beat/reporting areas.
2*1 Q Providing Information to patrol officers
242 G Evaluating program effectiveness
243 G Training
244 G Other - Specify j?

6a. As of June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 , which of t h e following methods
could citizens in your jurisdiction, use to access crime
statistics or crime maps? Mark (X) all that apply.
24e G In-person
204 G Radio
247 G Telephone
255 G Television
248 G Internet/web-page
259 G Agency reports
24s G Public kiosk/terminal 257 G Written requests
2so G Newsletter/brochure • 233 Q Other - Specify •$
25i G Newspaper
»9
H2 GFax
253 D Public library
2» G None of the above-STOP here
b. As of June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 , what level of crime
statistics/maps coutd citizens in your jurisdiction
routinely access? Mark (X) all that apply.
2ei D State
Z68 G Neighborhood
2« G Apartment complex
282 G County
270 G Census block
283 GCity
27i G Street
264 G District
2as D Precinct
272 G Block
266 G Census tract
273 G Address
z74 Q Other - Specify &
267 G Patrol beat

c. For t h e 12-month period ending June 3 0 , 1 9 9 9 , did
our agency conduct training classes f o r citizens on
o w t o use or analyze crime statistics/maps?

K

276 1G Yes
2 D No

Page B
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f

Comments

_
Thank you for your cooperation and prompt reply.

Burden statement
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response,
including time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the
data needed, and'completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this
burden estimate, or any other aspects of this collection of information, including suggestions for
reducing this burden, to the Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 810 Seventh Street NW, Washington,

DC 20531.

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (42 USC 3732), authorizes this
information collection, Although this survey is voluntary, we urgently need and appreciate your
cooperation to make the results comprehensive, accurate, and timely.
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Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables (Sheriff's Offices)

N
TOTAL FT EMPLOYEES
(SWRN+NONSWRN)
TASK SCOPE INDEX
RACIAL HETROGNTYINDX
BLAU/RUSHING '90
2000 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD
INCOME 1989-199
POPULATION CHANGE 1990-2000
CALEA Accreditation
COP TOTAL INDEX SCORE
URBAN PRESENCE (METRO VS.
NON)
BUREAUCRATIZATION INDEX
Funding per employee
INDEX CRIME RATE (AVERAGE)
1996-1999
NE REGION

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

897

1

13565

207.05

628.94

899

0

25

12.48

4.82

899

.00

.87

-22

.21

899

.00

21.70

5.65

2.35

899

-13

104

47.97

12.29

899

-37.38

96.91

12.68

16.04

899

0

1

.05

.21

897

-5.82

7.64

-.58

2.76

899

.00

1.00

.41

.49

825

0

5

2.05

1.68

899

.00

87781.57

3064.32

6186.06

718

.00

11732.94

2713.39

1836.27

''

899

.00

1.00

.07

.26

MIDWEST REGION

899

.00

1.00

.30

.46

WEST REGION

899

.00

1.00

.15

.35

Valid N (listwise)

662
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Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables (Small Municipal Agency)
N
TOTAL FT EMPLOYEES
(SWRN+NONSWRN)
TASK SCOPE INDEX

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

709

1

130

30.31

21.41

710

3

25

12.62

2.98

710

.00

.76

.19

.20

710

.14

30.70

5.83

3.61

710

-1

130

41.36

15.70

710

-42.77

102.71

10.3

18.48

710

0

1

.03

.17

708

-6.89

8.53

-.23

2.82

URBAN PRESENCE (METRO VS.
NON)

707

.00

1.00

.63

.48

BUREAUCRATIZATION INDEX

690

0

5

2.60

1.50

Funding per employee
INDEX CRIME RATE (AVERAGE)
1996-1999
NE REGION

709

.00

84375.00

5658.87

617

316.26

33257.34

5511.17

710
710
710
594

.00
.00
.00

1.00

.34
.24
.09

RACIAL HETROGNTY INDX
BLAU/RUSHING '90
2000 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD
INCOME 1989-199
POPULATION CHANGE 1990-2000
CALEA Accreditation
COP TOTAL INDEX SCORE

MIDWEST REGION
WEST REGION
Valid N (listwise)

1.00
1.00

9175.5
9
3986.3
2

.47
.43
.29
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Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables (Municipal Agency)
N
TOTAL FT EMPLOYEES
(SWRN+NONSWRN)
TASK SCOPE INDEX
RACIAL HETROGNTY INDX
BLAU/RUSHING'90

Minimum

POPULATION CHANGE 1990-2000
CALEA Accreditation
COP TOTAL INDEX SCORE
URBAN PRESENCE (METRO VS.
NON)
BUREAUCRATIZATION INDEX
Funding per employee
INDEX CRIME RATE (AVERAGE)
1996-1999
NE REGION
MIDWEST REGION
WEST REGION
Valid N (listwise)

Mean

SD

718

30

51348

436.29

2138.01

719

8

24

15.58

2.64

719

.01

.88

.33

.21

719

1.65

18.69

6.4

2.84

87

36.94

11.12

2000 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD
INCOME 1989-199

Maximum

719

719

-19.94

109.48

11.22

16.13

718

0

1

.19

.39

718

-4.12

8.79

1.89

2.54

712

.00

1.00

.94

.23

694

0

5

3.36

1.42

718

.00

31891.70

3590.80

4505.84

678

.00

28218.787

7295.98

3621.57

719
719
719
644

.00
.00
.00

1.00

.26
.21
.22

.44
.41
.42

1.00
1.00
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Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (Sheriffs Office)
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
897

.00

89.60

32.80

22.03

ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY (100 =
MAX)

883

.00

100.00

20.85

20.77

FRMLZTIONINDX # FRML WRTN
POLICIES'99

899

0

11

7.78

2.76

FNCTNL HETEROGENEITY INDX (ALL
ASGNMNTS)

880

.00

.91

.52

.21

ORGANIZATION HEIGHT - SALARY
DIFF'L

784

102.67

600.00

1

52

NUMBER OF STATIONS & FIXED
SUBSTATIONS
Valid N (listwise)

898

207.98 71.96
2.90

4.10

771

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (Small Municipal Agencies)
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
710

.00

57.14

17.72

10.99

ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY (100 =
MAX)

709

.00

100.00

13.49

11.54

FRMLZTION INDX # FRML WRTN
POLICIES'99

710

0

11

8.06

2.24

FNCTNL HETEROGENEITY INDX (ALL
ASGNMNTS)

708

.00

.82

.25

.13

77.44

600.00

171.78

40.33

1

8

1.51

.94

ORGANIZATION HEIGHT - SALARY

DIFF'L
NUMBER OF STATIONS & FIXED
SUBSTATIONS
Valid N (listwise)

675
710
674
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Descriptive Statistics for dependent Variables (Municipal Agencies)
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
718

.00

46.15

22.16

8.46

ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY (100 =
MAX)

718

.00

46.46

6.36

4.59

FRMLZTIONINDX # FRML WRTN
POLICIES'99

719

0

11

9.03

1.74

FNCTNL HETEROGENEITY INDX (ALL
ASGNMNTS)

718

.00

.74

.20

.10

ORGANIZATION HEIGHT - SALARY
DIFF'L

688

86.25

600.00

1

99

NUMBER OF STATIONS & FIXED
SUBSTATIONS
Valid N (listwise)

718
gsg

222.18 51.02
4.59

6.68

Appendix C
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Vertical differentiation for Sheriffs Offices
Model
1

2

3

B

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

99.593
-.150
31.709***
-1.301*
75.339
-.122
28.103***
-.871
70.026***
.704
.109
3.955
96.334
-.133
29.298***
-.854

SE

14.802
.116
2.323
.665
20.333
.113
2.433
.649
11.945
1.088
.210
4.965
22.406
.111
3.112
.656

P
-.053
.622***
-.072*
-.043
.551***
-.048
.200***
.021
.017
.026
-.047
574***
-.047

t
6.728
-1.299
13.650
-1.957
3.705
-1.083
11.552
-1.342
5.862
.647
.517
.797
4.299
-1.194
9.415
-1.303

22.048

13.282

.063

1.660

2.056

1.129

.062

1.821

-.030
1.32
8.521
1.616
-6.845
-3.227*
-.308
.255
•20.133
•19.417**
•36.808***

.212
5.084
10.228
.953
6.784
1.659
.551
.170
14.441
7.061
7.086

-.005
.009
.027
.060
-.045
-.072*
-.017
.059
-.051
-.116**
-.193***

-.144
.260
.833
1.696
-1.009
-1.945
-.559
1.499
-1.394
-2.750
-5.194

Vertical differentiation for small municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index

B
93.837
-.010
25.257***
-.132
88.870
.006
22.934***
-.008
26.703**
-.616
.110
2.210
79.116
-.007
24.608***
-.427

SE
15.619
.125
2.797
.585
16.727
.124
2.982
.584
8.510
.458
.105
2.928
17.806
.123
3.156
.592

Racial Heterogeneity

38.475***

9.978

2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

-.375
.254**
3.314
.694
.482
2.278
1.162
-.476
-.089
12.035*
-7.816
4.089

g

-.002
.404***
-.030

t
6.008
-.082
9.032
-.226
5.313
.052
7.690
-.015
3.138
-1.344
1.054
.755
4.443
-.059
7.798
-.721

.190***

3.856

.478

-.033

-.785

.108
3.121
9.319
.595
3.665
1.287
.372
.090
5.652
5.476
5.964

.097**
.045
.003
.033
.026
.041
-.050
-.053
.140*
-.071
.031

2.359
1.062
.074
.811
.622
.903
-1.281
-.995
2.129
-1.428
.686

-.003
.415***
-.009
.002
377*#*
-.001
.132**
-.054
.042
.030
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Vertical differentiation for municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

B
105.658
-.042
23.866***
-.410
104.876
-.028
22.292***
-.327
19.455*
-.431
-.070
3.541
131.391
-.198
23.422***
-.904

SE
17.161
.148
2.216
.762
19.721
.149
2.446
.774
10.292
.753
.166
3.493
23.289
.149
2.557
.764

-.050
.436***
-.047

t
6.157
-.286
10.769
-.538
5.318
-.191
9.115
-.422
1.890
-.573
-.424
1.014
5.642
-1.332
9.158
-1.183

21.839*

10.728

.091*

2.036

.096

.828

.136
3.787
2.090
.417
.867
-.513
.785
-.277*
6.080
•21.341***
19.298***

.173
3.801
4.924
.747
8.633
1.421
.474
.127
6.319
6.034
5.512

P
-.011
.444***
-.021
-.007
.415***
-.017
.081*
-.024
-.016
.038

.005
.030
.041
.016
.021
.004
-.014
.061
-.112*
.053
-.159***
-.164***

.117
.787
.997
.425
.559
.100
-.361
1.655
-2.180
.962
-3.537
-3.501

Occupational differentiation for Sheriff's Offices
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index

B
-20.733
.526***
7.141***
-.343
-26.708
.524***
7.757***
-.385*
-8.769*
.338
.099
-.345
-32.350
.534***
10.454***
-.240

_SE
4.500
.035
.706
.200
6.097
.035
.760
.201
3.788
.336
.063
1.557
6.864
.036
1.004
.209

Racial Heterogeneity

-5.905

4.318 -.059

2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<001; **p<.01; *p<.05

.152
.048
.210
-7.427*
-.769**
-4.875*
.368
.050
-.105*
-9.400*
1.705
-.049

.360
.065
1.641
3.361
.305
2.206
.535
.177
.055
4.648
2.259
2.271

(3
.665***
.505***
-.068
.662***
.549***
-.077*
-.088*
.036
.056
-.008
.675***
.740***
-.048

.016
.027
.005
-.082*
-.100**
-.113*
.029
.010
-.088*
-.083*
.036
-.001

t
-4.608
14.946
10.109
-1.712
-4.381
14.869
10.203
-1.919
-2.315
1.004
1.578
-.222
-4.713
14.901
10.414
-1.153
-1.367
.422
.741
.128
-2.210
-2.521
-2.210
.688
.287
-1.923
-2.022
.755
-.022

Occupational differentiation for small municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
*=p<.00l;**p<.01;*p<.05

3

B

SE

-1.132
.027
4.738***
.109
-9.064
.028
5.295***
.117
-2.543
-.017
.128***
.825
-6.039
.047
5.329***
.267

4.110
.033 .037
.725 .312***
.154 .030
4.315
.032 .038
.759 .348***
.151 .033
2.207 -.049
.119 -.006
.027
J92***
.762 .044
4:558
.032 .063
.800 .351***
.152 .075

t
-.275
.842
6.534
.706
-2.101
.884
6.972
.773
-1.152
-.144
4.730
1.082
-1.325
1.512
6.662
1.760

-5.924*

2.561

-2.313

-.153
.094***
.281
-.494
-.447**
-.747
.477
-.093
-.094
•5.938***
•3.185*
1.491

-.115*

.123 -.052
.028
.805
2.348
.152
.944
.332
.095
.023
1.456
1.410
1.533

.142***
.015
-.008
-.119**
-.033
.067
-.039
-.022
-.271***
-.114*
.044

-1.240
3.429
.349
-.210
-2.939
-.791
1.437
-.976
-.407
-4.078
-2.259
.973

Occupational differentiation for municipal police agencies
Model
I

2

3

17.875
-.075**
.866*
.287*
10.199
-.063**
.815*
.350**
1.234
-.197
.001
4.267***
14.406
-.004
.665
.380***

SE
3.109
.027
.404
.139
3.430
.026
.427
.135
1.794
.131
.029
.610
3.542
.023
.390
.117

-.006
.074
U3***

t
5.749
-2.826
2.145
2.070
2.973
-2.435
1.907
2.594
.688
-1.503
.038
6.994
4.067
-.177
1.704
3.259

-3.555*

1.636

-.088*

-2.173

B

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
*p<001;**p<.01;*p<.05

-.236
-.061*
1.013
-.227
.234*
3.223**
.031
.011
.001
-8.425***
-3.404***
4.600***

P
-.114**
.096*
.089*
-.095**
.090*
.109**
.031
-.065
.001
272***

.126 -.078
.026
.580
.749
.114
1.301
.216
.072
.019
.964
.912
.841

-.082*
.065
-.010
.070*
.083**
.005
.005
.003
-.439***
-.152***
.232***

-1.872
-2.331
1.747
-.304
2.056
2.477
.144
.153
.073
-8.737
-3.732
5.471

Functional differentiation for Sheriff s Offices
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

3

B
.978
-.005
- 039***
.002
.994
-.005***
-.034***
.002
-.038
.000
.000
-.025
1.062
-.005***
-.040***
.002

SE
.043
.000
.007
.002
.059
.000
.007
.002
.037
.003
.001
.015
.066
.000
.010
.002

-.074

.042

-.073

-1.772

.000

.003

.009

.245

.000
.035*
.018
.004
.039
.012**
.005**
.000
.037
.006
.026

.001
.016
.033
.003
.021
.005
.002
.001
.045
.022
.022

-.713
-.277***
.055
-.718***
-.238***
.052
-.037
-.002
.021
-.059
-.729***
-.283***
.043

.032
-.082*
-.020
.050
.088
-.095**
-.098**
.022
-.033
-.014
.048

t
22.576
-17.009
-5.874
1.469
16.888
-17.063
-4.690
1.362
-1.039
-.056
.634
-1.675
15.976
-16.988
-4.212
1.084

.919
-2.200
-.567
1.331
1.825
-2.383
-3.013
.516
-.839
-.308
1.223

Functional differentiation for small municipal police departments
Model
1

2

3

B

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

SE

0

t
17.622
-8.841
-11.415
-.239
16.109
-8.820
-12.389
.168
4.935
-.653
1.070
1.955
16.189
-8.708
-11.647
.613

.813
-.003***
- 092***
-.001
.783
-.003***
-.106***
.000
.123***
-.001
.001
.017*
.849
-.003***
-.107***
.001

.046
.000
.008
.002
.049
.000
.009
.002
.025
.001
.000
.009
.052
.000
.009
.002

.080**

.029

-.001

.001 -.052

-1.293

.001
.013
.001
.001
.018
.003
.001
.001
.030
.032*
.011

.000
.009
.027
.002
.011
.004
.001
.000
.017
.016
.018

.289
1.444
-.004
.329
-1.639
-.795
-.921
-.146
-1.834
-1.964
-.597

-.358***
-.504***
-.010
-.350***
-.575***
.007
.196***
-.025
.040
.074*
-.346***
-.581***
.025
.128**

.011
.059
.000
.013
-.066
-.035
-.035
-.007
-.116
-.094*
-.026

2.710

Functional differentiation for municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

B

SE

.168
-.001
.011*
-.001
.152
-.001
.008
.001
-.010
.004*
.001
-.013
.202
-.001
.010
.001

.040
.000
.005
.002
.046
.000
.006
.002
.024
.002
.000
.008
.056
.000
.006
.002

-.058
.092
.006

t
4.222
-.869
2.119
-.067
3.336
-.943
1.392
.193
-.386
2.290
1.784
-1.608
3.639
-1.373
1.715
.130

-.001

.026 -.002

-.043

.006**

.002

.152**

2.932

.001*
.010
.016
.001
.017
.001
.001
.001
.002
.008
.028*

.000
.009
.012
.002
.020
.003
.001
.000
.015
.014
.013

.083*
-.048
.058
-.017
-.036
-.004
-.036
-.104
-.010
-.031
-.113*

1.899
-1.040
1.352
-.407
-.862
-.087
-.864
-1.792
-.155
-.608
-2.147

P
-.036
.097*
-.003
-.039
.070
.009
-.018
.104*
.072
-.066

Spatial Differentiation for Sheriff's Offices
Model
1

2

3

SE

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
*p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

-1.524
.006***
.416***
.016**
-1.376
.005***
.420***
.015*
-.196
-.010
-.002
.034
-1.047
.004***
393***
.007

.147
.001 .180***
.023 .752***
.007 084**
.199
.001
177***
.025 758***
.007 .076*
.124 - .050
.011 - .028
.002 - .028
.051 .021
.222
.001 .145***
.033 .710***
.007 .038

-10.399
4.856
18.103
2.531
-6.919
4.769
16.941
2.285
-1.587
-.941
-.962
.675
-4.708
3.873
12.096
1.102

-.081

.140 - .021

-.584

-.026*

.012 - .073*

-2.277

-.001
-.001
.052
.036***
-.056
-.005
.004
-.001
.197
-.054
.259***

.002
.053
.109
.010
.071
.017
.006
.002
.151
.073
.074

- .004
.000
.015
120***
- .033
- .011
.024
- .016
.044
- .029
121***

-.135
-.005
.481
3.658
-.787
-.309
.853
-.417
1.306
-.740
3.519

Spatial differentiation for small municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
**p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

B
-.172
-.009
.156***
.009
-.225
-.001
.120***
.011
.319***
.0041
.001
.021
-.184
-.001
.062
.007

SE
P
.170
.001 -.030
.030 .249***
.006 .062
.181
.001 -.025
.032 .192***
.006 .076
.093 .151***
.005 .034
.001 .011
.032 .028
.194
.001 -.037
.034 .099
.006 .048

.205

.109

t
-1.010
-.680
5.194
1.440
-1.241
-.566
3.764
1.770
3.448
.824
.254
.665
-.949
-.854
1.831
1.089

.097

1.886

-.001

.005 -.002

-.052

.001
.008
.101
1.09**
-.012
.001
.001
.003***
.080
-.029
-.064

.001 .030
.034 .011
.100 .041
.006 .124**
.040 -.014
.014 .003
.004 .006
.001 .211***
.062 .089
.060 -.025
.065 -.046

.694
.256
1.016
2.977
-.311
.071
.144
3.800
1.290
-.485
-.984

Spatial differentiation for municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

B

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

SE

-1.870
.002
.614***
-.023*
-2.113
.002
.551***
-.017
.231
.042***
.003
-.003
-1.798
.001
.510***
-.018

.248
.002
.032
• .011
.280
.002
.035
.011
.146
.011
.002
.050
.337
.002
.037
.011

P
.029
.674***
-.072*
.034
.604***
-.053
.057
.138***
.041
-.002
.013
.560***
-.055

t
-7.546
.897
19.103
-2.114
-7.551
1.081
15.805
-1.558
1.580
3.972
1.316
-.071
-5.335
.406
13.746
-1.627

.090

.156

.022

.575

.028*

.012

.091*

2.335

.001
.068
.117
.018
.093
.008
.017**
.004*
.159
.012
.034

.002
.055
.071
.011
.124
.021
.007
.002
.092
.087
.080

.016
-.043
.053
.054
-.024
-.014
.081**
.091*
-.008
-.056
-.017

.477
-1.233
1.637
1.701
-.755
-.409
2.577
2.060
-.174
-1.468
-.425

Administrative intensity of Sheriff's Offices
Model
1

2

3

B

SE

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index

4.619
-.007***
-.341***
-.008
4.384
-.007***
-.302***
-.008
-.220
.002
.006**
-.164**
4.372
-.007***
-.292***
-.010

.182
.001
.029
.008
.245
.001
.031
.008
.153
.014
.003
.063
.281
.001
.041
.009

Racial Heterogeneity

-.161

.177 -.040

-.910

.015

1.011

2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

.014
.006**
-.164**
-.125
-.004
-.021
.012
-.013
.001
-.090
.036
.088

.003
.067
.138
.012
.090
.022
.007
.002
.190
.093
.093

3
- 230***
-.598***
-.040
-.234***
-.530***
-.042
-.055
.058
.087**
-.097**
-.236***
- 512***
-.051

.040
.088**
-.097**
-.034
-.001
-.012
.023
-.062
.017
-.020
.019
.040

t
25.373
-5.149
-11.928
-.990
17.856
-5.256
-9.880
-1.038
-1.444
1.600
2.440
-2.617
15.551
-5.127
-7.097
-1.202

2.378
-2.438
-.909
-.032
-.239
.537
-1.762
.368
-.472
.391
.950

Administrative intensity of small municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
*p<.001;**p<.01;*p<05

B

SE

4.705
-.010***
-.457***
.002
4.527
-.010***
-.486***
.004
.258*
-.002
.002
.071
4.688
-.010***
-.496***
.009

.217
.002
.038
.008
.231
.002
.041
.008
.118
.006
.001
.041
.250
.002
.044
.008

3
-.235***
-.530***
.012
-.231***
-.563***
.022
.088*
-.009
.052
.067
-.219***
-.575***
.042

t
21.729
-5.789
-11.966
.309
19.558
-5.718
-11.925
.547
2.182
-.243
1.370
1.741
18.760
-5.399
-11.310
1.030

.120

.140

.041

.857

-.007

.007 -.044

-1.071

.002
.044
.129
.008
.052
.018
.005
.001
.080
.077
.084

.711
1.336
.794
-1.233
-1.564
.995
-.831
.056
-2.157
-1.776
.037

.001
.059
.102
.010
.081
.018
.004
.001
.172*
.137
.003

.028
.056
.030
-.048
-.064
.044
-.032
.003
-.139*
-.086
.002

Administrative intensity of municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index

B

SE

2.146
.001
-.079**
.004
1.994
.001
-.106***
.007
.137
.011
.002
.020
2.244
.002
-.088**
.008

.196
.002 .031
.025 -.142**
.009 .019
.226
.002 .034
.028 -.188***
.009 .035
.118 .055
.009 .057
.002 .048
.040 .021
.275
.002 .043
.030 -.158**
.009 .042

3

t

10.932
.747
-3.120
.440
8.839
.820
-3.766
.803
1.164
1.251
1.192
.502
8.162
1.017
-2.923
.924

Racial Heterogeneity

.178

.127

.071

1.398

2000 Unemployment Rate

.016

.010

.088

1.694

.002
.045
.058
.009
.101
.017
.006
.002
.075
.071
.065

.045
-.017
.040
-.013
-.086*
.047
.015
-.108
-.078
-.015
.034

1.033
-.364
.933
-.299
-2.064
1.055
.365
-1.847
-1.248
-.288
.649

Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

.021
-.016
.054
-.003
-.208*
.017
.002
-.003
-.093
-.020
.04234

Formalization of Sheriff s Offices
Model
1

2

3

B

SE

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index

5.160
.002
.306***
.109***
5.086
.002
337***
.104***
-.289
-.064
.008
.051
6.351
-.001
.158
.078**

.608
.005 .023
.096 .177***
.027 .178***
.826
.005 .016
295***
.103
.027 .170***
.513 -.024
.046 -.057
.009 .038
.211 .010
.930
.005 -.014
.136 .092
.028 .128**

8.483
.477
3.209
4.026
6.156
.324
3.267
3.826
-.564
-1.426
.962
.244
6.829
-.277
1.165
2.768

Racial Heterogeneity

-.603

.585 -.049

-1.030

2000 Unemployment Rate

-.050

.049 -.044

-1.025

.003
-.046
-.093
.148***
.200
.074
.060**
.002
-.661
-.205
-.615*

.009
.222
.455
.041
.299
.073
.024
.007
.630
.306
.308

Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

3

.016
-.009
-.008
.158***
.038
.047
.095**
.018
-.048
-.036
-.093*

t

.389
-.207
-.205
3.586
.671
1.018
2.478
.353
-1.049
-.669
-1.999

Formalization of small municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index

B
6.387
.007
.329*
.013
6.175
.007
.375*
.012
-.668
.019
.001
7.009
7.059
.005
.351*
-.033

SE
P
.849
.007 .047
.150 .110*
.032 .019
.913
.007 .044
.161 .125*
.032 .017
.467 -.066
.025 .033
.006 .003
.161 .019
.946
.007 .034
.166 .117*
.031 -.047

t
7.526
1.025
2.197
.425
6.766
.968
2.334
.383
-1.430
.755
.069
.440
7.465
.773
2.112
-1.042

Racial Heterogeneity

.080

.531

.008

.149

2000 Unemployment Rate

.033

.026

.058

1.300

Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
•
West Region
***p<001; **p<.01; *p<.05

.001
.058
1.037*
.216***
-.048
.050
-.025
-.008
.284
.582*
.389

.006 .002
.167 .016
.487 .087*
.032 292***
.196 -.011
.069 .036
.020 -.053
.005 -.089
.302 .066
.292 .105*
.318 .058

.054
.346
2.129
6.851
-.248
.731
-1.284
-1.575
.939
1.992
1.224

Formalization of municipal police agencies
Model
1

2

3

Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income
Population Change
Intercept
Law Enforcement Oriented
Organization Size (In)
Task scope Index
Racial Heterogeneity
2000 Unemployment Rate
Change in Median Household Income

Population Change
CALEA Accreditation
COP Index Score
URBAN PRESENCE
Union Influence
Funding (In)
1996-1999 Index Crime Rate
NE Region
Midwest region
West Region
*p<001; **p<01; *p<05

SE
P
.628
.005 .016
170***
.081
.028 .133**
.721
.005 .021
.090 .158***
i^e***
.028
.377 .022
.028 -.017
.006 .036
.128 .078*
.855
.005 .005
.094 .115*
.028 .120**

t
9.354
.404
3.828
3.118
7.238
.513
3.234
3.353
.476
-.376
.917
1.942
7.138
.132
2.250
2.810

•.02309

.395 -.003

-.058

.010

.030 -.016

-.335

.005
-.014
.567**
.135***
-.217
.020
.01689
.001
.064
-.187
341

.006 .031
.140 -.004
.181 .127**
198***
.027
.314 -.027
.052 .016
.017 .038
.005 .007
.233 .016
.220 -.041
.203 .084

.742
-.100
3.137
4.918
-.689
.387
.968
.135
.274
-.851
1.682

B
5.870
.002
.312***
.087**
5.216
.002
.290***
.095***
.179
-.010
.005
.249*
6.103
.001
.212*
.079**

